The Threat Is Ever Present

We have seen these images before: the shattered concrete, the blown-out windows, the crater left by the bomb, the flag-draped coffins. We have heard the angry rhetoric before, the mandatory adjectives of outrage--barbarous, heinous, cowardly--and the vows of revenge. Ten years ago, terrorists were told, “You can run but you can’t hide.” This time, President Clinton warns, “America takes care of our own.” Tough talk that is operationally, deliberately vague.

Familiar also, in the wake of such attacks, are the inevitable questions about the adequacy of security. While claiming not to be finger-pointing, many people are asking aloud whether more could have--should have--been done in Dharhan. A terrorist bombing that kills 19 and injures hundreds more does not demonstrate the adequacy of security. But before proceeding to the conclusion that more should have been done, one must appreciate the uncertainties in assessing terrorism threats and in calculating the appropriate response.

The Dhahran bombing is being compared to the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines in Beirut when a suicide driver crashed a truck loaded with an estimated 12,000 pounds of explosives into a building used by the Marines as a barracks. Subsequently a commission of senior military and civilian officials headed by Adm. Robert L.J. Long concluded that the officers in the chain of command above the Marines had not adequately addressed the threat of terrorism and recommended that administrative action be taken against them. Is that appropriate here?

Lebanon in 1983 was in the midst of a long civil war. Car bombs had become commonplace. One had destroyed the American embassy in Beirut just five months before the bombing of the Marines. By contrast, Saudi Arabia was considered a safe place, although there was a smaller bombing in Riyadh last November and terrorists had also issued threats during the trial of the four accused of being responsible for the November bombing. Their execution should have put American forces in the kingdom on alert. The problem is that in terrorism, the volume of noise--in the form of threats, warnings and intelligence reports--is always high.

Most of the threats that these actions prompted will not result in terrorist attacks, but if an attack does occur, those charged with security will be criticized for not heeding the warnings. To protect against all of them would require a vast expenditure of resources and cause great disruption. In terrorism, it is not the existence of a threat that determines security costs but rather the size and number of potential targets to be defended. And security still may not be adequate.

There are no ordinary buildings that can withstand a blast caused by several thousands of pounds of explosives. That requires fortifications, the kind of thick concrete pillboxes and ramparts seen abandoned on the coast of Normandy. To diminish the effects of an explosion takes distance, hence the erection of concrete barriers and walls around buildings in Washington following the 1983 bombing in Beirut and around federal buildings throughout the United States following the Oklahoma City bombing last year.

The housing compound in Dhahran was protected by a concrete perimeter about 30 meters from the buildings. Following last November’s bomb attack in Riyadh, U.S. authorities wanted to push the perimeter out to 120 meters, but Saudi authorities reportedly denied them permission to do so. (The barriers are now being moved.) At 120 meters, the effects of the blast certainly would have been less, but even at that distance, a 5,000-pound bomb still would have caused serious damage; flying glass from shattered windows still would have caused casualties. Bomb experts point out that safety against those quantities of explosives may require a setback of up to three-quarters of a mile. At issue here, however, is not simply the distance from the barrier to the building that might be a target. Terrorist bombs will always find attractive targets. If terrorists judged the housing compound at Dharhran unsuitable, they could have set their bombs off somewhere else.

Terrorists have an inherent advantage over security planners. Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, anytime; we cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time.

We also have seen terrorists lob large quantities of explosives into their targets using homemade mortars. We cannot exclude the possibility of terrorist attacks from the air--a fear underlined last year when a suicidal pilot crashed his plane into the White House. Such attacks would be operationally more demanding but not inconceivable.

Recognizing terrorism as warfare demands defenses, but it also recognizes that, as in all wars, there are unavoidable risks. We will never achieve a level of security that removes all danger. Not in Oklahoma City. Not in Saudi Arabia.