Post-Mandela South Africa: Slow but Steady Progress

Last week, as I listened to South Africans describe the challenges their country faces, I sensed that something big had changed: The Nelson Mandela phase of the post-apartheid era is drawing to a close.

It began when Mandela walked out of prison in February, 1990, and continued on through his successful negotiations to end three centuries of white domination. High drama and miracles marked this phase. At times, the country was held together only by the sheer force of Mandela’s personality.

But South Africa is now on more secure footing. Immense problems remain, but they are unlikely to derail the country’s transition to democracy--and, for better or worse, they are not the kinds of problems that can be resolved by one man, even one as remarkable as Mandela.

During the past five years, South Africa’s leaders have successfully met two major challenges. The first was to persuade both the white minority and the black majority to accept a gradual, negotiated transition. Mandela’s reassuring presence and unceasing efforts to promote reconciliation gave white voters the confidence they needed to gamble and entrust their future to a black-led government. At the same time, Mandela’s commanding role in the liberation struggle enabled him to keep in check black demands for an immediate seizure of power and swift retribution against the old regime.

The second challenge was to prevent a civil war between supporters of the African National Congress and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party. Here, too, Mandela’s moral stature and ability to stand above the partisan fray was crucial both in forcing Buthelezi to abandon his threat to boycott national elections and in preventing ANC supporters from launching a war of retribution against Inkatha.

Today, white South Africans appear to have completed their psychological trek from domination to multiracial democracy. The National Party, which created the apartheid system, is busy reinventing itself. In talks with foreign visitors, Frederik W. de Klerk now emphasizes the party’s growing nonwhite constituency, which includes a majority of the country’s Afrikaans-speaking colored population and Indians. In government and Parliament, the “government of national unity,” which began as an uneasy and often awkward alliance between the National Party and the ANC, has become a close working partnership. Disagreements between the leaders of the two parties now seem to be minimal, even on sensitive issues such as the investigation of past human rights abuses.

The once widely feared threat from far-right whites seems to have vanished. Small pockets of militant white racism still exist, but the danger of a white counterrevolution is past. South Africa’s most prominent white conservative is Gen. Constand Viljoen, an easy-going former head of the South African Defense Forces who mixes easily with Mandela and the ANC leadership. Viljoen’s party, the Freedom Front, remains committed to the idea of a “boerstaat”--a territory within South Africa in which whites would be in a majority and Afrikaner culture would predominate. But there is no longer any talk of creating such a territory through armed violence.

Within the black community, there is discontent with the pace of change. Too few jobs have been created. Too few houses have been built. For most of the population, living conditions have not dramatically changed. But this dissatisfaction is no longer directed against whites; nor is it likely to lead to an outbreak of violence or calls to abandon the new constitutional framework.

The danger of a civil war pitting the government of national unity against Chief Buthelezi and his supporters in Natal has also diminished. While the petulant Zulu leader continues to try to thwart efforts to hammer out the details of a permanent constitution that would greatly diminish his personal power, his support, both internally and internationally, is eroding. His call for international mediation on the issue of the powers of provincial government in the future South Africa is not supported by any of the other parties. And, within Inkatha itself, there are signs of a growing division between those who support Buthelezi’s attempts to separate KwaZulu-Natal from the rest of the country and those who favor working within the existing framework.

A dramatic indication of the extent to which the South African agenda has shifted was provided by one leading National Party member who told a visiting delegation that he did not consider the drafting of a permanent constitution to be a major priority. Far more important, he contended, were efforts to promote economic growth, control crime and institute effective local governments.

The long-term peace and stability of South Africa depends, first and foremost, on the ability of its government and its private sector to open up the economy and promote growth with jobs in an increasingly competitive global environment. This is not an easy task. Unemployment in many parts of South Africa is running at 40% to 50%. The legacy of apartheid schooling and township unrest has left a large, undereducated and poorly skilled black labor pool. Ownership of South African industry, which had been highly protected and often subsidized, is concentrated in the hands of a small number of traditionally minded conglomerates. Exchange controls have created a large pool of captive capital that is likely to flow abroad as soon as restrictions are lifted. The country’s tax base is small. Demands for public services are immense and growing.

But the government’s economic team, which includes an unlikely mix of erstwhile communists, former National Party technocrats and others, is extremely capable. Talk of nationalization of industry has evaporated. Instead, priority is being given to creating “a stable macroeconomic environment” for sustained growth. In practice, that has meant a remarkable degree of fiscal restraint.

For the South African economy to grow, two things must happen: Foreign investment will have to flow into the country, and ways must be found to promote the emergence of small- and intermediate-sized businesses. Neither is going to happen overnight, but there are signs of progress. Almost all the foreign businesses that left South Africa in the 1980s have returned, and they are being joined by a host of new investors. Increasingly, the biggest complaint of potential investors is that existing South African businesses are trying to block their entry. This should change once the big South African conglomerates are free to shift their own capital out of the country and the government begins to privatize some of the large parastatals that were created during the apartheid era.

Black business is also beginning to prosper. In one of the great ironies of South Africa, a number of the leading figures in the anti-apartheid struggle are quickly becoming scions of industry. Zwelakhe Sisulu, the son of Mandela’s fellow prisoner on Robben Island, Walter Sisulu, and a prominent opposition leader throughout the 1980s, is head of the South African Broadcasting Corporation. The Kagiso Trust, run by Eric Molobi, was created to help funnel foreign funds to anti-apartheid organizations. Today, it is an investment fund.

The most visible negative development in South Africa is the spread of crime. In fact, there are two different crime problems. Ordinary crime, especially muggings and carjackings, has become a major problem, particularly in Johannesburg, the country’s economic capital. This part of the problem is directly linked to the state of the economy--and exacerbated by the large number of illegal immigrants who have come to South Africa. Organized crime is also becoming more of a problem due to the growing international air traffic in and out of the country. The government’s ability to combat crime has been hampered by problems in reorganizing the police, which had previously devoted most of its resources to enforcing apartheid laws and combatting the liberation struggle. As serious as the crime problem is, however, it is not significantly worse than in many other parts of the world, including America.

Another pressing challenge--and the one foremost in the minds of most South African officials--is the need to create effective local governments. On Nov. 1, the country will hold elections across the country to put in place new local authorities. These authorities will be expected to assume much of the burden of delivering essential services to South African citizens, especially housing, electricity and water. The fact that so much importance is being attached to them is a sign that national leaders clearly recognize the limits of the central government’s ability to satisfy popular expectations.

The next phase in South Africa’s evolution toward a multiracial democracy will not be dominated by one man. Rather, thousands of yet-to-be-elected men and women will try to make real the grand designs hatched at the top. The challenges ahead--economic growth, crime control and creation of local government--are beyond the powers of even a Mandela. They can only be met by a whole country committed to overcoming its past.