A U.S. Victory for the Record Books : Pacific war: A naval veteran corrects the facts on the Coral Sea battle in World War II.

James Michener’s heartfelt plea on this page July 4 to honor the anniversaries of U.S. Pacific victories in the greatest sea war ever fought is right on. He is entirely correct that the World War II naval battles in the Pacific were “of universal significance and changed the face of history.” Unfortunately, in his passion, he included some erroneous history.

The Battle of the Coral Sea was, as Michener correctly notes, a tactical standoff--but it was a strategic victory for the United States because it kept our lifeline to the South Pacific intact and gave substantial reassurance to our Australian and New Zealand allies. It was, however, the carrier Lexington that was so badly damaged by the Japanese that it had to be sunk by an American destroyer; the Yorktown suffered moderate damage, but round-the-clock repairs at Pearl Harbor got it back in time for the Battle of Midway the following month.

The Japanese lost not the carrier Shokaku at Coral Sea, as Michener reports, but rather the much smaller Shoho. More important, however, damage to the larger Shokaku and to the air group of the carrier Zuikaku kept them out of the coming Battle of Midway--beyond doubt the most significant naval battle of World War II.

The odds at Midway favored the Japanese, even with the accurate knowledge of Japanese plans provided by U.S. code breaking. The odds were not, however, as bad as Michener reports. Adm. Chester W. Nimitz had three carriers for the battle: the Yorktown, the Enterprise and the Hornet. The Japanese battle group included four carriers: Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga and Soryu.

There was no victorious first day in which the Japanese won every encounter. Japanese aircraft first struck Midway Island on June 4, the same day American carrier planes hit all four Japanese carriers and put them out of action. The dive bombers from the American carriers got in the first punch, catching the Japanese carriers with their returning aircraft refueling and rearming on deck. Planes from Hiryu later successfully attacked the Yorktown, which a Japanese submarine sank the next day. The U.S. Navy lost one carrier and the Japanese four.

All these losses were inflicted by carrier-based aircraft. Land-based Navy and Army air forces aircraft were ineffective, although on June 5 land-based Marine dive bombers sank the cruisers Mikuma and damaged the cruiser Mogami. The Japanese troop transports were never attacked by the American planes because they did not come within range.

The battle of Leyte Gulf was far too complex to recount in any detail here, but Adm. William F. (Bull) Halsey did not run north after “a ghost Japanese force”--he went after a very real force of ships sent to decoy him.

Michener concentrates on a portion of the engagement known as the Battle of Samar, where the small escort carriers commanded by Rear Adm. Clifton Sprague and organized in task forces--not squadrons--performed heroically against Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s powerful force of battleships, cruisers and destroyers.

Sprague’s screening force, consisting of only three destroyers and four destroyer escorts, was brutally overmatched by Kurita’s battle line, but, ordered to attack, they threw the Japanese into confusion and disabled at least one cruiser. The distinguished naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison described the action as among the most gallant in U.S. Navy history.

The attack by the “small boys” and the constant harassment by escort carrier aircraft were in large measure responsible for Kurita’s decision to turn back before reaching the almost defenseless U.S. amphibious forces.

James Michener is one of our finest authors, and his call to honor our great victories in the Pacific is timely and important. The historical errors concerning long-ago battles that crept into his essay undoubtedly stem from the passion of his cause. Yet it is important that our history be not only celebrated, but accurately preserved.