Averting the Dangers of Overreaction

A U.S. fighter pilot from the Vietnam era, speculating on the reasons for John F. Kennedy Jr.’s tragic crash, said he had gotten himself into what airmen call a square corner, “where you run out of ideas and experience at the same time.” That could aptly describe where U.S. attempts to engage North Korea seem to be heading today. Nothing is working with Pyongyang, and no one appears to have any new ideas.

Dealing with North Korea is never easy, and the United States is rapidly approaching a particularly tricky juncture with Pyongyang. Two months ago, former Defense Secretary William J. Perry went to Pyongyang and delivered a carefully prepared “package proposal” that opened the door to normal relations between North Korea and the outside world. He reportedly told the North Koreans that if they would stop firing missiles and forswear their nuclear-weapons program, the United States would move to lift sanctions and establish normal diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Senior North Korean officials warmly received Perry listened to him courteously, but gave no specific reaction. Washington is still waiting for a response.

Meanwhile, over the past two months, signals from North Korea have been far from reassuring. The North Koreans provoked a sea fight near the contentious fishing boundary known as the Northern Limit Line; held a South Korean tourist captive for several days, accusing him of being rude to a North Korean official at Mt. Kungang; and detained a Korean American, who is a U. S. citizen, on trumped-up charges of espionage. Worst of all, the North Koreans have reiterated their intention to launch another multistage missile that would fly over Japan.

Given such actions, many in Congress insist that North Korea cannot be trusted. Another missile firing by Pyongyang will be taken by many as North Korea’s response to the Perry proposal. Who can blame the legislators, since the development and firing of missiles was one of the very acts that the Perry proposal was designed to stop.

Still, to assume categorically that a missile firing is North Korea’s way of saying “no” to the proposal is dangerous. In Japan, such an assumption could end Tokyo’s financial support to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO, which is building two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea, on condition that Pyongyang shuts down its nuclear-weapons program. In Congress, anger at a North Korean missile could end U.S. support of KEDO. With KEDO removed, North Korea would have no reason not to return to its nuclear-weapons program, and the way would be opened for a replay of the dangerous confrontation of 1994.

Historian Kathryn Weathersby makes a perceptive comment about North Korea in an article in the Wilson Quarterly summer issue, dealing with the Korean War and Soviet-North Korean relations. She writes, “The new information from the former Soviet archives suggests that Moscow’s cynical, high-handed treatment taught Kim Il Sung and his associates that they could not count on their fraternal allies to ensure their survival. . . . When the Soviet Union finally collapsed, North Korea was left not only without an important source of support, but without an understanding of normal relations with other states--or even an understanding that such relations can exist.”

Applying this insight to past North Korean behavior sheds light on some of its bizarre aspects, such as sending commando-laden submarines into South Korean waters while, at the same time, living up to its obligations under the KEDO agreement of 1994. China used to behave in that seemingly self-contradictory way, as did South Africa and the Soviet Union. What broke those countries of their self-destructive pattern of behavior was not the use of force, but the gradual accumulation of experience that demonstrated that what they were doing was not working, and that there was another, better way to relate to the outside world. It took the Soviet Union, China and South Africa decades to achieve this level of maturity, and we would be foolish to expect a quick metamorphosis in North Korea.

There may well be a less than 50-50 chance of persuading the North Koreans not to fire another missile. But while there is still time, the following actions should be taken:

* Make public some details of Perry’s proposal, so the public will know what the North Koreans are putting at risk if they fire a missile.

* Press the North Koreans for an immediate reply to the Perry package. Make clear that if they do not reply and then fire a missile, world reaction would be severe.

* Use every available channel, especially the Chinese, to explain to the North Koreans why it is in their best interest not to fire another missile.

* If the North Koreans respond positively to the proposal, we should move quickly to demonstrate to Pyongyang the benefits of dealing constructively with its neighbors. One possible move might be to agree to discuss the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, a festering issue that would be in everyone’s interest to solve.

If these efforts fail and another North Korean missile is launched, Washington should make every effort to closely coordinate its reactions with Seoul, Tokyo and, if possible, Beijing. Any North Korean statements made at the time of launch should be carefully analyzed. If it is still possible to separate the missile firing from KEDO and the Perry proposal, we should do everything possible to preserve KEDO and the option of future constructive dialogue on other matters. (This will be difficult, given the congressional eruption that a missile firing will provoke.)

If the North Koreans are so obtuse as to indicate clearly that their missile is a response to the Perry proposal, we should prepare to act toward North Korea with greater severity than we have since 1953.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was the closest the United States ever came to waging war against the Soviet Union. If we are careful, the North Korean missile crisis need not bring us to the brink of war. But if we are not careful and overreact to crude signals from a dangerously isolated, failing state, the consequences could be severe. Washington’s patience and wisdom are sure to be tested by North Korea as it gropes for survival.*