Demonized Relations Magnify Weapons Issue

With Iranian President Mohammad Khatami’s address to the American people, we have further evidence of the dramatic ideological confrontation over liberalization underway in Iran, with important implications for the region and for U.S. policies. Hard-liners in Tehran and Washington will be forced to review the stereotyped and sometimes even demonized views of each other for the sake of larger regional interests. At the center of this painful reevaluation lies the issue of weapons of mass destruction.

It is no secret that Iran is developing advanced missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, other states in the area--Syria, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India--are pursuing similar courses to make war more lethal. Topping the list is Iraq, with Saddam Hussein’s record of proliferation coupled with two wars against Kuwait and Iran. But Iraq is now under deep international scrutiny, and Iran is not. And Iran’s past radical behavior has created anxiety about its own longer term intentions.

Iran’s quest for powerful weapons is linked to the global problem of weapons proliferation. In principle, any such proliferation is undesirable, on the simple calculus that the more such weapons exist, the greater the likelihood that they will be used. But the reality is that many states of the world with serious geopolitical pretensions nourish at least an aspiration, if not yet the planning, to develop such weapons, both as symbol of their prominence and to strengthen their position in either an offensive or defensive capacity as regional powers. It was the shah of Iran who stated that an eventual nuclear capability for his country befitted its greatness. In this sense, the U.S. faces a long-term losing battle in trying to limit the spread of such weapons.

But the weapons in themselves are neutral commodities. What really counts are the nature and intentions of the regimes or leaders that wield them. Americans do not lose sleep over the fact that France or Britain could destroy America’s major cities with nuclear weapons tomorrow. And American anxiety over Russia’s nuclear arsenal is vastly reduced. Why? Because the character and intent of Russia’s government now is far removed from what it was under ideological Leninist leadership. Furthermore, Washington has reluctantly but basically acquiesced to the reality of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons. It has no trouble with Israeli weapons of mass destruction. So the principle of proliferation already is muddied.

In Iran’s case, its harsh rhetoric and radicalism of the past give real pause for thought about its intentions. But such anxieties are not evident in the way most of America’s allies in the Persian Gulf or Europe have chosen to treat Tehran today, for a variety of reasons. This leaves the U.S. in a dilemma and with limited choices in managing the problem.

First, top priority must go to encouraging change in the nature of Tehran’s policies. A key driver behind Iran’s development of a missile program was its disastrous experience at the receiving end of Saddam’s missiles for seven years of war; it is determined never to be in that position again. Also, partly for reasons of its own making, Iran is convinced that Washington--its single greatest threat, surpassing even that of Saddam--is determined to bring Tehran to its knees. Finally, Iran sees itself as the natural dominant power of the Gulf.

If a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement can come about--and this is not unattainable--it will go a long way toward lessening the intensity of Iran’s need to develop these weapons or to use them against the U.S. or its allies. A rapprochement indeed takes two, but Washington must appreciate that Iran’s weapons quest is as much the result of the present U.S.-Iranian hostility as it is the cause.

Despite the heartening changes Khatami has promised, there can be no guarantees that Iran will not remain a revolutionary power for a long time, a potential source of instability and the possessor of dangerous weaponry. No one can rule out the possibility that the U.S. might even have to take preemptive military action if signs of imminent conflict raise the prospects of the use of such weapons. Vigilance and preparation for such a conflict may be desirable, but there is no ideal world in which all risks can be eliminated in advance on the off chance of conflict.

In short, certain realities confront U.S. policies: the determination of many regional powers to work toward acquiring more dangerous weapons in the coming decades; the great problems in arresting such a trend; the impact that a U.S. rapprochement with Iran can have on Tehran’s quest for such weapons; the diminished likelihood of Iran’s use of such weapons if it is no longer eyeball-to-eyeball with the U.S. in the Gulf.

Work to limit nuclear proliferation in Iran? Yes indeed, but that’s not enough. In planning Gulf security, we need to ensure that our policies and our presence there do not actually carry the seeds of future regional conflict in themselves. That fear is precisely what is driving many of our newly dovish allies in Europe and the Gulf today.