The Unknown Factors of the Anthrax Vaccine
The Pentagon’s recent decision to vaccinate every member of the armed forces against anthrax may have come too quickly. One study just reported by the National Academy of Sciences questions the vaccine’s effectiveness against varied strains of the bacteria. Another suggests Russian scientists have already genetically engineered a strain that resists the available vaccine. And there are other concerns as well.
To be sure, germ warfare is worrisome, and anthrax bacilli are probable biological weapons. But besides uncertainties about effectiveness, the vaccine’s safety has also been questioned. Moreover, the timing of the decision is unfortunate. Coming amid near-frenzied speculation about Saddam Hussein’s germ-weapons program, it heightens an unwarranted sense that Americans are in imminent danger of an anthrax attack.
Anthrax primarily affects livestock and wild animals. But the bacteria can be fatal to humans, especially if inhaled. Though the microorganisms commonly exist as durable shell-like spores, in a warm moist environment like the lungs, they can become active and lethal.
These features make airborne anthrax appealing to anyone wicked enough to want a germ weapon. But anthrax is only one of many biological weapons. It seems shortsighted to believe an enemy might not choose from scores of others that troops were not inoculated against. Even if anthrax were the weapon of choice, questions about the vaccine persist.
Unlike polio, small pox and other diseases controlled by vaccines, anthrax is not contagious and airborne infection is rare. This is because the spores usually lie beneath the soil surface. Thus, the effectiveness of the vaccine against inhaled spores has been virtually untested in humans and is largely surmised from experiments with animals.
People who have received anthrax vaccinations, like wool handlers and some researchers, appear protected, although it is not clear whether they ever breathed in spores. The number of such workers, in any case, is limited. The plan to inject 2.4 million troops is, in part, a leap of faith that the vaccine will work against inhaled germs. Still, the effort might be worthwhile if the vaccine’s safety were assured. But here, too, there is uncertainty.
The only previous large-scale inoculation program took place on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, when 150,000 troops received shots. Thankfully, the Iraqis did not unleash anthrax weapons, and the effectiveness of the vaccine went untested. But the program has since become embroiled in debate about illnesses suffered by many veterans.
In December 1994, a staff report of the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs came to an unnerving conclusion. Based on testimony from scientists and veterans, the report said, “anthrax vaccine should continue to be considered as a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf military personnel.”
Many scientists doubt that the side effects of the anthrax vaccine are greater than for other vaccines. But this presumption could not be confirmed or refuted from the records. In 1996, the congressionally chartered Institute of Medicine found information on Gulf War vaccinations was “incomplete and possibly inaccurate.”
The Pentagon’s credibility about Gulf War illnesses has since plummeted. After denying for five years that military personnel were exposed to chemical or biological warfare agents, the agency began to reverse itself in mid-1996. At first, it admitted a few hundred troops might have been exposed while destroying Iraqi chemical stockpiles. In the following months, estimates were repeatedly raised, most recently to about 100,000 soldiers.
The military’s records were so botched that a presidential panel questioned the Pentagon’s ability to oversee investigations of Gulf War illnesses. A House committee has recommended stripping the Defense Department of its supervisory authority altogether.
We have come to this: The Pentagon’s ability to assess possible vaccination-related illnesses remains in question. But it is planning a massive program of such vaccinations anyway.
U.S. troops should never be deprived of appropriate protection, but neither should they be put at risk by a rushed program. Promising careful oversight, the Pentagon plans first to vaccinate 100,000 personnel, followed by the remaining two-million-plus. But even the initial 100,000 seems an overreach.
In conjunction with current studies of Gulf War illnesses, perhaps a few thousand troops might be given the vaccine and monitored for an extended period. The resulting information could provide more answers about safety and offer a greater sense of confidence.
No one should underestimate the misery of germ warfare. The administration’s insistence that Hussein not be permitted to block U.N. monitors from unfettered inspections is right. Nonetheless, despite his cat-and-mouse behavior concerning Iraq’s bio-warfare plans, Hussein’s war-making capacity remains crippled. Of course, if left unmonitored, Iraq could revive its largely destroyed weapons programs. Still, U.S. troops do not now appear in imminent danger of an anthrax attack from Iraq or any other country.
The proper response to Hussein, and any others who develop these abhorrent weapons, must be assurance they will suffer intolerably. If Iraq is forced to stop its illegal biological activities, the example will be a lesson to other countries. If not, we shall need more than anthrax vaccines to stop the biological calamity that could ensue.
