Zoran Djindjic

For three frigid months last winter, Zoran Djindjic led tens of thousands of demonstrators through the streets of Belgrade. They demanded that Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic respect local election results giving Djindjic and other opposition candidates victories in more than a dozen cities. It was the most serious challenge to Milosevic in his 10-year authoritarian rule. Ultimately, Djindjic and his coalition partners were successful, and in February Djindjic took his elected seat as Belgrade’s first non-communist mayor since World War II.

And then the even harder part began: Struggling to keep the three-party coalition together--an effort that has failed--and fighting to run a sprawling capital with no money--the budget is largely controlled by Milosevic--and scant political support.

Seated in his spacious office in the 19th-century City Hall, decorated with old paintings and new plants, Djindjic was showing signs of the strain. His handsome face was lined with worry. The coalition, known as Zajedno (“Together”), has all but collapsed. City council members are conspiring to dump Djindjic as mayor. And the gray-haired 45-year-old is embroiled in an acrimonious, public feud with his former coalition partner, Vuk Draskovic, over how to maintain the momentum in working for political freedoms in repressive Serbia.

Throughout the protests of last winter, which began after Milosevic annulled Nov. 17 municipal elections, the pragmatic Djindjic was a cool counterbalance to the more emotional firebrand Draskovic. Such pragmatism has led Djindjic to unfortunate causes: He campaigned on behalf of the party of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, an indicted war-crimes suspect, last fall. But Djindjic is also widely seen as one of only a handful of capable politicians who can rally a credible opposition to Milosevic.

Married and the father of two young children, Djindjic cut his teeth on leftist student activism. After schooling in Germany, he shifted to mainstream politics, has been a member of Parliament since 1990 and was elected to head his Democratic Party in 1994.

Opposition to Milosevic was the one constant. Djindjic was forced to recognize his foe’s uncanny ability for political survival last month, when Milosevic traded in the presidency of Serbia for the presidency of Yugoslavia--ensuring himself another four years in power. This has opened the race for his replacement as Serbian president; the election is now set for Sept. 21. As Djindjic’s moderate opposition flounders, nefarious characters such as ultra-nationalist Vojislav Seselj are emerging to fill the void.

During a recent conversation, Djindjic, who says he does not intend to run for president, acknowledged his role in causing Zajedno’s demise by advocating expansion of the coalition. This new bloc would go beyond the original three parties, to include students, union activists and people from other professions and non-political walks of life. That angered and alienated Draskovic, who wants to run for the presidency as coalition candidate. But Djindjic insisted that doing anything else would be political suicide for the Serbian opposition

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Question: It seems Zajedno is dead. Is there any chance of salvaging the coalition? And if not, how does the opposition pose a credible challenge to Milosevic?

Answer: Only Milosevic’s mistakes led to a broad people’s protest, where our three coalition parties played a certain role. Our parties, a new mood of the Serbian people wanting reform and change, popular discontent and Milosevic’s mistakes--all that combined into an explosive mixture. As soon as this protest was over, [the coalition’s] role was over.

Looking at the present, Milosevic’s mistakes remain real, because it is part of his character. Discontent of the people remains too, because it is authentic and has deep roots. But, there is no political grouping now that is able to unite this and turn it into a force.

We have to remember that after Nov. 17, everything happened spontaneously. We should also remember that in [the protests], we as a coalition of parties were not the main heroes. The heroes were students, the city population, professionals, independent media. . . . That spirit has to be rekindled and then we again will have a victorious combination. And we are working on that.

Q: How?

A: All political parties are in very bad shape--Milosevic’s party, all other parties. This is a period of political deca- dence, interrupted only by temporary social or political unrest.

No existing political party or parties can bring the new quality that Serbia needs. Only by including other social structures can we achieve [renewed fervor]. We need to link the lively political activity at universities, and the trade unions, and the independent media that has grown over the last few months ... But we need a reason for all that to re-appear on the scene.

That reason can be the fight to create democratic conditions for the [upcoming presidential] election, the call for elections itself, or mistakes that Milosevic is going to make. And he will make mistakes, because he cannot function in a different way.

Q: But people were out in the streets for months--and now they look at the leaders of the movement and all they see is infighting. What can you say to these people, who are disillusioned and disappointed?

A: Of course they are disappointed. But that is a process of political maturation. It was unrealistic to expect that political representatives, like the three or four of us, could carry out a job that this country has been waiting for for the last 50 years.

People have to realize that without their daily and permanent participation, changes cannot happen. Our society is sick in a much more serious way, which cannot be solved by a simple change of government.

Q. Your decision to expand the coalition in some ways triggered the crisis within the coalition. What was your thinking?

A. My reason for provoking a crisis is that I saw that this coalition doesn’t guarantee reforms. For me the question was whether to disappoint the people now, with time to correct mistakes and build up strength; or in six months--when a lot of things would have been done definitively in a wrong way and when there is no possibility to correct these mistakes. In running the city, I have seen that in our coalition there is no willingness to include people who are not members of the parties. Yet, people in the parties are not good enough to run such serious things.

At that moment I realized that victory of such a coalition does not guarantee reforms in Serbia. And if I stop halfway, which means win the power and say this is enough, I would consider this my personal defeat.

Q: What about your own plans? Are you thinking of running for the presidency or are you happy to be mayor now?

A: My aim, now, is to create this democratic bloc, bringing together a lot of individuals with good reputations and a lot of non-political organizations. There are individuals like former [Central Bank] Gov. Dragoslav Avramovic, [former prime minister and Orange County businessman] Milan Panic, former Belgrade Mayor Nebojsa Covic [who defected from the Socialists]. And then there are representatives of actors, writers, students. There are [democratic] parties and a large number of local trade unions and civic organizations. Our idea is to make a wide alliance with other parties around the issue of elections.

Q: What has been the most difficult thing about being mayor?

A: [Under communism] the mayor was the strongest party man after the party chief. And as a mayor, using party instruments, he could do whatever he wants--with the banks, with state companies, the mayor could solve problems regardless of city statutes.

Now all that is completely different. But people have in their heads the picture of that old mayor, and they expect this mayor can solve housing problems, or problems of their salaries--which is, of course, impossible.

Objectively speaking, we have no money, even for the things that are our responsibility.

The only way for me to do something is to mobilize volunteer participation of the citizens, which means promoting the office of mayor. I think this is my biggest success--gathering a lot of financiers ready to pay for something for the city, and they receive only non-material satisfaction. To appear in public with me or that the name of their company is mentioned.

Q: For example?

A: With Nike and a couple of other sports companies, we are building 100 sports playgrounds. With McDonald’s and other local food producers, we managed to provide, for children with no parents that live in children’s homes, one free meal a day. As a city we wouldn’t be able to pay for these things. For physically handicapped children, through volunteer computer companies, we provided computer training and we will create several small Internet centers.

With UNICEF and several children organizations, we are providing every child aged 5 to 7 in Belgrade with at least one children’s book. We did a survey and saw that more than 30% of children in Belgrade get their first book at the age of 7. This project will last the whole summer.

With several cinemas in town, we made an agreement that every month on one weekend they will have free movies for children. About 7,000 children a month will visit the cinema for free. Our same survey told us that 70% of children in Belgrade have never been to the cinema.

All these things are financed by privately owned companies. This is the way authorities who have no money but have credibility work.

Q: Opponents, and some of your former allies, are trying to sack you as mayor. Can you survive?

A: In Serbia, a person who works for something instead of just talking is an obstacle. This disturbs the rules of the game. The rule of the game is that one should just talk, and not do anything.

But the situation is favorable for me. I can be dismissed only if Draskovic and [Milosevic’s] Socialists make a coalition. And if they make that coalition in an election year, then this is good for me. They can’t dismiss me without that coalition . . . because [without the Socialists] my opponents don’t have enough votes.

Q: Along with other Serbian intellectuals, you recently signed a controversial letter against genocide, that argued that Serbs have suffered more than any other group from the former Yugoslavia. Why?

A: I don’t consider that to be something important . . . at the present political moment . . . .

The Serbian people throughout this century, as a nation, were exposed to various extermination programs. The fact that at this moment Serbs also had a program to exterminate other peoples can’t annul the fact that from the beginning of this century there were genuine programs to eliminate this nation because of its religion and ethnicity . . . . So if somebody asks me, do you want to sign a statement that the Serbian people were object of genocide in this century, for me that statement is correct.

Q: Worse than Muslims?

A: Muslims are a religious community that was created in Yugoslavia. And as a religious community, they were certainly the biggest victim. But if we talk about the Yugoslavia created in 1918, with only three nations [Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], then out of these three nations, Serbs suffered the most. But if somebody asks me to sign a declaration that Muslims are the biggest victims of this war, I would sign that.

Q: How dangerous is the rise in popularity of extremist Vojislav Seselj?

A: People cannot behave irresponsibly, voting for somebody out of frustration, or fear, or incapability to evaluate one’s own interests, and not pay a price for it. Milosevic was a wrong investment and people are paying the price. If people want to invest more money in a lost investment like Seselj, then the price will be very big.

But my political view is that Seselj will never be able to come to power in Serbia. He has significance only in combination with Socialist Party, . . . doing their dirty jobs. There is nobody who can make a coalition with him, so he cannot get a majority. He is not dangerous as a political concept but as a factor that can block reforms.

Q: Many people describe a scenario in which he can very well become president of Serbia, forcing a second round in which the choice is him or Milosevic’s candidate.

A: He wouldn’t live long enough. In the state secret services, there are so many structures that would prevent [his victory]. He is the least protected from the forging of election results. If he ends up in a second round, he wouldn’t even be able to find out how many votes he had received. Nobody would regret that.