PERSPECTIVE ON MEXICO : Spare Salinas to Spare the Nation? : The institutions of government may be too weak to sustain the shock of holding an ex-president accountable.

In politics, dead-ends are scarce; rarely do situations emerge with only one available avenue of escape. Governments, political personalities and parties generally keep a range of options in mind to avoid being painted into a corner. A remarkable exception to this rule seems to be occurring in Mexico, as the administration of President Ernesto Zedillo finds itself in a dilemma that either has no exit or allows for only one way out at prohibitive cost.

The evidence emerging from the investigations into the murders of Luis Donaldo Colosio (last year’s initial government-party candidate for the presidency) and Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu (the party’s secretary-general and former brother-in-law of ex-President Carlos Salinas de Gortari) point in the most excruciating direction.

On the Colosio front, the evidence, largely originating in a series of videotapes of the assassination and eye-witness accounts, suggests that the candidate’s security detail was part of the conspiracy. One suspect was arrested, and another accused of being the second gunman was photographed leaving the scene of the shooting in the company of Gen. Domiro Garcia Reyes, the deputy chief of the presidential military staff and head of Colosio’s security team. The general has denied ever having met the second gunman before driving off with him. But strong suspicion persists. Garcia Reyes took orders only from two individuals: the president and his chief of staff (and alter ego), Jose Cordoba. Neither of the two has been questioned. It is virtually impossible to believe that if there was a conspiracy, one or both of them had no knowledge of it.

The Ruiz Massieu affair is even more convoluted. Salinas’ brother Raul has been formally charged with master-minding the murder. Although the evidence presented against him so far has not persuaded everyone, the government clearly has a case and will prosecute him to the full extent of the law. The problem is that Salinas put the investigation of Ruiz Massieu’s assassination into the hands of Mario Ruiz Massieu, the victim’s brother. He is now in jail in New Jersey, in the process of being extradited to Mexico to face charges of embezzlement and covering up Raul Salinas’ involvement in the murder of his brother.

If this sounds complicated, it is, and it gets worse.

Mario Ruiz Massieu has said that he reported everything to Carlos Salinas, including all references to Raul Salinas’ participation, and that the president ordered him to cover up the investigation--not an unreasonable charge.

The Ruiz Massieu situation is similar to that prevailing with the Colosio case: If one is to be believe that Raul Salinas had Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu murdered, and that Mario Ruiz Massieu orchestrated a cover-up, it is impossible to believe that Carlos Salinas did not know about it or was not part of it. Once again, all arrows point the wrong way: toward the former president, who may well be on the verge of being called in for questioning, if not directly indicted.

So? If Salinas did all these nasty things, shouldn’t he be charged, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced? In Mexico, where nothing is ever simple or clear, the answer has to be: not necessarily. The ex-president has already been tried in the court of public opinion and found guilty. He is the most discredited former leader in the country’s contemporary history, having presided over the explosion of the drug-trade as well as the most blatant corruption since the 1940s, and he provoked the worst economic collapse in memory. But it is one thing to hold Carlos Salinas responsible; it is quite another to move against the most important institution--some would say the only true institution--in Mexico without having anything to put in its place.

Until today, the Mexican political system has functioned because (among other reasons) outgoing chief executives have been pardoned ex officio for all their sins, real or perceived. That system does not work anymore, but nothing resembling a system of accountability is anywhere near to being installed in its place.

Whatever Salinas is to Mexicans, he remains a symbol of modernity and business-oriented governance in the eyes of the United States and other markets. He is the father of NAFTA and the emerging Latin American free trade--what might be called Reaganomics in the tropics. While no one on Wall Street will go to the mat for the Harvard-bred whiz-kid, throwing him in jail on justified or semi-trumped-up charges will not wash well with investors, corporations or pundits in New York and Washington. Nor will it work wonders for Mexico’s capacity to receive new, voluntary lending to finance its indefinitely postponed development. In fact, putting Salinas behind bars could be his successor’s undoing, even if it turns out to be the most obvious move, ethically and politically, for Ernesto Zedillo.

The operative principle here is what the French call raison d’etat: choosing a course of action that serves the interests of the nation’s institutions first. Mexico’s institutions, lashed by economic crisis, drug-trafficking and a dysfunctional political system, are falling apart. There is nothing in their place.

Saving Salinas to save Mexico is a lousy idea; going after him, however guilty he may be, is almost as bad.

Mexico has been painted into a corner.