The Folly of Trading Peace for Justice

It was an irony that befitted Cambodia’s remarkable penchant for losing lives and opportunities. The last Khmer Rouge hard-liners announced they agreed to the government’s terms for peace--but their words were drowned out as the forces of the co-prime ministers traded mortar, rocket and machine-gun fire. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who had been talking peace with the Khmer Rouge, was deposed by Hun Sen, who had threatened the Khmer Rouge with violence.

The coup may have cost Cambodia the long-awaited end of the Khmer Rouge albatross. With their plans for the future suddenly in tatters, the guerrillas may change their minds about shifting to the political arena and decide they have no choice but to fight again. After the coup, Khmer Rouge President Khieu Samphan called for a popular uprising against Hun Sen, whom he labeled a Vietnamese “puppet.” It was the same language--of revolution, force and rabid nationalism--that the group has used since it filled the countryside with mass graves during its rule of the 1970s.

Even as it was about to disintegrate as a military force, the Khmer Rouge again played a major role in deciding Cambodia’s fate, as it has for three decades.

For years, Hun Sen has exploited the people’s hatred and fear of the Khmer Rouge to justify his attempts to aggrandize power. This time, Hun Sen said he struck to prevent what he claimed was Ranariddh’s attempt to smuggle Khmer Rouge defectors into the capital to attack him. Whether this claim is true or not, the coup, in which many civilians died in cross-fire and top Ranariddh associates were summarily executed, was a spit in the eye of the world community. The United Nations brokered the Cambodian peace treaty of 1991 and mounted a $2-billion mission that organized an election in 1993.

To understand why he launched the coup, one must understand that Hun Sen, who had headed the Vietnamese-installed communist government of the 1980s, is accustomed to monopolizing power. He recently felt his hold slipping ahead of the May 1998 presidential election, and reacted in his customary way--with force. Over the years, foreign countries and his Cambodian rivals have yielded to Hun Sen’s heavy-handedness because they wanted peace and “stability” at any price. That emboldened him.

Like the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen’s party violently breached the peace treaty during the U.N. mission. The Khmer Rouge continued fighting and boycotted the ’93 election. Hun Sen would not let peacekeepers control the state apparatus, and during the election campaign, his supporters murdered many opposition party members. After Ranariddh won anyway, Hun Sen’s party threatened an armed successionist movement. He shoved his way into the coalition government and soon dominated it.

Last year, Ranariddh moved to counter Hun Sen by gaining two important allies: Khmer Rouge defectors and opposition leader Sam Rainsy.

Ranariddh’s people and the Khmer Rouge have been symbiotically entwined since the 1970s. In their joint struggles against governments in Phnom Penh, the royal family contributed public respectability while the Khmer Rouge contributed military might. They separated when the Khmer Rouge reneged on the 1991 peace treaty.

The chance for reunion came last year, when senior Khmer Rouge official Ieng Sary and thousands of his fighters broke with Pol Pot. Competing for their allegiance, Hun Sen and Ranariddh gave defectors top posts in the national army. They pardoned Ieng Sary, who had been sentenced to death in absentia in 1979, and let him keep his organization, guns and riches at the gem-mining center of Pailin. Ranariddh wanted to give the same sweet deal to other Khmer Rouge whom he was trying to lure into defecting. They included Khieu Samphan, who, Ranariddh said, deserved special praise for having captured Pol Pot.

Ranariddh’s gamble was paying dividends. Ieng Sary warned Hun Sen that he would use force, if needed, to ensure that the results of the ’98 election were respected. Khieu Samphan’s party sought to join Ranariddh’s election alliance. This essentially recreated the battle lines of the 1980s. Hun Sen suddenly declared negotiations with the Khmer Rouge “illegal” and told Ranariddh: choose between me or them. Ranariddh’s underestimation of Hun Sen’s paranoia may have been his key miscalculation.

Last Sunday, Khieu Samphan, representing the last guerrilla holdouts, agreed to all Ranariddh’s conditions for peace. He declared support for the Cambodian Constitution and King Sihanouk, and said the regime of Pol Pot was finished. But now there is no one with whom to finish the deal. In fact, Hun Sen had threatened Khieu Samphan with violence if he came to the capital.

Last month, the co-prime ministers asked the United Nations to set up a tribunal to hear charges of genocide against Pol Pot. The United States has been searching for an alternative tribunal in case that effort fails. But Ranariddh’s negotiators said Pol Pot is being held by renegade rebels, and his hand-over depended on a deal with the government. With Pol Pot about 70 and described as very ill, the coup may have dashed any chance of bringing him to justice.

That may be just fine with Hun Sen. Testimony at a trial could implicate Hun Sen and other party bigwigs who had held positions of authority in the Khmer Rouge regime before fleeing purges in the late 1970s. And it might increase pressures to prosecute more recent political crimes. Since the 1993 election, many opposition party members, journalists and human rights workers have been killed in circumstances suggesting involvement by Hun Sen’s party. Most recently, Hun Sen was connected to a grenade attack on an opposition political rally. No one has been punished.

Human rights activists have criticized Ranariddh for using Pol Pot as a scapegoat so his henchmen can enter the mainstream. Some say Ranariddh brought about his own downfall by courting the Khmer Rouge and ignoring morality and the national interest. As if mindful of this, the prince last week promised the United States that he would not bring the Khmer Rouge into a government if he is restored to power.

But it’s not that simple.

The 1991 peace treaty, brokered by the U.N. Security Council and signed by 19 countries, recognized the Khmer Rouge as a legitimate political player in Cambodia. Two of Pol Pot’s closest associates, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen (who oversaw the Khmer Rouge torture chambers in the 1970s and was reported murdered last month in Khmer Rouge infighting) were members of a U.N.-recognized interim Cambodian government. In welcoming back the Khmer Rouge, Ranariddh was just pursuing an internationally sanctioned strategy of trading justice for peace.

Most Cambodians are so exhausted by so many years of fighting that, despite their nightmares of the 1970s, they would rather accommodate than antagonize the Khmer Rouge. Ranariddh won the 1993 election largely because he promised accommodation, while Hun Sen promised to fight to the end. Now, by eliminating Ranariddh, Hun Sen may finally have his wish.