One Doable Goal: Defanging Saddam

Diplomats from several countries are seeking to avert a military confrontation between the United States and Iraq over the expulsion of Americans from weapons inspection teams fielded by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq. But even if a face-saving formula to resolve the current crisis is agreed, the underlying conflict of interests between the U.N. commission and Iraq will continue to generate new complications and risks. U.S. policymakers must therefore determine realistic objectives and plan their moves in the high-stakes chess game with Baghdad.

The three U.S. objectives most frequently cited by analysts are: toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein while preserving a viable Iraqi state as a counterweight to Iran; if Saddam remains in power, keeping economic sanctions on Iraq in place; and eradicating Iraq’s stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and missile delivery systems and preventing Baghdad from reacquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The first two objectives are not realistic under current conditions. The American public does not support the cost in treasure and blood that would be required to topple Saddam, as the Bush administration recognized during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. And aerial bombing of chemical and biological weapons sites could entail substantial civilian casualties, not only in Iraq, but also downwind in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. With respect to maintaining the current level of sanctions, it is unlikely that France and Russia, which have extensive economic interests in Iraq, will tolerate an indefinite extension of the oil embargo.

Thus, the only American objective that is both compelling and realistic is to ensure that Iraq does not acquire, retain, brandish or use weapons of mass destruction against its neighbors in a bid to exert hegemony over the Persian Gulf.

In pursuit of this goal, the United States should publicly delink U.N. inspection activities from the targeting of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Instead, the primary U.S. objective should be to ensure that U.N. weapons inspectors, including Americans, return to Iraq and continue ferreting out its remaining chemical, biological and missile capabilities. As President Clinton has pointed out, the U.N. commission has eliminated more weapon stockpiles and production facilities over the past six years than were destroyed by air strikes during the Gulf War.

There is a catch, however. To carry out their mission, the U.N. inspectors must have full access to a number of sensitive sites that Iraq has previously denied to them. The barred sites include facilities controlled by the leading state security organs: the Special Republican Guard, the Mukhabarat (intelligence service) and the Special Security Organization. These agencies are primarily responsible for concealment, denial and deception with respect to Iraq’s illicit weapons programs, but they also are key to the security of the regime and of Saddam himself. Thus, even if a compromise with Baghdad can be worked out over the next few days, U.N. inspections will still meet with Iraqi resistance in practice.

A possible solution would be for the U.N. Security Council to specify a clear deadline for the lifting of economic sanctions against Iraq, say Jan. 1, 2000. Ensuring the elimination of Iraq’s mass destruction capability by this deadline would require a substantial increase in funding and manpower for the U.N. inspections. The deadline could be revoked if Iraq denies U.N. inspectors unimpeded access to any facility.

Such a formula would buy time while giving Saddam a face-saving way to back away from military confrontation. It would also provide an opportunity for domestic political changes that eventually could open the way for a reversal of Iraq’s proliferation programs, much as has occurred in South Africa, Argentina and Brazil. Finally, if Iraq fails to live up to its side of the bargain, the likelihood of a multilateral military response would be greater.

It is said that the best is the enemy of the good. This aphorism is particularly true of foreign policy, which typically involves a choice between unpalatable alternatives. In this case, while toppling Saddam Hussein may be the preferred U.S. option, the unilateral use of military force would have seriously negative consequences. Instead, the United States should focus its diplomatic efforts on the more narrow goal of ensuring that U.N. inspection teams complete their vital work of eliminating Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

Jonathan B. Tucker directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, Calif. In February 1995 he served on a U.N. inspection team in Iraq.

American effort would be best spent in support of United Nations inspections to eliminate the weapons of terror.