NEWS ANALYSIS : Will Is Key if Allies’ Plan to Succeed : Bosnia: Resolve in the face of public criticism is necessary, experts contend. But they say the new policy is workable.

The Western allies’ plan for using air strikes to defend the Bosnian “safe area” of Gorazde has a good chance of achieving its military objective provided the allies can maintain the political will to carry it out, defense analysts here said Friday.

The plan is sufficient to protect the mostly Muslim enclave--and could have been put into effect long ago, they argued.

But at U.N. headquarters in New York, the plan met with skepticism. In the past, U.N. officials and diplomats have been infuriated by Clinton Administration demands for North Atlantic Treaty Organization air strikes without any contingency plans for the Bosnian Serb retaliations that have followed. In their view, the current American scheme sounds like more of the same.

“Nobody in the United States is prepared to answer what happens next,” one analyst at the United Nations said. “The strategy begins and ends with the bombs.”

U.S. and allied strategists cautioned that NATO forces almost certainly would suffer some casualties in the air strikes, especially in the first days before the Bosnian Serbs become convinced the allied effort is serious.

“There’s a risk here that the Serbs may take more U.N. hostages, but, frankly, if we’re going to get serious about this, this is the route to go,” said Bernard E. Trainor, a former Marine Corps general now at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.

Robert W. Gaskin, a former Pentagon planner now with Business Executives for National Security, a nonpartisan defense-monitoring group, called the new strategy “laser-guided diplomacy.”

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The United States and its major European allies agreed Friday to deliver punishing NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs’ crucial air-defense network, heavy weapons and other targets if the rebels breach the U.N.-imposed perimeters around Gorazde. The Pentagon is already preparing to fly in more radar-jamming aircraft to help counter Bosnian Serb missile launchers.

If the Serbs were to retaliate by taking U.N. peacekeepers hostage again, U.S. officials said, the allies would step up their attacks--despite the risk--rather than negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs to free the hostages, as in the past.

And while the Pentagon hopes to keep ground action to a minimum, if U.N. peacekeeping units do get into trouble, the allies would be able to call in elements of the 12,500-member European rapid-reaction force now being assembled in the Balkans.

One important element of the allied plan is a general agreement that NATO’s first mission would be to destroy the sophisticated Bosnian Serb air-defense system.

Although the Bosnian Serbs would still have some shoulder-fired missiles, defense analysts said that these are not nearly as dangerous. With the long-range missiles gone, allied fighters would be able to fly over Bosnia-Herzegovina with impunity, destroying Bosnian Serb tanks and artillery at will.

Second, the allies finally have changed their command mechanism and rules of engagement to enable NATO to launch air strikes immediately and aggressively without having to get permission from civilian U.N. officials. There would be no more “pinprick” strikes, as in the past.

The air campaign also would pose an additional threat to the Bosnian Serbs by finally providing Bosnian government forces with the air cover they need to offset the rebel Serbs’ superior armor and artillery so that their own ground troops can attack the Serbs more aggressively.

Finally, analysts pointed out, the allied plan is being launched at a time when there have been these important changes on the battlefront that can only enhance prospects that the effort will succeed:

* Partly in reaction to previous acts of hostage-taking, the United Nations has consolidated many of its peacekeeping units, pulling them back to central Bosnia, where they are less vulnerable and can be defended more easily.

* For all the renewed military activity by the rebel Serbs, the Bosnian government’s position has become less perilous than it was a few months ago, partly because the Muslims and Croats have made peace and joined forces.

* Despite the recent Bosnian Serb victories, Bosnian government troops have begun making some significant gains of their own, including a successful assault on Bosnian Serb militia around Sarajevo and a series of Muslim takeovers near the safe area of Tuzla.

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The allied plan will require some significant political management over the next few weeks, something that has often severely tested the Western democracies. The United States and its allies must push their plan through both the United Nations and NATO, overriding objections by smaller, reluctant countries that have peacekeeping troops on the ground.

They also must find the will to remain firm if the Bosnian Serbs shoot down allied warplanes or take more U.N. hostages--not an easy thing for elected politicians, particularly after images of captive peacekeepers flash around the world.

Finally, there is always the risk that if the new policy fails, it could draw U.S. and allied troops into a full-scale ground war--even if it is only temporary to allow U.N. peacekeepers to withdraw.

Even so, the odds seem good for the moment that the allies finally have built up enough frustration over the failure of their previous efforts to make this one stick.

Trainor, for one, said he believes that this time they may have found the key. “We’ve made such a 10-foot monster out of these guys [the Bosnian Serbs], and that’s not the case at all,” he says. “This is a viable plan--if the allies have the will.”