RUSSIA : Grozny May Be Graveyard of a Democratic Russia

As images of the wanton destruction of Grozny flickered across TV screens this past week, even the most optimistic observer of the Russian scene must have felt a sense of dark foreboding.

Whether Russia’s heady experiment with democracy and market reforms will suffer only a temporary setback, or a serious reversal, as a result of the Chechnya debacle cannot be predicted. There is little doubt, however, that the Yeltsin era in Russia’s post-communist history and, with it, the ardent belief that Russia would quickly embrace democracy and the market and join the community of free nations are coming to an end.

Nothing testifies more eloquently that events have come full circle since Boris N. Yeltsin’s resounding victory over the communist die-hards in August, 1991, than his government’s actions in Grozny. Not only was the unprovoked assault on Grozny and its mixed Chechen-Russian population of great ferocity, but it also was accompanied by a flood of Kremlin propaganda and disinformation, eerily reminiscent of past Soviet practice.

The intervention, it was first said, was a limited action to prevent bloodshed among warring Chechen factions and to protect the ethnic Russian population. In a classic example of Orwellian doublespeak, erstwhile democrat and Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev assured foreign correspondents that the intervention was “to protect human rights.”

In yet another remarkable irony, perhaps the most influential adviser to Yeltsin’s administration on Chechen affairs, is the former Communist Party boss of Chechnya, Doku Zavgeev. He supported the 1993 coup attempt against Yeltsin and, as a result, was overthrown by pro-Yeltsin Chechens, led by current Kremlin bete noire Dzhokar M. Dudayev.

For external consumption, the Kremlin has cultivated the fiction, eagerly bought by Washington and the West, that Chechen actions endangered Russia’s territorial integrity and, besides, it was an internal matter of no concern to anyone else. On the first point, it is difficult to see how a tiny, landlocked region, dependent on Russia both economically and for access to the world, could offer much of a threat. Indeed, for three years following the Chechen declaration of independence, in October, 1991, nobody in Moscow seemed unduly disturbed.

On the second point, this century’s bloody history has taught us a murderous assault by a government against its own people cannot be a purely internal matter, if we are to remain a community of civilized nations. Chechnya’s tragedy should be of no lesser concern to us than the Tian An Men Square massacre or ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

What, then, are the implications of the Kremlin’s grievous miscalculations? On the ground in Chechnya, there is no doubt that Moscow will be able to achieve its aim of crushing Dudayev’s forces. But it will be a hollow victory. Yeltsin’s incredibly inept policies have managed to achieve what would have been considered impossible a month ago--salvage Dudayev’s flagging political fortunes and unite the fractious Chechen clans on an anti-Russian platform.

At the very least, Moscow would have to occupy the country to impose its will through Chechen puppet administrators. This is an untenable position. It could also, of course, be much worse--a nasty guerrilla war is possible. The Chechens are a warrior people whose history is replete with seemingly hopeless struggles against the Russians.

Troublesome as these prospects are, the repercussions for Russia’s own political fortunes are far more daunting. The Kremlin’s policies in Chechnya have sealed the irreparable break between Yeltsin and his democratic constituency. Democratic members of his own administration, such as the chairman of the presidential commission on human rights, Sergei Kovalyov, have called Moscow’s actions “criminal” and parted ways with the president. Not surprisingly, the only people who have publicly supported the administration’s policies are Yeltsin’s sworn enemies on the chauvinist, national bolshevik and neo-fascist fringe.

In short, Yeltsin has never been more isolated and less popular among the political elite and the population. Even if he manages to survive until the next scheduled elections, in June, 1996, his prospects of becoming a credible candidate again must be considered negligible.

Yet, with Russia turning inward and becoming more anti-Western and parochial, the next leader will almost certainly be even less congenial to political pluralism and genuine market reform. This is not to say the country will again become totalitarian or militantly nationalistic. But the chances that Russia, at least in the short term, could turn to a quasi-democratic, quasi-market political order--a kind of oversized banana republic with nuclear arms--can no longer be dismissed as preposterous.

There are further serious economic implications to this tragic conflict. Over the past year, Russia has become both a favored recipient of international financial aid and increasingly dependent on it. Under pressure from the Clinton Administration, the International Monetary Fund committed itself to providing huge sums of money to Moscow. Roughly 30% of Russia’s budget deficit this year was to be covered by more than $6 billion of IMF loans. But events in Grozny will make this politically difficult if not impossible.

Even without factoring in the huge cost of the military operation, the failure to receive the IMF aid could put Russia’s fragile economy into a tail spin. Nor is Chechnya going to encourage needed foreign investment in Russia, or Russian flight capital to come back. Clobbered by the twin blows of the Grozny events and the emerging markets meltdown, following the peso devaluation, Russia’s foreign debt paper has lost more than 30% of its value in the past week alone.

Finally, the bloodshed in Grozny cannot but have a chilling effect on Russia’s relations with the West. Already various pending agreements with the European Union have been put on hold and some have started calling for economic sanctions. Re-evaluation of the relationship will be hardest in Washington, where the Clinton Administration made aid to Yeltsin a top priority and proclaimed its Russian policy a seminal achievement.

Given so much vested political capital, it is not surprising that for nearly a month after the intervention began, the Administration refused to acknowledge, let alone condemn what was going on. Until a few days ago, even as the Europeans expressed outrage, Vice President Al Gore talked in platitudes about the need to preserve Russia’s territorial integrity.

Is it possible to find a silver lining on Russia’s gloomy horizon? As always, the picture is not uniformly dark. Opinion surveys have shown that, perhaps for the first time in modern history, the vast majority of the Russian people strongly condemn their government’s actions. Generals and soldiers alike refused to carry out orders to shoot at civilians, while TV and the print media bravely reported the truth to the people, despite tremendous pressure from the Kremlin.

These positive signs show times have indeed changed--and a return to the dark past is no longer an option. Still, one fears, Russia is again headed for a time of troubles.