Cambodia Will Test ASEAN’s Maturity

Last week, the Assn. of South East Asian Nations celebrated its 30th anniversary. In the midst of the celebrations of economic growth and emerging political democracy in many ASEAN nations, however, recent currency crises call into question just how sound and sustainable the apparent progress is. Even more troubling, ASEAN faces in Cambodia a critical test that may determine whether it is an emerging regional bloc or just a geographical neighborhood.

Cambodia again is split by intense political disputes so divisive that the United Nations General Assembly decided late in September to leave the Cambodia seat vacant rather than decide between the competing factions. As before, these factions seek to internationalize their dispute, each obviously hoping that external political intervention will tip the domestic political scales in its favor. History tells us, however, that appeals to external powers only will prolong civil strife in Cambodia, and that the country and its immediate neighbors--in short, ASEAN--must solve the problem themselves. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration has not yet learned this lesson.

The earlier international effort in Cambodia began to fall apart when it lost touch with actually trying to bring the Cambodian factions into genuine agreement. Instead, the emphasis in the long-running negotiations among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council fell into a typical diplomatic trap: believing that agreement to a piece of paper, the Paris accords, amounted to a genuine meeting of the minds of the Cambodian parties.

The international community’s real disgrace was in deceiving the Cambodian people into thinking that their leaders, particularly Hun Sen, actually had agreed to abide by the results of free and fair elections, which they manifestly had not. “Nation building” was precisely what the U.N. tried, unsuccessfully, in Cambodia before and is precisely the policy to avoid now. Today, even the interventionists concede that the initial U.N. effort in Cambodia failed.

It is both presumptuous and naive to believe that “nation building” is something that the United States or others should hazard. Presumptuous, because it implies that all-knowing foreigners can do a better job of creating a nation than the people who are going to have to inhabit the nation after it is built. Naive, because after Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia, one would think that the sheer weight of contrary empirical evidence would have some chastening effect on the ethereal mentality inherent in trying to rebuild failed states.

Although it has been some time since commentators wrote disparagingly of “social engineering,” perhaps it is now appropriate to bring that phrase back. Professor Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University has characterized President Clinton’s foreign policy as being “international social work,” which is an equally accurate description of many current proposals for Cambodia.

Perhaps most destructive of true “nation building” in Cambodia is the idea of an international tribunal to try charges of genocide. To get the full cathartic benefit of war crimes trials, a nation must be willing to take on the responsibility of judging its own. It may choose to opt for the amnesia of a general forgiveness of past crimes, but if the nation’s people want justice instead of amnesty, they should try the criminals themselves. To create an international tribunal to do the dirty work implies an immaturity on the part of the Cambodians and paternalism on the part of the international community.

Repeated interventions by global powers are no substitute for the Cambodians coming to terms with themselves. There may well be a role for outsiders to encourage the factions to meet and in post-settlement guarantees or assistance. This role, however, is ripe for the expanded and ever more self-confident ASEAN, not for the United Nations. This is a real test for ASEAN, which now includes Vietnam as well as Thailand and all other countries of the region. Success in Cambodia has measurable value for its fellow ASEAN members and their own continued international maturation requires that they take the lead.

What ASEAN, not the United Nations, should undertake is the diplomatic equivalent of a union-management negotiation. The principal Cambodian leaders should be closeted in a conference room until they reach genuine agreement among themselves. If ASEAN is satisfied with less than a fully democratic result in Cambodia, then ASEAN can explain that to the rest of the world. If ASEAN has higher standards, all the better.

It is time for the U.N. to get out of the way and let ASEAN take the lead--politically and financially--in Cambodia.