Enough Blame to Go Around

The independent investigation of the June 25 terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia has found major security failures at nearly all levels of command before the attack and dissimulation and attempted blame-shifting by the military afterward. The investigating panel, led by retired Army Gen. Wayne A. Downing, faults high officers for doing too little to safeguard the living quarters of thousands of U.S. airmen near the Dhahran air base, despite clear signs that Americans in the kingdom had been targeted by terrorists. Even such simple steps as coating apartment windows with Mylar sheeting to reduce shattering in an explosion were neglected, at a terrible cost. The panel’s report notes that flying glass was a prime factor in the deaths of 12 of the 19 Americans killed in the truck bomb explosion.

A relatively modest expenditure, by Pentagon standards, could have bought greater security for U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. That security is now being sought at vulnerable bases overseas by spending more on high-tech surveillance and detection devices, extending base perimeters and the like. The biggest change, says Defense Secretary William Perry, is in a “radically new mind-set . . . in the way we protect our forces.” That presumably includes more emphasis on intelligence gathering and analysis and an insistence from the top down on unremitting vigilance against the terrorist threat. That threat can’t be eliminated, but clearly many measures are possible to mitigate its effects. At Khobar Towers, much that could have been done was left undone. That failure must not be repeated.