U.S. Can’t Just Dismiss Yeltsin’s Political Antics

So who will Russian President Boris (“off with their heads”) N. Yeltsin appoint as his next prime minister, once he tires of Vladimir Putin? His horse? Mikhail Baryshnikov? Lavrenti Beria, Stalin’s long-dead KGB henchman?

Yeltsin’s sacking on Monday of Sergei Stepashin, his fourth prime minister in the last 17 months and his appointment of Putin, a low-profile Russian spymaster, seem like fodder for Jay Leno. These days, musical-chairs politics in Moscow is treated more like entertainment than news. In Washington, the big congressional debates are about China; Russia is hardly taken seriously any more, except by those with professional interest.

But when you think about it, Yeltsin’s peremptory dismissals are not so funny--not for the people of Russia and not for American foreign policy, either.

Russia, of course, still has far more nuclear weapons than any other country besides the United States--many times more than China. And the unpleasant fact is that the government of Russia has become chronically, hopelessly unstable.

Look at the long-range trends. Yeltsin used to be able to stick with his prime ministers for a few years, then for close to a year. Now the time period is down to three months. At least New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, baseball’s equivalent of Yeltsin, finally settled down with a manager and team he likes. Yeltsin can’t make it through half a baseball season any more.

And the problem is not merely a matter of personnel. On matters of consequence to the United States, it’s hard to get decisions from Moscow that stick. It’s also increasingly hard for Yeltsin’s civilian government-of-the-moment to assert control over the Russian military. Look at the back and forth in June over the Russian troops that rushed to seize the airport in Pristina in advance of NATO forces entering Kosovo.

Moreover, reports from Russian locations outside of Moscow paint a portrait of a government that finds it increasingly difficult to ensure safety and provide routine public services.

Let’s take events of just the last three weeks.

In the Russian Far East, the head of Russia’s Federal Forestry Service told reporters that firefighters were having trouble fighting spreading forest fires because they didn’t have enough fuel for trucks and planes. In Arkhangelsk, Russian newspapers reported that residents have no heat or hot water because the thermal power station closed down; it doesn’t have the funds to buy more fuel oil.

The Clinton administration pretends that none of Moscow’s political turbulence matters too much, because it can do business with whomever Yeltsin sends here.

The bankruptcy of this approach was illustrated by the recent visit to Washington by Stepashin, Russia’s then-new, now-former, prime minister. What exactly was the aim of Stepashin’s trip? It was explained this way by Leon Fuerth, Vice President Al Gore’s national security advisor:

“The first thing we have to do is to explore Prime Minister Stepashin’s formulation of Russia’s priorities,” Fuerth said. “We have to get warmed up with a brand new government, and that’s the primary purpose of this meeting.”

If so, then President Clinton and Gore were wasting their breath. Stepashin and his government were dismissed less than two weeks after warming up Washington.

The Clinton administration can take some consolation from the fact that other governments don’t find it easy to deal with Russia these days, either.

China has been trying to entice Russia to team up in international diplomacy as a means of offsetting the power of the United States. The Chinese thought they had a special connection to Stepashin, who was born on Chinese soil when his father, a naval officer, served at what was then the Soviet naval base at Port Arthur near Dalian.

Two months ago, when Stepashin met with a Chinese military delegation in Moscow, he observed that in helping the People’s Liberation Army, “it’s as though I am continuing my father’s work.” Now China too finds itself starting afresh with a new Russian government.

Clinton administration officials suggest that those critics who focus on Yeltsin’s personnel changes are short-sighted.

“Government heads do change, and yet governments work with each other on substance,” State Department spokesman James P. Rubin said Monday. And in fact, the administration has succeeded in bringing about the European goals it sought--including NATO expansion and the military intervention in Kosovo--without significant Russian interference.

Yet the administration’s day-to-day approach doesn’t begin to address many of the long-term questions about Russia. Will its democracy survive? What will its foreign policies be over the coming decades? How can the United States and Russia work out a new arms control agreement that is not only supported by the prime-minister-of-the-month but actually ratified and put into effect?

It’s even possible that by doing business as usual with Yeltsin’s ever-changing government, the Clinton administration may be harming America’s interests over the long run. Instead of warming up to Yeltsin’s next few hapless prime ministers, maybe Washington ought to think about the future.