The Message in Pyongyang’s Madness: Save Me Before I Kill

North Korea’s bizarre behavior has again put the world on edge. In retrospect, Pyongyang’s provocations--for three successive days, it sent several hundred heavily armed soldiers into the Demilitarized Zone on exercises--appear more political theater than military threat. But they set the stage for last week’s parliamentary elections in South Korea and for President Bill Clinton’s visit this week.

Whatever Pyongyang’s mysterious, untitled leader Kim Jong Il had in mind, the effect of his breach of his country’s armistice obligations was to make him, in effect, the unofficial campaign manager for Clinton and South Korean President Kim Young Sam. His boost to Kim’s New Korea Party, which was expected to suffer major losses, was similar to the effect China’s military exercises had on Taiwan’s presidential elections: not only did they fail to intimidate voters, but they actually increased Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s margin of victory. And Clinton almost cannot help but appear tough, presidential and steadfastly loyal to his Korean allies when he meets Kim on Cheju Island en route to Japan.

Odder still is the fact that North Korea’s military machinations contrast with its cooperation in implementing the October 1994 U.S.-North Korea nuclear accord, its willingness to discuss its sale of ballistic missiles, and hints that it may be ready to open a new dialogue with South Korea. Yet, even as the North Korean soldiers marched into the DMZ, the country’s top military officials were warning that war might be imminent and that the United States and South Korea would be at fault. What’s going on here?

First, it is important to keep in mind that irresponsible as Pyongyang’s military gestures were, it is deterrence--the combined military capabilities of the United States and South Korea--that keeps the peace, not the armistice. The armistice is an important mechanism for regulating activity along the heavily armed border. North Korea’s incursions into the DMZ were, in one respect, connected to its long-standing campaign to force Washington into negotiations to replace the armistice with a peace treaty. In this sense, they were a case of “same old, same old.”

But Pyongyang’s antics were not aimed at managing the North-South border. Instead, North Korea is behaving more and more like the tiny country in “The Mouse That Roared,” which declared war on the United States in order to surrender and get foreign aid. Its military forays into the DMZ were reminiscent of the nuclear crisis it triggered when, in April 1994, it removed the nuclear core of a reactor, thereby giving it potential nuclear-bomb material. What then appeared as a crazy move was, it turned out, an effort to force the Clinton administration to offer a deal, which it did. This time, the immediate goal of the DMZ incursions was to stimulate negotiations for a peace treaty--without South Korea. But both actions must be seen as signs of an increasingly desperate North Korea pushing whatever buttons it can in hopes of improving its situation by getting a potential benefactor to respond.

From North Korea’s perspective, the promise of the nuclear accord it signed with the United States, in October 1994, has not materialized. The North agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear-weapons program in exchange for a commitment to build two light-water nuclear reactors, heavy oil and improved economic and diplomatic relations. But it will be eight to 10 years before the reactors are built and producing energy. Furthermore, because North Korea has not improved ties with the South, the United States has not relaxed its trade embargo against Pyongyang. Its consolation prize was $2 million in emergency food aid. But North Korea’s larger hope that the nuclear deal was the beginning of a new lease on life has been frustrated.

Unfortunately, Pyongyang’s ham-fisted way of dealing with its predicament has made it more difficult for either Seoul or Washington to respond. Kim Young Sam’s New Korea Party, which took a hard line toward North Korea’s DMZ antics, did better than expected at the polls. The opposition, led by Kim Dae Jung, suffered a major setback, possibly burying any presidential ambitions that Kim Dae Jung may have had. In both cases, the crisis atmosphere generated by Pyongyang helps explain the result.

Kim Young Sam, now focused on the 1997 presidential elections, has little incentive to be more generous toward the North. When he meets Clinton, the emphasis will be on reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the alliance, and both will stress firmness toward the North.

Lost in all this is the stark reality that the hope of a “soft landing” and gradual reunification spawned by the nuclear deal is fading. Reprehensible as Pyongyang’s temper tantrums are, the prospect of impending collapse in the North should spur the United States and South Korea to seek more imaginative ways to engage North Korea’s leaders. Pyongyang’s campaign to talk about the armistice may offer an opening. The goal would be to solve practical problems. For example, as the light-water-reactor project progresses, there will be a growing need for engineers and technicians to have access to North Korea. A “Checkpoint Charlie” mechanism, as existed in Berlin, could facilitate border-crossing. Without it, moving material and large numbers of personnel into North Korea to build the reactors will be costly and difficult.

If North Korea is willing to adhere to the armistice, the United States and South Korea would be wise to offer trilateral talks to revise it in order to create such a border-crossing mechanism. The forum would give North Korea’s restless military a seat at the table where other issues--reducing forces along the DMZ, missile sales or even a peace treaty--could be discussed. No initiative can guarantee a successful outcome. But absent some creative diplomacy, North Korea is likely to end not with a whimper, but an unexpected bang that will be felt across East Asia.*