THE WORLD / MIDDLE EAST : Rabin’s Death Amplifies Jordan’s, Arafat’s Risks

The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin has not only highlighted deep political and religious divisions within Israel, it has also underlined the complex splits among, and within, Arab states.

On the one hand, there was that astonishing assembly of Arab leaders from Egypt and Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians, Qatar, Oman and Morrocco at Rabin’s funeral. There was Yasser Arafat’s surprising visit to Tel Aviv to pay condolences to Rabin’s widow. And there was that remarkable and memorable funeral speech delivered by King Hussein, in which Jordan’s leader referred to Rabin as a “martyr.”

Then there are others who see little benefit, if not outright danger, in the drive to make peace in the region. Islamic political groups in Southern Lebanon, especially Hezbollah, remain actively at war with Israel. The very “toughness” that made Rabin popular at home is the same trait that increased Lebanese pain--and hate. On the day of Rabin’s assassination, Islamic groups in Lebanon were preparing to mourn their own loss: Fathi Shikaki, the assassinated leader of Islamic Jihad. The deep feelings stirred up by the Palestinian’s murder were captured in a statement by Iran’s president, who saw Rabin’s assassination as an act of “divine revenge” for Shikaki’s killing.

Similar sentiments were heard in diaspora Palestinian communities. Most of these 1948 refugees come from coastal cities and towns that now constitute the heart of Israel. The Palestinian-Israeli agreements “postponed” consideration of their predicament until final-status negotiations begin sometime next year. They celebrated Rabin’s death, but some no doubt hoped to celebrate Arafat’s as well.

Syria’s reaction to Rabin’s assassination carefully dodged any compliments that might have antagonized its allies. Condemning the assassination in general terms, it urged that Rabin’s death be turned into an opportunity to speed up the Syrian-Israeli peace talks. Similarly, the Saudi government, mindful of popular sentiments but also of American wishes, issued the most general of statements condemning violence. Other Gulf states, including Kuwait, preferred to detach themselves through a collective statement of condemnation issued by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which joins them. Yet, even as Qatar sent representatives to Rabin’s funeral, some of the country’s press accused Rabin of having “Arab blood” on his hands.

The assassination may prove most con- sequential for Jordan. The king’s daring embrace of Rabin, his powerful words in favor of peace with Israel, have suddenly propelled him into the leadership of the “peace camp” and made him a favorite in Israel and in the United States. But even as the king was speaking, his Islamist opposition in Jordan was calling the man Hussein considered his “brother” a criminal and a murderer. True, this opposition represents only a minority in Jordan. But public opinion, in general, had been running against a speedy normalization with Israel. In raising his voice even higher in favor of U.S. policy, he is taking extraordinary risks at home.

Those risks extend abroad as well. Syria sees any Arab normalization of relations with Israel before Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights as diminishing its bargaining leverage. Thus, King Hussein’s perceived rush to peace is a source of unwanted pressure to make a deal. Even Egypt, the first Arab state to make peace with Israel, sees the king’s moves as undermining its leadership role by making Jordan, not Egypt, the American favorite. Only days before the Rabin assassination, during the Economic Summit in Amman, Egypt called on Jordan to slow down the peace process, while the Jordanians reminded the Egyptians that Egypt was the first to brake with the Arab world and make peace with Israel.

Ultimately, however, the Arab party most affected by Rabin’s murder will be Israel’s Palestinian partners. Even though Arafat had to be mindful of prevailing public attitudes in the West Bank and Gaza that held Rabin personally responsible for harsh measures during the Palestinian intifada , and blamed him for the slow implementation of the Oslo agreements, Arafat swiftly made sympathetic statements free of any references that could have diluted their impact on the Israeli public.

Especially telling was Arafat’s reference to Rabin as a “partner” and courageous peace-maker. This is perhaps a symptom of what may turn out to be the most profound impact of the assassination on Palestinian psyches: heightened sensitivity to internal Israeli politics, which could shift the struggle from a purely Palestinian-Israeli one to one between coalitions of Palestinians and Israelis favoring or rejecting peace. For years, many Palestinians believed the divisions within Israeli politics were merely tactical, that all shared the strategic objective of controlling the West Bank. The Oslo accords reflected a Palestinian gamble, not conviction, that Labor’s aims differed from Likud’s. Recent setbacks in implementing Israeli withdrawal from parts of the West Bank had revived Palestinian fears about Labor’s intentions. But the assassination, coming on the heels of a new agreement for Israeli withdrawal, will greatly alter Palestinian perceptions.

This will push Arafat to cooperate even more closely with the new prime minister, Shimon Peres--a possibility that worries Palestinian leaders fearful of overly generous Palestinian concessions at a time when they will need considerable leverage as they approach negotiations on the final settlement. There is another element in this equation: Just as the assassination is giving the Israeli government license to crack down on Jewish extremists, Arafat may be more responsive to Israeli calls for decisive action against Palestinian militants.

But Arafat will have to be careful, lest his actions backfire: Consider the impact on peace if Rabin’s assassin had been a Palestinian. And Arafat cannot be seen as jeopardizing the democratic nature of Palestinian elections, scheduled for Jan. 20. In the end, it is these democratic elections, bestowing popular legitimacy on Palestinian officials, that will defend the peace process from the continuing risks to individual leaders.*