PERSPECTIVE ON ASIA : Move Beyond Cold War Theories : Taiwan is not Europe and China is not the Soviet Union; we must tread carefully in meeting Chinese threats.

China’s recent saber-rattling about Taiwan has caused numerous pundits, policy experts and politicians to advocate a firm U.S. military commitment to defend Taiwan’s de facto independence. But Americans must ask themselves whether they really would be willing to assume the risk of a confrontation with a nuclear-armed power over such an issue.

Proponents of a policy of deterrence blithely assume that Beijing would back down if faced with a clear demonstration of American “resolve.” That is a lesson drawn almost entirely from America’s Cold War experience. The conventional wisdom is that aggressors will be deterred from molesting a U.S. ally or client whenever Washington provides an unambiguous security commitment.

But the assumption that the deterrence of Soviet aggression during the Cold War can be replicated in a much more complex post-Cold War international system is dubious.

Three factors are especially important in determining whether extended deterrence--attempting to deter an attack on an ally or client--is likely to succeed: The importance of the stakes to the protector, the importance of the stakes to the “aggressor” and the extent of the aggressor’s inclination to gamble.

All three factors worked to Washington’s advantage to an unusual degree in its confrontation with the Soviet Union.

America’s security guarantees were largely confined to Western Europe and northeast Asia. Both regions were considered crucial to America’s own security and economic well-being, and U.S. policymakers were determined to prevent them from coming under the control of the Soviet Union. It was therefore credible to leaders in the Kremlin that the United States would be willing to incur significant risks--even the possibility of a nuclear war--to thwart a Soviet conquest.

Conversely, while those regions would have been a significant strategic and economic prize for the Soviet Union, neither area was essential.

Fortunately for the United States, the Soviet leadership tended to be relatively risk averse. Most of Moscow’s challenges occurred on the periphery, primarily in the Third World. Although Soviet leaders occasionally tested the U.S.-led alliance network (especially over West Berlin), they did not put their prestige on the line to such an extent that a tactical retreat became impossible.

As the possible confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan makes clear, there are crucial differences in all three deterrence factors. Taiwan may have some importance to the United States, since it is a significant trading partner and a sister democracy. Nevertheless, its relevance to American economic and security interests hardly compares with the central position U.S. policymakers thought the Western European and northeast Asian powers occupied during the Cold War.

The problem is that Chinese officials probably understand that point as well. Soviet leaders may have considered it credible that the United States would risk nuclear war to keep Western Europe and northeast Asia out of the Soviet orbit. But it is far less likely that the Chinese believe that Washington will incur the same risk merely to defend Taiwan.

While Taiwan’s importance to the United States is at a lower level, the island’s importance to China is much greater than Western Europe or northeast Asia was to the Soviet Union. To Beijing, Taiwan is not merely a political and economic prize; the status of the island is caught up in issues of national pride and prestige. Along with Hong Kong, Taiwan is a reminder of China’s long period of humiliation at the hands of outside powers. When such potent emotions are engaged, even normally dispassionate political leaders do not always act prudently or even rationally.

In its casual dissemination of nuclear weapons technology, the Chinese leadership already has given some indication that it may be less risk averse than was the old Soviet hierarchy. The comment of an anonymous high-level Chinese official that Beijing did not fear U.S. intervention because “American leaders care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan” was a none too subtle threat. Perhaps the comment was mere bluster, but it is equally possible that China does not regard a U.S. attempt at deterrence in this case as credible.

At the very least, it is risky to assume that the United States can invariably deter great-power coercion of small U.S. clients around the world. Washington’s successful deterrence of the Soviet Union may have been an aberration, a combination of luck and an unusual convergence of factors. If that is the case, applying the supposed lessons of the Cold War in confrontations with other major powers could lead to a humiliating retreat or a disaster.