Netanyahu Mishandles Foe’s Weakness

Of all the errors a political leader can make in a conflict, none is so dangerous as underestimating the power of his adversary. It is true that Yasser Arafat is very weak. He has no real military power, only a force of 40,000-plus policemen who, while capable of terrorizing the Palestinians they control and assorted isolated Israelis, could not resist a serious Israeli attack for more than a few hours. And because he is now based in Gaza, inside a strategic perimeter solidly controlled by Israel, Arafat cannot be reinforced by a military alliance with any Arab country.

But from the moment of his election, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acted as if Arafat were not only weak but entirely powerless. When Netanyahu finally agreed to a meeting, after first disdaining to do so in a very humiliating manner, he presented a list of stiff security demands without offering in exchange concessions that Arafat could show off to his own people.

As it turned out, Israel’s demands were amply justified: Arafat’s men have been violating the Oslo rules by being too aggressive in hunting his political enemies and not aggressive enough in hunting terrorists. But equally, Arafat’s demand for the implementation of the long-promised Israeli withdrawal from Hebron was not only justified, but also an absolute necessity for him. To survive politically as Israel’s negotiating partner, and as its auxiliary against the terrorists, Arafat simply had to have Hebron to maintain a minimum of prestige as the Palestinian leader.

In these circumstances, Arafat’s very weakness actually strengthened his bargaining position. That always happens as the Palestinian leader. cannot afford the total collapse of the weaker; it is the same paradoxical logic that compels bankers to accommodate major borrowers who might go bankrupt. And that was the logic that Netanyahu failed to recognize. True, he was and is under pressure from the hard-liners of his own party, but no prime minister of Israel can afford to miscalculate the balance of power. Netanyahu did, and Arafat had to act in order to correct the mistake, so to speak. Naturally, Arafat used the only weapon he has: the ability to provoke riots.

Arafat had been briefed on the Israelis’ plan to open the now-infamous archeological tunnel alongside the Temple Mount. He even agreed to the opening--or agreed not to disagree with the project. He understood that the tunnel leads away from the Al Aqsa mosque and cannot possibly undermine any building on the site revered by Muslims. But the secretive opening of the tunnel was the perfect excuse for the riots he needed to start.

Of course, Arafat has a long history of overplaying his hand with disastrous results, and he probably did so this time by having some of his policemen open fire. That has outraged even left-wing Israelis, reducing Netanyahu’s ability to make concessions even if he wants to (the logic works both ways). But as soon as possible, Netanyahu does have to make enough concessions to keep Arafat in business as leader of the Palestinians, while Arafat in turn must recognize that he is weak and cannot ask for more.