Needed: a Clear Political Strategy

The U.S.-British military strikes against Iraq mark the beginning of a new phase in the eight-year U.S. policy of containing Saddam Hussein.

This revised policy has three parts: The threat of military force if Iraq tries to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction programs or attacks its neighbors, the Kurds or allied aircraft; U.N. sanctions on Iraq, described by the president “as among the most extensive sanctions in U.N. history”; and increased efforts to encourage Iraqi opposition activities against Saddam’s government.

In policy terms, the costs of the strikes and the implications of the new approach to Iraq appear high, for three reasons. First, the United Nations Special Commission is an apparent casualty of the U.S. decision to attack. In announcing the airstrikes, President Clinton used as justification the Dec. 15 report to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan by Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector Richard Butler. Clinton had called off airstrikes against Iraq one month earlier after Iraq’s last-minute decision to resume cooperation with UNSCOM. Butler’s report concluded that UNSCOM made “no progress” in its disarmament activities because of Iraq’s obstruction, restrictions and noncompliance.

Although the U.S. has threatened further airstrikes, it is difficult to imagine how periodic bombing could rival the effectiveness of UNSCOM in monitoring Iraq’s weapons programs. In the hype over Butler’s Dec. 15 letter, many may have lost sight of the commission’s record of disarmament in Iraq. Butler’s October 1998 report to Annan noted that “the disarmament phase of the Security Council’s requirements is possibly near its end in the missile and chemical weapons areas.” The International Atomic Energy Agency, responsible for monitoring Iraq’s nuclear programs, reported in its own letter to the secretary-general on Dec. 14 that Iraq “has provided [the IAEA] the necessary level of cooperation.”

In short, the loss of UNSCOM is a net gain for Saddam’s efforts to reconstitute his weapons programs.

Second, the U.S. may have squandered what remains of the U.N. consensus on policy toward Iraq. This time the U.S. worked around, rather than through, the U.N. Security Council, drawing protests from Russia and China, among others. This is unfortunate, because despite the differences over Iraq among the five permanent members, they all share an interest in enforcing U.N. resolutions dealing with Iraq. The American military action might mean that the U.N. will be marginalized in Washington’s diplomatic initiatives.

This development could, over time, work to Saddam’s advantage. The U.S. needs the support of its U.N. allies if it wishes to maintain sanctions on Iraq and, if possible, resume UNSCOM inspections. Although it remains to be seen how far Moscow will push Washington over Iraq, the American attacks are probably the most severe test of U.S.-Russian relations since the Gulf War. Increased American unilateralism means increased isolation for future U.S. policy initiatives toward Iraq.

Third, many in the Arab world and elsewhere view the American military action against Iraq as part of a cynical strategy that disregards the lives of ordinary Iraqis for the declared objective of containing Saddam’s regional influence. Further questions have been raised about the perceived link between the timing of the attacks and the impeachment hearings. The demonstrations throughout the region against U.S. military action should be understood in the context of a pervasive and growing Arab frustration with U.S. policy toward both Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The U.S. should think carefully about the policy costs of bombing--the loss of UNSCOM and increased U.S. isolation at the U.N. and in the Arab world--and consider means of regaining international and regional consensus:

* Negotiate with both the U.N. and Iraq about the resumption of UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring and disarmament activities inside Iraq as part of an agreement to conduct a comprehensive U.N. review of the Iraq issue.

* Expand the oil-for-food program to allow more support for Iraq’s education, health and sanitation sectors.

* Declare that the U.S., along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, will reconsider Iraq’s sanctions, debt and reparations obligations, once Saddam is no longer in power.

* Recognize the inherent limitations of so-called “liberation” strategies and halfhearted efforts to depose Saddam, and refrain from picking winners among Iraqi opposition groups and figures. The failure of these initiatives will only serve to deepen cynicism in the region and among Iraqis about U.S. policy. The future of Iraq is a question first and foremost for Iraqis themselves.

Washington should understand that there are no quick fixes in Iraq, and that a successful long-term strategy for Iraq requires consensus, consultation and credibility, as well as a clear political strategy to guide any further use of military power.