Jiang, Clinton Won’t Make Waves

Richard Nixon’s visit to China opened the door to improved Sino-U.S. relations. Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States established formal diplomatic relations, and he, with Jimmy Carter, mapped out a strategy to contain the Soviet Union. Those two meetings between Chinese and American leaders played a crucial role in the historical development of the world situation.

Jiang Zemin’s visit next week to the U.S. and meeting with President Clinton could also produce a new world situation. As Clinton told Liu Huaqiu, director of the Chinese State Council’s Office of Foreign Affairs, this month, “Sino-American cooperation may produce a great impact on the world situation in the coming 40 to 50 years.”

From China’s perspective, Jiang consolidated his ruling position at the 15th Communist Party Congress. With the domestic situation stabilized, he must further seek the stabilization of the international situation. China’s greatest source of instability is its relationship with the United States, in which Taiwan is the main factor.

Jiang has already set up strategic partnerships with Russia and France, not only for economic and military development, but also to constrain America and divide it from its allies. In the Far East, he has adopted neighborly policies to improve ties, allay suspicions and strengthen economic cooperation, but also to weaken and diminish American influence in the region. China’s alternating use of “hard and soft” tactics toward Japan is clearly aimed at confining a resurgence of Japanese militarism and assuring Japan’s economic cooperation while playing Tokyo against Washington.

Jiang’s multi-front foreign policy is mostly directed at the U.S. His aim is not to make America into an enemy; rather it is to weaken America’s ability to confine China and to establish a long-term relationship with the U.S. that will benefit China’s economy. China’s economic construction will rely greatly on U.S. markets and capital. In order to maintain stability across the Taiwan strait, Jiang also needs U.S. policy restrictions and constraints on Taiwan.

Both Clinton and Jiang have high hopes for the favorable development of Sino-American relations. But they both face internal constraints and they cannot control each other. In particular, the stagnation of China’s political reforms and the ideological conflicts between the two countries are likely to pose great difficulties.

During the summit, Jiang may make concessions on a range of issues, including human rights, the arms race, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the trade deficit. He may present Clinton with some big economic or political “gifts.” His sole request will be twofold: He will request that America further restrict Taiwan’s efforts toward independence and its notion of “one China, one Taiwan” as well as its push for membership in the United Nations and for official visits or activities in America. He also will seek a more clear-cut commitment to cut back on U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan. If Clinton can deliver on these two items, Taiwan independence forces are sure to be suppressed and Jiang will not have to resort to the use of force to resolve the Taiwan question. On this basis, a new Sino-American relationship can be established.

The United States is still the only superpower in the world, but its position of strength has been greatly weakened since the end of the Cold War, as the global emphasis has shifted toward economic development and trade. America’s former allies have become its economic competitors. The international rise of nationalism and religious forces undoubtedly pose grave threats.

In the Far East, America wishes to foster Russia but feels uneasy, as both have their own motives. On the issue of security in the Far East, America wants to constrain the expansion of China’s influence, yet has no choice but to rely on China to maintain security in the region. Therefore, America must similarly both restrain and rely on Japan. But the biggest potential threat to America comes from China, not just because of its huge size and population, but because of the immeasurable threat posed by its growing economic and political power.

On the Taiwan issue, America wants to hold on to Taiwan but worries that China may resort to the use of force. The U.S. is limited in what it can do by the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques.

Following Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to Cornell University, America was forced to reexamine and adjust its strategy toward China. Although Clinton is relatively well-prepared for Jiang’s visit, they are unlikely to have any breakthroughs in bilateral relations.

Yet there is truly a historical opportunity for China and America. This meeting between Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin--provided they possess the same strategic wisdom, courage and resolve as Mao, Nixon, Deng and Carter and overcome obstacles, downplay conflicts and turn negative factors into positive ones--can create a new strategic arrangement in which the two countries peacefully co-exist and develop for the next few decades.