Gulf Veteran’s Clue Guided Search for Illness’ Source

One morning in March, a chemical weapons specialist at the CIA’s sprawling headquarters complex put a cassette into a tape recorder and listened to a replay of a Baltimore talk show from the previous October.

The guest, Persian Gulf War veteran Brian T. Martin, was describing how his 37th Army Engineer Battalion had blown up the Khamisiyah weapons bunker in Iraq in 1991. The CIA man--who had heard about Martin’s appearance--had been looking for information on just such operations.

As it turned out, that talk show would provide a potentially critical clue to solving one of the biggest mysteries of the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict: Is there a “Gulf War illness” from which Martin and thousands of other veterans are suffering?

Spurred by Martin’s account, the analyst ran a computer search of CIA intelligence records, using “Khamisiyah” as a reference word, and matched Martin’s description of the bunker with a long-buried U.N. report that contained a startling revelation:

In October 1991, U.N. inspectors had found rockets in a bunker at the Khamisiyah site that clearly contained sarin and cyclosarin nerve agents. They said the Iraqis had told them that allied forces had destroyed the bunker just after the war.

The discovery, confirmed in May by tests at the site, has blown a gaping hole in the Pentagon’s long-standing contention that U.S. troops had not been exposed to chemical agents in Iraq.

It also has raised the prospect that thousands of soldiers now suffering from symptoms such as joint aches, memory loss and depression may not have been afflicted with ordinary ailments, as the Pentagon had concluded, but instead were victims of low-level exposure to nerve agents.

Search for Explanation

The belated disclosure has sent hopes soaring among the Gulf War veterans, many of whom have been searching without satisfaction for a rational explanation.

“Right now, the Pentagon is in a round room, looking for a corner to hide in,” said Martin, 33, who has been suffering from headaches, digestive problems and insomnia since he returned from the Gulf.

“Ninety-nine percent of the veterans I talk to, all they want is their health back,” he said in a telephone interview from his home in Niles, Mich. “I know veterans every day who are dying.”

At the same time, the Khamisiyah incident has triggered a crisis of credibility for the Defense Department, which had insisted for five years that it had turned over every stone in searching for a possible cause for the symptoms and found nothing.

“Why it took five years to get released is a question I keep asking,” Rep. Fred Upton (R-Mich.) complained at a hearing a few days ago. “How many veterans could have been treated in the last five years if we knew all the facts we know now?”

In their defense, Pentagon officials insist that their search was exhaustive and honest. The U.N. report was one of thousands that poured into U.S. intelligence agencies after the Gulf War.

The Iraqis did not use chemical weapons during the war, so intelligence analysts were not primed to look for evidence to explain possible side effects.

“There was an avalanche of these kinds of reports every day,” said a Pentagon official. “There was nothing in this one to jump out at anybody.”

Furthermore, Pentagon officials note that the Khamisiyah finding is only a clue, not a solution. Much more research will be necessary before it is known whether chemical exposure did play a significant role in the disorders, and for how many of those afflicted.

Even so, some veterans and lawmakers see it as a long-awaited breakthrough to a serious and vigorous investigation--and proof that the one conducted so far has been much less than that.

James J. Tuite III, director of the Gulf War Research Foundation, an activist group, said it is clear that the Pentagon was so skeptical about the veterans’ complaints that it did not explore all possibilities--particularly that of toxic exposure.

He and others note that while case investigators sorted through reams of medical records and unit reports, they did not talk to many of the veterans, who could have related their experiences and recollections. The U.N. report was there for them to find too.

“Hopefully, with the new revelations, we can discuss the problem,” said Paul Sullivan, head of the Gulf War Veterans of Georgia.

Discovery of the report has been a bombshell for the Pentagon, which was already under a cloud as a result of its handling of the Agent Orange controversy involving Vietnam War veterans, and it has sent Defense Department officials scrambling to rectify the damage.

Defense Secretary William J. Perry has ordered a rush effort to determine how many soldiers might have been affected by the Khamisiyah explosions, including preparation of computer models that retrace wind direction to determine where vapors might have traveled.

Pentagon Actions

The Pentagon has already estimated that at least 15,000 U.S. troops may have been exposed to spewing chemical agents, and it expects that number to rise--possibly sharply--as new data arrive.

In addition, Deputy Defense Secretary John P. White has ordered a major broadening of the department’s investigation and placed it under a new, high-level director.

The fallout may go further. Some critics are openly asking whether the Defense Department can be objective enough to assess such health problems when its own military practices in an engagement could be called into question.

A few days ago, the staff of a new presidential advisory commission appointed to review the Pentagon’s performance called for the establishment of an independent body to take over the inquiry.

Sen. John D. “Jay” Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.) agrees. “The Pentagon’s performance in this area is sorry indeed,” he said. “It is time . . . to apply the very substantial resources we have . . . to finding the causes of Gulf War sicknesses.”

The weapons complex now at the center of the controversy was one of several dozen built by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to support his million-man military--the world’s fifth-largest in 1990.

Located about 110 miles north of the Saudi Arabian border, the sprawling Khamisiyah depot was thought by U.S. intelligence to contain only conventional munitions. So when the Gulf War began, it was not high on the allies’ target list.

Bombing raids did strike the dump during preparations for the allied ground attack, but Pentagon officials say damage assessments showed that none of the chemical-weapons bunkers was hit.

Then, just after the war ended, U.S. troops swept through the area, routinely destroying what was left of Iraqi munitions on their way back to Saudi Arabia. The Army’s 37th Engineer Battalion was assigned to blow up bunkers in southern Iraq. Khamisiyah was in its path.

On March 4, 1991, the 37th detonated enough explosives to destroy dozens of Iraqi bunkers, including one labeled Bunker No. 73. On March 10, the soldiers also blew up an open ammunition pit several miles from the bunkers.

Vapor Clouds Seen

Military officers who served in the Gulf War say that unlike U.S. and allied forces, Iraqi troops did not paint any special markings on artillery shells or rockets that contained chemical agents, making them virtually indistinguishable from other munitions.

And the fighting and maneuvers during the 100-day Gulf War moved at such a breathtaking pace that the units did not take time to look closely at the stockpiles they were destroying.

“The guys just went in and did their thing,” said one senior officer whose unit was involved in such weapons demolition. “We didn’t see any with chemical markings, but can I tell you we never ran into any Iraqi chemical weapons? Not at all.”

Many soldiers involved did not even bother to wear protective gear. Members of the 37th told investigators later that they conducted routine tests to detect traces of toxic agents. Only one showed a positive reading, and it was later dismissed as a false positive.

Significantly, however, witnesses said the explosions at Khamisiyah produced large vapor clouds that prompted the troops to move back farther from the bunkers. Martin videotaped the ominous-looking plumes. He would show them later to anyone who asked.

Still, little was made of it until the following October, when an investigative team from the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq visited the depot as part of a postwar probe of Baghdad’s chemical and biological warfare program.

Contrary to the beliefs of U.S. intelligence agencies, Iraqi sources had told the commission that chemical weapons had been stored there.

Almost immediately, the panel sent its report on the destroyed bunker back to U.N. headquarters. In a later visit, U.N. inspectors also found and destroyed more than 450 122-millimeter rockets--all filled with chemical nerve agents--in a companion pit area several miles from Bunker No. 73.

The U.N. reports were forwarded to the Pentagon, which distributed a summary to major military commands. But with chemical weapons having played no role in the war, the reports drew no reaction. There was no record that U.S. troops had yet complained of any unusual symptoms.

But in early 1992, reservists in two Indiana units that had fought in the Gulf War--not at Khamisiyah, as it turns out--began to experience some ailments that they could not explain: headaches, fatigue, rashes and memory loss.

During the next several months, the same symptoms began showing up in other veterans across the country, inundating hospitals run by the Veterans Affairs Department and spilling over into the headlines.

By mid-1993, the mysterious epidemic had acquired a name: “Gulf War syndrome.”

Clinical Study

The Pentagon’s initial response was one of skepticism. Many in the Defense Department regarded the reservists as malingerers--or, in some cases, pretenders--who were simply after increased medical benefits.

But in May 1994, the department announced a new clinical diagnostic program to explore whether any aspect of the veterans’ service in the Persian Gulf had led to their health problems, as many of the victims believed.

In companion efforts, the Defense Department and the Veterans Administration set up hotlines for Gulf War veterans to report their ailments. Government physicians examined some 62,000 who registered, feeding the results into a clinical study that was pored over by specialists from a variety of disciplines.

They also compiled computer maps to explore any correlation between veterans who were ill and the deployment of their units, but found no clear pattern.

In August 1995, the Pentagon issued its conclusion: There was no clearly identifiable cause for Gulf War syndrome, and thus no single treatment. All of the symptoms seemed to involve either common recognizable illnesses, from arthritis to sleep disorders, or else seemed to be psychological or psychosomatic. And statistically, the veterans were not sicker than any other equivalent group.

“There is no magic bullet,” Dr. Stephen C. Joseph, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, told reporters at the time.

Some of the veterans were unpersuaded and angry. Martin was one of them, and he poured out his frustration in his appearance on the Baltimore talk show, describing the vapor cloud at Khamisiyah that he had found so suspicious but that the military had not.

Not until now.

According to Joseph, the now-unearthed U.N. report on the Khamisiyah inspection--since supplemented by new tests that found the toxins sarin, cyclosarin and mustard agent at the pit area as well--has finally provided the solid peg that the medical probers needed.

Under accepted medical procedure, he said, the veterans’ ailments could not have been linked to toxic agents until there was evidence they had been in contact with toxic gases or had suffered immediate side effects.

“Khamisiyah is a turning point,” he said in an interview.

But even some senior Pentagon officials now admit more could have been done earlier. The initial study probably was too “clinical” and failed to consider enough possibilities, one official said.

Also, the investigators had failed to look into the day-to-day experiences of U.S. ground troops, whose stories provided telling information that the official records did not.

There is also a question of original motives.

“There’s an institutional bias in the Defense Department in which you’ve got many people here who regarded these [veterans] as malingerers,” one knowledgeable official said. What impact that may have had on the Pentagon’s efforts is difficult to say.

Where the broader, intensified investigation will lead is unknown.

Medical officials say a number of theories and factors besides chemical exposure also are being considered in some Gulf War cases.

The Gulf War Research Foundation’s Tuite believes that allied bombing of chemical weapons stores may have blasted enough toxins into the atmosphere to account for many of the cases, even distant ones.

Other Possibilities

The veterans also point to reports by Czech and French chemical-weapons teams that say they detected the presence of nerve agents at various sites during the Gulf War, which could account for cases far from Khamisiyah.

Other researchers have suggested possible connections to the pyridostigmine bromide pills that more than 250,000 troops took to counteract chemical weapons; contact with depleted uranium, used in U.S. anti-tank shells; fumes from the burning oil wells in the region; a weakening of the veterans’ immune systems; and a little-known disease called organo-phosphate induced delayed neurotoxicity.

Pentagon medical investigators say they have found insufficient evidence to support any of these theories, or were not able to examine enough data from private studies to make a judgment. Private research on several continues.

Pentagon officials say they are hopeful that the expanded research on chemical weapons, including a CIA computer model of the winds and cloud cover during the destruction of the Khamisiyah bunker and ammunition pit, will help find a link. The model is due in the next few weeks.

Veterans say they hope the renewed search for a cause of Gulf War syndrome will translate into improved methods of treatment.

Most Gulf War veterans, active-duty and civilian, who have experienced symptoms are eligible for free medical treatment, and those with serious disorders can qualify for government disability benefits, which provide from $91 to $1,870 a month.

But some veterans have complained that more could have been done for them, and the Pentagon confirms that some cases have proved intractable.

The Khamisiyah breakthrough has already spurred more Pentagon spending on research into low-level exposure to nerve agents, which previously had been ignored. And experts say that if the calculations show that many veterans were exposed, the pressure to develop more-effective treatment will grow.

But it still remains far from certain that either the cause or cure of Gulf War syndrome will be found. Although the government finally recognized Agent Orange defoliants as being responsible for some health disorders in Vietnam War veterans, the chemical link remains elusive.

No matter what happens in the future, say some veterans, the turnabout on Gulf War syndrome will stand as a vindication for those who served in the conflict, and as an important lesson for their Pentagon overseers.

“We’ve fought this fight for five years with no basis of evidence that they would believe,” Martin says bitterly. “We’re hoping what the Khamisiyah incident will do is close off any questioning on that issue.”

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Chemical Weapon Stockpiles

U.S. troops were unaware that some Iraqi sites contained chemical weapons when they swept through after the war. U.N. inspectors later found evidence of chemical contamination. The Pentagon is now investigating which units were exposed to the chemicals, which may be linked to illnesses among some veterans. One of the worst possible contamination sites was the Khamisiyah weapons complex, where troops from the Army’ 37th Engineer Battalion blew up bunkers containing potentially lethal gas.

Source: CIA