After Suharto: The Men Who Would Rescue Indonesia

The collapse of Suharto’s rule last week was almost inevitable. Once the economic crisis began to overwhelm his government early this year, it was just a matter of time. As Indonesia picks up the pieces, the big question is which individuals and which institutions will be able to operate effectively in the new political environment.

Suharto’s departure represents an enormous change for Indonesia. Under his 32-year rule, power became extremely centralized. Although Indonesia’s constitution provides for a powerful presidency, Suharto introduced myriad other rules that served to concentrate his authority even more. Now, suddenly, the man at the center is gone.

Not long ago, people in Washington and other foreign capitals contended that Suharto had to be supported since there was no alternative political leader on the horizon. This view was never compelling, both because Suharto had become terminally damaged by early 1998 and because in Indonesia, as elsewhere, there are always other leaders awaiting an opening. Now that the cat is away in Indonesia, the mice assuredly will begin to play.

Anyone who is to succeed in ruling Indonesia in the near term will have to satisfy a number of key constituencies the students, the army, foreign investors and, to a lesser extent, certain foreign governments. For now, the presidency is occupied by Suharto’s deputy, Jusuf Habibie.

Habibie is a bright man with a vision for his country, but he has displayed no aptitude for prime-time politics. His successes rest on his status as a privileged protege of Suharto. But this is his hour. The constitution has given him the chance to show what he is capable of.

In the brief period since his appointment, Habibie has made positive noises but taken uninspiring action. His first official speech promised political reform, a return to stability and fulfillment of commitments to international creditors. But the Cabinet he announced could hardly be described as bold. It is composed of many of the key figures from Suharto’s last cabinet. It does not include the most flagrant faces of cronyism--Suharto’s daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, and timber baron Mohammed “Bob” Hasan--but it does have a depressing number of political hacks with dubious backgrounds.

Habibie is trying to play the old game but he commands none of the key political levers that animated it control of the army and access to abundant slush funds. Furthermore, the students have not warmed to him, the key generals don’t trust him, international markets are wary of him and his natural constituencies, sections of the Muslim community and the bureaucracy, are divided. If Habibie is to survive, he will need to establish his credibility quickly. He may succeed, but the greater likelihood is that he will be overwhelmed fairly quickly--between one week and several months from now.

For it’s unlikely that Habibie will be allowed to remain in office if the country’s political and economic circumstances show no signs of improvement. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that he will enjoy the latitude Corazon Aquino did in the wake of the fall of Ferdinand Marcos. Although the Philippine economy was in bad shape after Marcos, it was not so utterly or so suddenly devastated as Indonesia’s. Critically, unlike Habibie, Aquino enjoyed extraordinarily high public legitimacy.

If Habibie falls, the likely scenario is that a special session of the Peoples’ Consultative Assembly--a super-Parliament and electoral college combined--will be called to review the situation and choose a new president. This, indeed, was the fate that Suharto faced earlier in the week.

There will be a number of leading players to watch. In the military, the key one is the commander of the armed forces and defense minister, Gen. Wiranto. Wiranto is an unusually capable man and has emerged from the current political crisis with a high degree of credibility. His primary opponent and Suharto’s son-in-law, Lt. Gen. Prabowo Soemitro Subianto, is a political wild card, but may well see his fortunes decline if Wiranto is able to consolidate his own position. Also to be watched is the former vice president, Try Sutrisno, who still commands respect.

In terms of market confidence and economic leadership, the main player is Ginandjar Kartasasmita, coordinating economic minister. Ginandjar is a seasoned political operator who, in the last few months, has emerged as the one government official to have earned the respect and trust of financial markets. More distantly, Emil Salim, a former government minister who recently defied Suharto by standing as a candidate for the vice presidency, enjoys wide respect and could serve in some transitional capacity.

Within the House of Representatives itself, there are few notable political operatives. Harmoko, the speaker of the House and a senior member of the state political party (Golkar), proved an unlikely hero last week when he took the lead in calling for a special session of the Consultative Assembly to replace Suharto. But he’s a slippery figure, long associated with Suharto and enjoys little public trust. Yet, his decision to abandon Suharto’s sinking ship ahead of most other Suharto loyalists suggests he may have enough raw political cunning to survive.

Perhaps the most interesting figure in Indonesian politics today is Amien Rais, the key opposition figure. As leader of the Muhammadiyah, a large Muslim social organization, he has been a notable figure for some time. But it is only recently that he has stepped forth as the key opposition identity. Although Rais is a potential Habibie ally, he is difficult to pin down politically. Without a broadening of his support base, he seems unlikely at this stage to reach the presidency, though he can certainly be a potent spoiler for others.

Besides individual players, the strength of a number of Indonesia’s political institutions will be put to the test. So far, all the major protagonists, from the military to the students, have operated within the parameters of the constitution. Although there is broad agreement on the need for some political reform, there also appears to be a tacit understanding that lawlessness and chaos must be avoided.

In the weeks ahead, the House of Representatives and the political parties will come to life. These institutions have long been tame, but unless Habibie is able to establish far-reaching authority, their political survival is going to depend less on presidential approval and more on their ability to muster popular support. Harmoko seems to have been the first to recognize this.

Getting rid of Suharto is only the first step for Indonesia. The country needs to forge a new set of political arrangements that will give it the stability to move forward economically. Just as many in the West did not think Suharto could be forced out, so much of the optimistic commentary today about a transition to democracy and economic revival is naive. Indonesia has entered a difficult and dangerous phase. Unquestionably, political change is needed. But outsiders should think carefully before pressing for immediate, dramatic reform. The potential for serious splintering is real. To avoid this danger, Indonesia will need time and support as it finds its way.