Can Antagonists Avoid the Inevitable in 1999?

In late 1996, the government of Israel faced serious difficulties in its relations with the Palestinians. With the peace talks hopelessly stalled, at Israel’s request the United States returned to center stage, having put in an Oscar-worthy performance as “best supporting actor” from 1993 to 1996. On a practical level, it produced results. A combination of U.S. side letters, notes for the record and guarantees escorted the Hebron agreement, which seemed to get things back on track and answer the needs of the parties involved.

But implementation didn’t proceed smoothly and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu again turned to the U.S. to help sell his ideas to an increasingly suspicious partner. Netanyahu apparently could agree to an additional Israeli redeployment from the West Bank if it were accompanied by immediate final status talks, a heavy dose of security measures and reciprocity on the part of the Palestinians.

After an initial American attempt to unstick the process by dealing with one issue at a time, the U.S. put these Israeli-inspired ideas together as a package. This was the genesis of the U.S. initiative that was first presented to the two sides in early 1998.

With much encouragement and to the surprise of the U.S. and Israeli governments, the Palestinians accepted the plan.

After becoming the poster boy for “foot dragging” over the past months, it appears that Netanyahu is somewhat less enthusiastic about his own ideas today than when he first suggested them to the U.S.

It is reasonable to assume that the Clinton administration will now formally make the plan public, as it has committed itself to doing. After State Department Spokesman Jamie P. Rubin commented that the Palestinians have agreed to the American ideas and that “the ball is in the court of the Israelis” to sign off on them, it becomes inconceivable that the details of these very ideas will remain a secret one moment longer.

This week’s direct talks at the request of the U.S. have been equally fruitless. The merits of the plan now should be judged in the court of public opinion.

A reasonable expectation, once the plan is public, would be for the self-styled moderates in Israel’s governing coalition to make good on their claim that they have no place in a government that refuses to move forward on the peace process. The opposition Labor Party, for its part, should declare that it will provide the government with a safety net in Parliament in the face of any extreme right-wing attempt to call a no-confidence vote.

With such encouragement, the elusive Israeli “yes” should be be forthcoming.

The adoption of this package of ideas and its implementation has become the sine qua non for moving forward at this stage. Final status negotiations would be resumed, but even my optimism cannot entertain the notion that the two sides will reach an agreement by May 4, 1999--the five-year mark by which the Oslo accords called for conclusion of permanent status negotiations.

Thus, the morning after the U.S. package is agreed upon by all parties, our immediate challenge becomes how to avoid the apparently inevitable unilateral acts and responses--the declaration of a Palestinian state and the annexation of parts of the West Bank--waiting to greet us next May.

I propose the following:

Both sides should complete implementation of the interim agreements by Jan. 1, 1999. Israel should announce its willingness to recognize a demilitarized Palestinian state at the completion of negotiations, which would have an extended deadline but should be completed not later than Jan. 1, 2001.

This might just avoid the inevitable. Both sides would realize concrete achievements and be presented with a way out from the respective corners that they have maneuvered themselves into as we approach May 1999.