PERSPECTIVE ON IRAQ : Keep the Door Closed on Saddam Hussein : France tilts toward lifting sanctions, a mistake that won’t ‘rehabilitate’ him or help the suffering Iraqis.

Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s veteran trouble-shooter and ambassador of charm, is once more on the offensive. Last week in France, he scored a significant success, being received by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe in Paris. The result: the first breach in the Western diplomatic dike designed to contain Saddam Hussein’s errant regime.

Aziz’s achievement in France is the most significant in a series of developments during the past several months, all aiming toward ending Iraq’s international isolation and gaining Hussein’s rehabilitation. Earlier events included urging by the Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, to lift sanctions against Iraq and let it gradually rejoin the international community. And a Western ally, Turkey, has been re-evaluating its own policy toward its misbehaving Eastern neighbor. This was especially true during the brief period when Mumtaz Soysal, a champion of improved Turkish relations with Arab states and especially with Iraq, directed Ankara’s diplomacy.

Indeed, of all the countries that took part in the 1991 war against Iraq, Turkey has had the most valid reasons to want to mend fences with Baghdad. Turkey has suffered significant financial losses because of the continued closure of the pipeline that carries oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War has exacerbated Turkey’s Kurdish problem. Yet when the crunch came, the Turkish Parliament again agreed to extend the use of Turkish bases for Operation Provide Comfort, the U.N.-mandated and U.S.-led relief effort in northern Iraq.

Russia’s championing of Iraq’s cause was prompted by its desire to show that it is still a major player in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East generally. It also has wanted to revive old links that Iraq had with the Soviet Union. While potentially at variance with Western interests, these motives at least have a certain coherent logic.

French policy proceeds from different motives. For example, throughout the 1970s and ‘80s, France invested heavily in Iraq as an important economic and political foothold in the gulf. As a result, Iraq still owes France large sums for military and other equipment, and it is natural that Paris should want to recover these sums. It is also true that France, like most other countries, feels sympathy for the suffering of the Iraqi people. But perhaps an even more important reason for Paris’ new willingness to break ranks and take the first steps toward diplomatic relations with Baghdad is the French view that Hussein’s Iraq could be a barrier against Islamic radicalism, which at the moment is France’s most serious preoccupation.

No doubt, Islamic radicalism is a major threat to peace and stability, and it should be countered through a judicious mix of policy instruments. It is doubtful, however, that rehabilitating Saddam Hussein is a necessary or even effective ingredient of such a mix. It should be remembered that, during the Persian Gulf War, Hussein manipulated Islamic sentiments and radical rhetoric in his efforts to appeal to the Arab masses. For example, broadcasts by Baghdad radio and television began and ended with “Allahu akbar” (God is great), a battle cry of the Islamists. During that period, broadcasts from Baghdad also sounded more like the speeches of the Ayatollah Khomeini than the usual Baathist Arab nationalist propaganda. In response, the Islamists in the Arab world rallied to Baghdad’s call. In the future as well, if a revitalized and rehabilitated Saddam Hussein judges that recourse to militant Islamic rhetoric would help advance his ambitions, he would not hesitate to do so.

When the Iran-Iraq War was raging during the 1980s, Hussein fooled the world into believing that he had become a convert to democracy and even a supporter of Israel. Expectations based on those pretensions suffered a heavy letdown. He should not be allowed to repeat that feat, this time presenting himself as a bulwark against Islamic radicalism.

Something surely must be done for those innocent Iraqis who are paying the price of Saddam Hussein’s follies and ambitions. Indeed, there are already provisions allowing the sale of Iraqi oil for food and medicine and other necessities, should Hussein be prepared to help his people. Yet the Iraqis who are suffering are not the ones who are still supporting Saddam Hussein. Those loyal to him and his repressive policies are relatively well taken care of. Rather, the suffering is concentrated among the Iraqi Shias and the so-called marsh Arabs in the country’s south, against whom Hussein has been conducting a near-genocidal campaign. There is little reason to believe that easing sanctions would improve their lot in the absence of more vigorous international efforts to protect them, as has been done for the Iraqi Kurds.

At this time following the Cold War, when the West is trying to promote greater respect for at least the most basic of human rights, the right to life, and is critical of Russia for its behavior in Chechnya, it would be unseemly to bestow international legitimacy on a regime that has gassed some of its own citizens and has launched a campaign of extermination against others. Equally, in view of Saddam Hussein’s track record, such an act would be proof of unpardonable naivete on the part of the international community. The dictator knows what he must do to get Iraq back into the world’s good graces, and he should be held to that standard.