THE WORLD : CHINA : Is U.S. Playing the Taiwan Card by Granting Its President a Visa?

The U.S.-China relationship has bumped into another rock. This time, the trouble is not copyright laws, arms sales, even human rights. It is Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s planned visit to the United States this week. The White House insists that granting Lee a visa does not represent a shift from its longstanding one-China policy, because his trip is “private”--he will be attending an alumni event at Cornell University. But the very fact that Lee is the first Taiwan leader to visit since Washington established diplomatic relations with Beijing conveys a degree of official recognition to the de facto island state. For this reason, Beijing has accused the Administration of perfidy and warned that Washington will “pay the price.”

Why should the White House care so much about Taiwan that it would risk unraveling U.S.-China relations? The Administration claims that Lee is welcome because America “treasures the rights of freedom of travel and believe others should enjoy these privileges as well.” But it would be naive to believe that the visa decision is truly based on moral considerations. For one thing, morality rarely motivates the United States in international affairs. Rather, it is self-interest, whether enlightened or ill-calculated, that determines its agenda.

Strong pressure from Congress has undoubtedly played an important role in bringing Lee to the United States. The House voted 396-0, the Senate 97-1, for resolutions urging the Administration to let the Taiwan leader in. Given that congressional Republicans want to slash favored Democratic programs and foreign aid, which would seriously erode Washington’s global influence, the Administration may feel it has to accommodate Congress on the Taiwan issue to win support on more urgent budget proposals.

More significant, the Taiwan leader’s visit indicates that Washington has begun to adjust its overall China policy to the emerging post-Deng era. While there is a long list of items on the China agenda, from Beijing’s missile exports to its assertiveness in the South China Sea and persecution of political dissidents, the United States has failed to achieve much progress through normal dialogues with Chinese leaders. Accordingly, the Administration may feel that it has to find a new solution to old problems.

Bringing Taiwan into the game appears a more effective way to put pressure on China. Unlike the ambiguity and contradiction inherent in a policy such as economic sanctions, upgrading relations with Taiwan would not only avoid damaging U.S. business interests; it would also promote American exports to Taiwan, one of America’s largest trading partners. Reports indicate that the Taiwan leader may bring with him a long shopping list that includes such items as Alaska oil and nuclear-power stations.

The Lee visit may have another positive result--it could open up additional channels to influence post-Deng Chinese politics. The fact that Taiwan is viewed by Beijing as a renegade province makes Lee’s trip highly symbolic. Currently, the power struggle in China to succeed Deng Xiaoping, on display in the thinly veiled “war on corruption” at the top level, has entered a volatile stage. Washington may want to use the Taiwan leader’s visit to send a signal: The United States may choose to deal with regional bosses, rather than the central leadership, if the situation in China after Deng’s death gets out of control. Even the timing of Lee’s visa is significant: Since his trip coincides with the sixth anniversary of the Tian An Men crackdown, Lee, who is credited with promoting democracy in Taiwan, can be seen as an expression of Washington’s continuing criticism of Beijing’s political repression.

Lee’s visit certainly has hit a sensitive nerve in China. Beijing has fired a barrage of hostile pronouncements, canceled high-level official trips to the United States and threatened further retaliations. The shrillness of the response should not be surprising: Few Chinese leaders want to be perceived as weak on an issue involving China’s sovereignty. In a country that has a long history of humiliation at the hands of Western powers, nationalism on sovereignty still remains an effective means to unite the 1.2 billion Chinese and hold together the crumbling communist empire. The reunification of Taiwan is one of the few issues on which post-Deng Chinese leaders, hard-liners and liberal, may agree.

Incidentally, Lee’s trip coincides with the 100th anniversary of the first Sino-Japanese War--the origin of the Taiwan problem. It was in the Shimonoseki Treaty, which ended the war in the spring of 1895, that the declining Manchu Dynasty was forced to cede the island to Japan. Since then, Taiwan has been “lost” from China, ruled successively by Japan and the Nationalist government that fled the mainland in 1949. To mark the anniversary, a group of 100 Taiwanese politicians organized, in April, a “Shimonoseki Tour.” Their action, seen as evidence of an anti-China conspiracy, was strongly condemned by Chinese leaders.

In Lee’s case, his purported pro-Japanese sentiment must surely add fuel to Beijing’s anger. In an interview with a visiting Japanese writer not long ago, the Taiwan president expressed nostalgia for growing up in colonial Taiwan as a “Japanese citizen.”

So far, it is unclear what further actions China might take. But one thing is certain: The two-decade long U.S.-China relationship is on the chopping block. Beijing can choose a wide range of areas to retaliate, from exporting missiles to the Middle East to siding with North Korea in its quest to develop nuclear weapons. If the visa tempest escalates into a real U.S.-China confrontation, the result could be disastrous. It would tip the balance of power in Asia and may even lead to new allegiances among nations in the post-Cold War international community.

Since much more is at stake than the Lee visit, Washington needs to be cautious in playing the Taiwan game. It may help reduce the tension if the White House reassures Beijing that, despite upgrading relations with Taiwan, the Administration will continue to support China’s most-favored-nation status and its bid to join the World Trade Organization.

Washington should also let it be known to the post-Deng Chinese leaders that it is time to modify their rigid and obsolete stance on the Taiwan issue. The U.S.-China agreement that bans official relations with Taiwan was reached two decades ago in an entirely different context. In the post-Cold War era, Taiwan’s gain is no longer Beijing’s loss. A confident and stable Taiwan may serve Beijing’s long-term interest, because it can help frustrate the anti-Chinese radicals on the island who seek full independence. On the other hand, to deny Taiwan a role in the international community would only push the island to look for a potential patron for protection.

The Administration’s delinking of trade and human rights has produced little improvement in U.S.-China relations. Whether the Taiwan card is a prudent policy that can yield better results, or an inappropriate move that may lead to a showdown, remains unknown. But at least for the time being, the U.S.-China relationship appears to have entered a phase of uncertainty.