Options May Boil Down to One: Ground Forces

With Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic still defiant and unbowed in the second week of NATO’s bombing campaign, many of those familiar with the crisis are now convinced that, barring an unexpected turn of events, airstrikes alone cannot end Kosovo’s agony.

It is also becoming clear that, however distasteful and difficult it may be, President Clinton’s options for avoiding the unthinkable debacle of a NATO defeat may soon be reduced to one: ground forces.

The Clinton administration continues to hope that Milosevic will eventually buckle under the weight of intensified, expanded strikes by North Atlantic Treaty Organization aircraft, which again Thursday carried the alliance’s air campaign to the heart of Serbia, the dominant Yugoslav republic, knocking out one of its main bridges over the Danube River.

In a speech Thursday at the Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia, Clinton urged his audience to give airstrikes a chance to work--to force Milosevic to accept an agreement that would grant considerable autonomy to Kosovo’s majority ethnic Albanian population.

“We’ve been doing this for seven days now, just seven days,” he said. “Our pilots have performed bravely and well, in the face of dangerous conditions and often abysmal weather. But we must be determined and patient.”

(Commenting on the poor weather, one NATO official noted that the 30 French combat aircraft involved in the strikes had managed to drop a total of eight bombs during the first six days of operations.)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry H. Shelton on Thursday reiterated the current administration position on deployment of ground forces: “No plans, no intention.”

But in the corridors of the Pentagon, the subject of ground forces has already become Topic A, while in the halls of NATO headquarters in Brussels, officials have begun to talk openly about the inevitability of a deployment of ground forces to the region.

Some, for example, argue that NATO could help Milosevic’s victims considerably with a plan that didn’t initially aim to sweep through all of Kosovo but created protected “enclaves” where ethnic Albanian refugees could be given temporary shelter.

“With planes alone, we’re in the process of losing the race,” confided one senior NATO diplomat.

Asked a high-ranking NATO military official: “Could two planes in the air stop gang violence in Los Angeles?”

The reason for this new focus on ground forces is not hard to discern.

As each additional day’s television news footage depicts Milosevic in a business-as-usual setting in Belgrade, the Yugoslav and Serbian capital, the key issue for the United States and its European allies has moved beyond the Balkans and halting the fast-unfolding human catastrophe in Kosovo, a southern province of Serbia. Suddenly, it is the credibility of the world’s most powerful nation and the alliance it leads that is on the line.

Unlike in Somalia, where Clinton pulled out American peacekeeping forces after U.S.-led efforts to hunt down a local warlord ended in the deaths of 18 GIs, or in Iraq, where he simply declared U.S.-led airstrikes a success, the United States cannot walk away from Kosovo.

“If we end up looking like we’re impotent, or NATO can’t do the job it said it could, then the consequences are extremely serious--for NATO and for the United States,” stated Brent Scowcroft, one of the most respected foreign affairs voices in Washington and the national security advisor in the Bush administration. “This conflict carries consequences that [affect] far more than just Kosovo.”

Predicted William Kristol, an influential Washington-based Republican strategist and editor of the conservative Weekly Standard: “Let’s be clear: If NATO doesn’t win in Kosovo, it will be the end of NATO as an effective alliance.”

In light of the Serbian atrocities in Kosovo during the last week, it is now virtually impossible politically, Scowcroft and other analysts agree, for NATO’s use of military might to end with the forced exodus of Albanians and Milosevic still controlling an “ethnically cleansed” province.

Senior administration officials also admit that the atrocities of recent days may have permanently altered the conditions of the political deal NATO airstrikes were meant to force on Milosevic. Those conditions, outlined in the so-called Rambouillet accords already signed by Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian leaders, call for a high level of autonomy for Kosovo but leave ultimate political control in the hands of Belgrade.

Now, senior administration officials are seriously reviewing the possibility of placing Kosovo under some form of international control, protected by NATO.

Clinton has already agreed to contribute 4,000 Americans as part of a far larger, NATO-led peacekeeping force originally envisioned to police a settlement, but has consistently rejected sending U.S. forces into a hostile environment.

However, some influential congressional figures have already declared their backing for ground forces, including Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, although the entire issue remains emotional and controversial.

“Immediate, conspicuous planning for the use of NATO ground troops must commence in the numbers required to blunt the Serbia offensive, stabilize Kosovo and, if necessary, repel whatever elements of the Serbian armed forces that remain,” declared Lugar, writing in Thursday’s edition of the Washington Post.

Sending a combat ground force to Kosovo would not be easy.

Top Pentagon officials contend that a forced entry into Kosovo would require 200,000 troops, with a month or more of preparation, and would entail significant casualties. They cite Kosovo’s few entry roads, its rugged terrain and the ability of Serbian forces to harass NATO.

But many outside experts, including retired military officers, believe that those estimates are high.

Retired Gen. Gordon Sullivan, a former Army chief of staff, said the estimate of 200,000 troops “seems high to me.” He said the rule of thumb is that invaders should have, optimally, about three times the number of troops as an enemy with defensive positions.

Many others contend that 75,000 to 100,000 ground troops would constitute a strong force. And they argue that NATO could help Milosevic’s victims considerably with a plan that didn’t initially aim to sweep through all of Kosovo, but created protected “enclaves” where ethnic Albanian refugees could seek temporary shelter.

The prospect that Clinton and other Atlantic alliance leaders may soon be forced to consider sending ground forces into a hostile environment in Kosovo follows a series of miscalculations in the administration’s dealing with the Yugoslav leader. The most recent--and crucial--of these came in January, when the United States unsuccessfully used the threat of force to leverage Milosevic into accepting the Rambouillet accords, and then persisted in its conviction that air power alone would be enough to move him.

“Once you start threatening the use of force and your bluff is called, you have to be ready to use force and you must prevail,” said Frank C. Carlucci, former Defense secretary and national security advisor. “What we underestimated is Milosevic’s brutality. We certainly can’t stop that with air power.”

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Marshall and Kempster reported from Washington and Dahlburg from Brussels. Times staff writer Paul Richter in Washington contributed to this report.

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The Challenges of a Ground Attack

If NATO attempts to push the Serbs out of Kosovo on the ground, alliance forces would face many obstacles in the rugged terrain of the small province. One of the most critical: time. To establish launch points and move enough troops and equipment into the area would require three or more weeks. But if NATO waits too long, critics contend, there may be nothing left in Kosovo worth saving.

Battle plans

A. NATO forces would probably attempt to push Serbian forces up and out.

B. Serbs would be forced across the border, or into strips along the border that would be part of a negotiated agreement.

Kosovo: Approximately 80 miles wide and 80 miles long

Length: 80 miles

Width: 80 miles

Distance from Macedonian border to Pristina: About 35 miles

Distance from Albanian border to Pristina: About 50 miles

Size: 4,200 square miles (roughly the size of San Diego County)

Kosovo compared with California

Potential staging areas

1. Italy: Key staging area for troops and gear coming from Britain and Germany.

2. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Currently has 30,000 NATO troops who would have to cross Serb-held region of Bosnia and then Montenegro.

3. Hungary: New NATO nation would probably be key staging area for shipments from Britain.

4. Turkey: Could be used as holding area to feed weapons and troops into Macedonia.

5. Greece: Another potential staging area, though protests over NATO bombings could jeopardize its role.

6: Macedonia and Albania: The most valuable launch areas. There are already about 10,000 NATO troops in Macedonia.

Risks and Challenges

Roads: Only 14 roads or highways lead into Kosovo.

Mountain passes: Many entrances into the province lead through mountain passes that would allow Serbian artillery units to fire down on NATO troops.

Bridges: Likely blown out in advance or wired with explosives to be triggered by NATO forces.

Mine fields: Many of the entrances to the province will be mined.

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Sources: Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution; Lt. Col. Piers Wood, Center for Defense Information; Times Washington Bureau

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Compiled by DAVID RICKLEY / Los Angeles Times