Tycoons in Russia Buy Themselves a Voice

When banking mogul Vladimir Gusinsky bought 25% of the Israeli newspaper Maariv last week, he was tipping off the cognoscenti about his druthers in Russia’s next presidential election.

Gusinsky and the rest of Russia’s small clique of oligarchs have been buying up major newspapers, magazines and broadcast networks to shape public opinion about the political candidates they consider most likely to benefit their bottom lines.

In the case of Gusinsky’s recent purchase, the tycoon--variously associated with three rival contenders to succeed President Boris N. Yeltsin--appeared to be settling on support for Moscow Mayor Yuri M. Luzhkov.

Luzhkov has invested heavily in ventures aimed at luring back the brains and money that have migrated to Israel over the past two decades, and Gusinsky’s purchase secures a platform for Luzhkov to campaign among Israel’s 800,000 emigre Russians.

Such obscure, behind-the-scenes manipulations of the media are the hallmark of Russia’s post-Communist press--an institution that has been liberated from Soviet-era censorship but is still far from what Western journalists would consider free.

Journalists and others supportive of a more independent press complain that democracy’s development here is stunted when the media are the tools of a tycoon’s trade rather than venues for debate and examination of public interests.

“The authorities and many other people have come to view the media as weapons with which to resolve political questions. And it is partly our own fault, as we created this role in 1996 when all the mass media took the side of the president” in the last election, said Oleg Dobrodeyev, head of the NTV network. NTV, by the way, is owned by Gusinsky in alliance with Rem Vyakhirev of Russia’s natural gas monopoly, Gazprom.

Dobrodeyev and other media managers lament the editorial intrusions of their politically motivated owners, but Western champions of free speech note that the Russian press has made great strides toward independence and objectivity in the decade since Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev introduced glasnost.

Gone are the days when Communist Party ideologues dictated, line by line, the “news” to be printed or broadcast. But Russian journalists note that only two years ago criminal charges were brought against the producers of NTV’s satirical puppet show, “Kukli,” for lampooning Yeltsin and his Kremlin cronies. And this week, the president called broadcasters on the carpet for “excesses” in covering the recent 10-day blockade of Russian railroads by coal miners who hadn’t been paid.

“The media owners are sometimes the worst censors,” Yeltsin complained, blaming privately owned television for encouraging the striking miners by publicizing their “illegal actions.”

Big Change Since Soviet Era

Nonetheless, journalists are aware of the contrasts with the Soviet era, when any coverage of social unrest was unthinkable because Communists controlled every step of the corrupted information business.

When publisher Sergei Fedorov and a few friends started a business newspaper in the Volga River city of Samara in the early days of glasnost, they were arrested for running a photo that made fun of the Communist leadership’s approach to dealing with ubiquitous shortages. The photo showed a sign at a pharmacy explaining that because of insufficient stocks, condoms were for sale only to elderly World War II veterans.

“I can’t imagine such an incident being repeated in today’s conditions,” Fedorov, now head of his own regional publishing company, recalled of his short-lived shutdown with nostalgic good humor.

But the leadership’s ability to obstruct press freedom is still in place, even if strong-arm tactics like arrest and suppression are resorted to less often.

“Almost all newspapers now are owned by private investors, but they are all printed on presses that remain local government monopolies,” noted Pavel Gusev, the editor of the lively Moskovsky Komsomolets daily. Like all Moscow-based media, Gusev’s newspaper never dares extend its exposes and muckraking to Luzhkov’s city government, which has at times shown it is willing and capable of sabotaging publication by every trick from cutting off electricity to a newsroom to revoking an office lease.

Businessmen Can Control Content

The powerful businessmen who own controlling interests in Russian media are also able to rein in reports that are unflattering to any of their empires’ diverse figures by direct or implied threats to fire writers or editors who are indiscreet.

The daily Izvestia, for example, ran a story more than a year ago quoting a report that then-Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin had amassed an estimated $5 billion in personal wealth during his government service as head of Gazprom. Editor Igor Golembievsky was forced to resign--outraged oligarch Vagit Alekperov, who owns much of Izvestia, is allied with Gazprom.

Two years ago, the influential magnates who united behind Yeltsin to ensure the defeat of Communist Party leader Gennady A. Zyuganov in the presidential race were of one mind because their vast capitalist networks were uniformly at risk in the event of a Communist comeback.

But as the country gears up for the contest that will decide who succeeds Yeltsin, the tycoons have splintered in their support for the non-Communist contenders.

Gusinsky, whose Most Group banking interests have long been entwined with Luzhkov’s quasi-private municipal financing and construction ventures, had been flirting with Chernomyrdin and liberal economist Grigory A. Yavlinsky before his recent moves signaling a preference for Luzhkov.

Vladimir O. Potanin, the politically engaged chairman of the powerful Uneximbank empire, has steadfastly aligned himself with the party in power--the Yeltsin entourage that has yet to put forward an heir apparent for the presidency in 2000 but seems to be grooming young reformer Boris Y. Nemtsov.

Perhaps Russia’s most powerful oligarch, Boris A. Berezovsky, has been using his media holdings--ORT television, the daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta and the weekly magazine Ogonek--to push the agenda of the ousted Chernomyrdin while keeping his options open with the current reform team as well as nationalist-patriot Alexander I. Lebed.

Berezovsky takes exception to the term “oligarch” as well as to suggestions that the independence of his media outlets is subordinated to his political aims.

“Private capital has no claims to power in Russia,” the mogul-cum-public-servant said. He has already served as deputy head of the national Security Council and is currently head of the government agency in charge of relations with former Soviet republics, and he has used those positions to wage open warfare with prominent reform strategist Anatoly B. Chubais as well as the man to beat in the next election, Luzhkov.

Despite his assurances, Berezovsky makes it clear that he is engaged in the media business to influence the development of a market economy. His influence with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, for example, was apparent during a savage battle with Chubais late last year, when the newspaper cast the Kremlin’s chief economic architect as a bribe-taker.

Freedom of Press Depends on Economy

But those with longer memories of the rough road to freedom that the Russian media have traveled concede that the emergence of a fully independent press is contingent on widespread economic revival. Until considerably more advertising revenue and disposable income are in play, they say, the media will remain the moguls’ playthings.

“What choice did we have but to be bought so we could work another day?” asked Vitaly Tretyakov, the editor of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, which Berezovsky bailed out of impending failure three years ago.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, which means “Independent Newspaper,” will apparently have to wait for broader economic revival in Russia to live up to its name.

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The Moguls and the Media

* Boris A. Berezovsky: head of Logovaz financial-industrial group that encompasses car imports and sales, aviation, oil and media--ORT television, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Ogonek. Supports former Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, one of the few declared candidates for the next presidential election. Also bankrolled the regional gubernatorial campaign recently won by retired Gen. Alexander I. Lebed, apparently trying to keep his options open. Generally supportive of President Boris N. Yeltsin, but less keen on the “young reformers” believed to be running the Kremlin.

* Vladimir Gusinsky: head of Most Group banking empire and major shareholder in daily newspaper Sevodnya, news weekly Itogi and NTV. Strong links to Moscow Mayor Yuri M. Luzhkov. Also supportive in the past of liberal economist Grigory A. Yavlinsky and Chernomyrdin.

* Rem Vyakhirev: head of state natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, which holds major interests in dailies Trud and Rabochaya Tribuna, as well as NTV. Strongly supportive of former boss Chernomyrdin.

* Vladimir O. Potanin: head of the Uneximbank holdings that include oil, metals and telecommunications as well as media interests in dailies Komsomolskaya Pravda, Russky Telegraf and Izvestia. Closely allied with Yeltsin team but has also shown support for Luzhkov.

* Mikhail Khodorkovsky: head of the Menatep banking and industrial group with oil interests and influential share of Independent Media, which produces Moscow’s main English-language daily, Moscow News, and Russian-language editions of magazines Cosmopolitan, Playboy, Good Housekeeping and Men’s Health.

* Vagit Alekperov: head of Lukoil vertical monopoly with major holdings in daily Izvestia. Supportive of Chernomyrdin.