The World : DIPLOMACY : Rallying the Nonaligned States Against the Real Nuclear Threat

Nuclear danger has a new image. Instead of the mushroom cloud, picture the back seat of a nondescript sedan, seized by the Prague police in December. Lying on the seat were two metal canisters the size of large Thermos-type bottles, containing fissionable material. The sedan was headed for the black market before being impounded.

This new image of proliferation makes the outcome of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty extension conference profoundly important. The conference opens Monday at the United Nations, where more than 170 states must decide on the treaty’s future. There are three choices: indefinite extension, extension by a fixed period, or periods.

The Clinton Administration is pulling out all stops to secure an indefinite extension. But the outcome will be determined by the nations of the “nonaligned movement.” Extension will be decided by majority vote and is not subject to a Security Council veto.

The indefinite extension of the treaty is necessary, but not sufficient, to combat nuclear proliferation in the period ahead. After all, the treaty and its implementation arm, the International Atomic Energy Agency, weren’t effective in dealing with Iraq’s and North Korea’s covert nuclear programs. The treaty clearly needs to be strengthened to deal with rogue states, seepage from the former Soviet Union and the troubling global accumulation of weapons-grade fissionable material for “peaceful” purposes.

A divisive conference that endorses indefinite extension by a small majority will not facilitate the collective action needed to combat nuclear danger. The Administration’s task is to build an overwhelming consensus for the treaty’s indefinite extension and for essential strengthening measures--such as tougher inspections of nuclear facilities. Its biggest obstacle to building this consensus is outmoded dogma.

Not wishing to give the nuclear-weapon states the “blank check” of indefinite extension, states aspiring to leadership of the nonaligned movement, including Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Egypt, have suggested imposing conditions on the treaty’s renewal. They oppose the treaty’s division between nuclear “haves” and “have nots” and insist that the exclusive club of nuclear powers fulfill the treaty obligation to denuclearize.

The position of South Africa will be crucial. To foster a consensus vote, Pretoria has contemplated a series of rolling, 25-year extensions--unless a majority of the parties vote otherwise. But South Africa has been under heavy pressure from the United States, Russia, France and Britain to endorse indefinite, unconditional extension.

The Administration believes it already has a majority to engineer this result, and hopes for a bandwagon effect in New York, facilitated by the nonaligned movement’s inability to coalesce behind an alternative position.

The case for the treaty’s indefinite extension has certainly become stronger. Superpower nuclear arsenals are being dismantled at record rates, and the treaty’s success stories are obvious on every continent. Many holdouts have recently come on board--with South Africa, Argentina, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine leading the way. The treaty facilitated international efforts when Iraq and North Korea disregarded their obligations. Only Israel, Pakistan, and India remain major holdouts.

With the arms race over, the chief proliferation threats come from nuclear smuggling and rogue states. Nonetheless, nonaligned dogma remains stuck in a time warp, repeating shop-worn arguments about nuclear threats from the Security Council’s five permanent members. In this view, the treaty is a gift of the nonaligned to the nuclear-weapon states.

Nonaligned dogma retains currency because the Perm Five’s nuclear theologians cling to weapons they dare not use against the weak and cannot use against each other. China champions a five-power agreement pledging “no first use” but broadcasts a different message by continuing its solitary pursuit of underground testing. Britain, France and China balk at completing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. France appears unwilling to stop producing fissile material for bombs. The Pentagon is unconvinced that it can do with much fewer than 3,500 deployed nuclear warheads, fearing reversals in Russia. The Kremlin fears losing its last “great power” card.

The nonproliferation treaty’s division between nuclear “haves” and “have nots” is reconciled by the treaty’s ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. But leaders of France, Britain and the United States have difficulty vocalizing this treaty obligation. In December, when Japan offered a unanimously approved U.N. resolution reaffirming the treaty’s ultimate objective, these three states abstained, along with Cuba, North Korea, India, Israel and Brazil.

Nuclear theologians and nonaligned dogmatists appear stuck in the same time warp. This odd coupling constitutes the biggest threat to the treaty’s permanent extension. It would be ironic if the security of nonaligned states were impaired by successfully imposing conditions and linkages to the treaty.

Short extensions of the treaty will surely encourage states to hedge their bets against a more uncertain future--inviting new, covert adherents to the nuclear club. The shorter the extension, the greater the likelihood of short-circuiting nuclear-arms reductions among the Perm Five. Timetables for reductions impose added burdens on the treaty.

A weakened treaty would be especially harmful to small states in tension-filled regions prone to proliferation. The treaty has stigmatized the acquisition of nuclear weapons by new nations and facilitated collective action against rogue states that threaten international peace. Moreover, without the treaty, there would be no obligation on nuclear-weapon states to eliminate their stockpiles, and heightened concerns that civilian nuclear power plants will turn plowshares into swords.

Given these circumstances, a resounding endorsement of the treaty’s indefinite extension is possible, but not assured. One way to achieve this is for the parties to spell out what they will do to reform and strengthen the current non-proliferation regime. The conference’s final report offers an ideal opportunity for the nuclear “haves” and “have nots” to reaffirm their obligations--including deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, effective controls on fissionable materials and stronger export controls and inspection procedures.

A compact forged in New York outlining the mutual obligations of the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members and the nonaligned movement can pave the way for an overwhelming majority vote for indefinite extension and strengthening measures for tomorrow’s challenges.*