PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY : Bellicose Habits That Can Lead to War : Without the restraint born of the Cold War, nations are cranking up the bombast to perilous levels.

The strategic culture of the Cold War combined great eagerness to accumulate weapons with great restraint in using military power. Fearful that even the smallest act of war might start a progression of countermoves leading to catastrophe, the nuclear powers strictly avoided any direct warfare with one another.

They also learned to be very careful when displaying, moving or exercising their forces to apply diplomatic pressure. The aim was to frighten, but only within strict limit, to ensure that symbolic gestures would not be misinterpreted as actual military threats, evoking an armed response that would start a war.

All this caution did not prevent more than 100 real wars during the decades of the Cold War, between nuclear powers and their nonnuclear enemies and among their allies, clients, friends and other third parties such as India and Pakistan. But even in war, there was notable restraint. The new awareness of the risks of “escalation” was shared by the nonnuclear powers as well, so that in almost every case, military action was severely limited. In war, the political leaders of most countries routinely overruled military commanders who wanted to widen or intensify combat operations. In peace, military prudence restrained leaders who wanted to score points in domestic politics by bellicose words or threatening military moves.

With the passing of the Cold War, its acute nuclear fears, high military expenditures, vast armed forces and culture of restraint all are much diminished. Once again, as in prenuclear times, when fighting breaks out, there is no great concern to limit escalation, so that infantry clashes can lead directly to aerial bombing, as in the 1995 fighting between Ecuador and Peru, or to artillery barrages against cities, as in the struggles within the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union.

Once again, as in prenuclear times, much less than imperative diplomatic goals or even mere posturing for the purposes of domestic politics, is sufficient to motivate highly provocative displays of bellicosity and reckless conduct that invites military threats.

In recent months, Greece and Turkey have maneuvered combat-ready warships against each other to dispute an uninhabited rock in the sea, with much accompanying bombast by politicians on each side for the benefit of domestic audiences. To divert attention from political scandal, the president of Korea has sent warships to claim some tiny islands, against the background of a press campaign of foolhardy taunts and empty threats against Japan. And Pakistan has escalated armed intrusions into Kashmir, while its president has boasted of her immediate readiness to fight India.

That is the world context in which China’s leaders, in the midst of a succession struggle, tried to claim sovereignty over Taiwan by military exercises meant to be as threatening as possible in the run-up to the island’s presidential election. Taiwan’s leaders, for their part, have been striking postures of defiance to impress the voters.

None of these quarrels are new, but all persisted more or less quietly for decades, until now. That is the best evidence that the deeper cause of what is happening is global rather than local, the result of a mentality shift rather than of specific urgencies. While the ambient circumstances of the Cold War induced caution, present world conditions evidently do not. It would be foolishly optimistic to believe that this return to prenuclear bellicosity can long continue without leading to outbreaks of actual warfare, as already has happened between Ecuador and Peru.

From the start of Beijing’s campaign of intimidation, we have repeatedly been assured that China would not actually attack Taiwan because the economic cost would be too great. The Chinese have been sending mixed messages, of course, both denying any intention of attacking Taiwan and also saying that they would do so should Taiwan declare independence. Certainly China’s extra-rapid industrialization, propelled by exports and foreign investment (not least from Taiwan) would immediately come to an end if Taiwan were attacked. That is why Taipei’s leaders dismissed Beijing’s threats. But if calculations of economic costs and benefits could stop wars from happening, very few would ever have been fought. In this case too, sober calculations may be overthrown by the sheer dynamics of confrontation.

Chinese hard-liners pursue the succession struggle by threatening Taiwan without any intention of starting a war. But Taiwan’s response also is conditioned by domestic politics: Government and opposition must both show voters that they are not intimidated. That in turn undermines the position of the hard-liners in Beijing, who respond by escalating the threats against Taiwan, and so on. A chain reaction between Beijing’s bellicosity and Taipei’s recklessness can therefore restart at any time.

The vigorous U.S. intervention--and China’s very small amphibious capability--almost certainly have stopped the progression toward war this time. But what already has happened reinforces the impression that prenuclear habits have returned--the habits that lead to war.