The Folly of Breathing New Life Into an Outdated Military Alliance

It is often said that generals, in planning for the next conflict, refight the last war. Democracies are supposed to avoid such pitfalls by entrusting decisions on war and peace to civilian leaders, on the unspoken assumption that, as another aphorism has it, “war is too important a matter to be left to generals.” Unfortunately, political leaders are no less prone to refight the last war, especially if they won it.

A case in point is NATO’s seemingly irreversible commitment to expand the alliance by admitting several East European countries as new members. Not only do the allies universally support expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; it is also the only foreign-policy issue that enjoys strong bipartisan support in Washington.

At first glance, NATO’s planned expansion makes eminent sense. It was NATO, after all, that served as the military shield and pillar of Western determination to deter and contain Soviet expansionism throughout the Cold War. With Russia’s economic and political direction still unsettled, while Eastern Europe appears embarked on the road to democracy and a market economy, what could be more logical than to extend NATO’s umbrella over an even wider area and enhance the security of all Europe?

Logical as this argument may sound, tough questions remain. To begin with, though it is never stated explicitly, NATO’s proposed growth only makes sense as a deterrent to a revival of Russian expansionism. While this is clearly possible--and one certainly can sympathize with East European apprehensions on this score--it is simply not reality. Given the current state of Russia’s armed forces, furthermore, even the most pessimistic assessment does not envisage a serious Russian military threat for at least another decade.

In any case, were such a threat to exist now, the countries chosen for NATO membership--Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and perhaps Slovenia--would not be those most threatened by an invasion. None of the four countries borders Russia. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the impression that they were picked not because they would be at risk, but precisely because they would not be. NATO, for example, has told Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are also eager converts to democracy and free enterprise, that they are not yet eligible for membership because of unsettled ethnic and territorial disputes with Russia. In other words, the Baltic republics, because they really would be directly and immediately threatened by any resurgence of Russian imperialism, are not suitable candidates.

Nor does the planned expansion of the alliance seem to be feasible economically. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of modernizing the four countries’ antiquated military forces from $60 billion to $125 billion. Even the smaller estimate vastly exceeds the limited spending abilities of the East Europeans, which are unlikely to be buttressed by the shrinking defense budgets of the Western allies, either. The new applicants would thus be relegated to second-class status.

Perhaps the most serious objection that could be raised against NATO expansion, however, is that it will almost certainly have a destabilizing effect on European security and U.S.-Russian relations. Despite numerous statements by Western officials that NATO expansion would not be directed at Russia, it is widely perceived by Moscow, even in pro-Western, democratic circles, to be precisely that. For the reactionary, anti-democratic part of the political spectrum, it would be nothing short of proof positive of the sinister intentions of the West.

A NATO move eastward is likely to provoke instability and encourage Russian belligerence in yet another way. By accepting three or four new members now, and closing the door to new applicants for the foreseeable future, NATO will, in effect, sponsor a new division of Europe. An Iron Curtain it would not be, but even a “velvet curtain” is a curtain. It would be difficult to blame countries on the wrong side of the curtain for feeling like fair game for renewed Russian efforts to browbeat them into political subservience. The alleged rationale for the alliance’s enlargement--deterring Russian expansionism--could yet become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

If NATO’s expansion makes little sense politically or militarily, what reasons could there be for its wholehearted support among Western power brokers, from Berlin to Washington? To answer this question, one has to realize that the alliance’s planned expansion is not a sign of robust health, but an act of near-desperation to breathe new life into a terminally ill patient. Appearances aside, the fact is, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO lost its enemy and thus its raison d’etre as a miliary alliance. There has never been a military alliance in history that has survived the absence of a manifest and clearly understood threat and a well-defined mission to counter it.

NATO should have declared victory, congratulated itself and set up a schedule for its own dissolution. Instead, it has acted much like a corporation losing market share and is trying to survive by acquisitions and ventures outside its core business.

There is a final reason for the European push for NATO expansion that has little to do with security and everything to do with money. The West Europeans--first and foremost, Germany--realize the political and economic imperative of integrating Eastern Europe into the European Union. Yet, they are unwilling to face the huge economic costs that such an integration would entail. Even the poorest European Union member, Greece, which receives more than $5 billion of yearly subsidies, is richer than the best-off East Europeans. The cheap bone of NATO membership provides a convenient pretext to postpone economic integration and its costs into the 21st century.

What is lost in the sanguine hoopla surrounding NATO’s future is the stark reality that the national interests least served by its proposed expansion are those of the United States. There are any number of threats to U.S. national security, but a Russian invasion of Hungary or Slovenia is not one of them. The large amount of scarce U.S. defense dollars earmarked for NATO increasingly serves to subsidize a political klatsch society, at best, and, at worse, a promise to entangle the United States in more marginal, Bosnia-like ethnic conflicts.