Strike Quickly While Barak Is Hot

As President Clinton meets with Israel’s new prime minster, Ehud Barak, expectations are high for quick progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations. These expectations could turn into disappointments if the parties begin addressing the most contentious questions at the outset, or if they waste precious time deciding which front to pursue first--the Palestinian-Israeli or the Syrian-Israeli one. Momentum could be achieved by striking a quick Palestinian-Israeli “declaration of principles,” even as the Wye agreements are being implemented: Israel accepts that the negotiations would lead to an independent Palestinian state, and the Palestinians agree that their state will be demilitarized, and that Jerusalem will remain “unified,” even as its sovereign status will be decided in the negotiations. A deadline would be set for a “final status” agreement.

Such an early declaration would revive the excitement that followed the Oslo accords, and it would alleviate concerns that the suddenly promising Israel-Syria negotiations will come at the expense of a Palestinian-Israeli deal. It would also frame the negotiations on the difficult issues such as borders, Jewish settlements and the sovereign status of Jerusalem.

Although such a declaration is no longer controversial in the mainstream of Israeli and Palestinian politics, the reluctance to make it in the past was based on the assumption that it would undermine each party’s leverage in the negotiations. This thinking is no longer relevant.

First, Israel’s leverage in holding out on accepting the principle of a Palestinian state must be balanced by the benefits that such acceptance up front would bring: momentum and quick improvement of relations between Israel and Arab states. It is evident today that most of the Arab world understands the current opportunity to clinch a peace agreement with Israel. Moreover, Israel does not need such leverage to extract Palestinian concessions since it holds most of the cards: On most issues of contention, the current Israeli territorial control means no agreement will be reached without fully addressing Israeli interests.

Second, the Palestinians’ leverage in holding out on the issue of demilitarization is minimal. No Israeli government will accept a serious Palestinian army. On the other hand, a Palestinian acceptance of the principle of demilitarization would instantly earn points among Israelis, most of whom are concerned about security. Moreover, the Palestinians do not need a significant army in a era of peace, and, if conflict with Israel should arise in the future, any army that the Palestinians could build would not possibly be a match for Israel’s; the per capita income of Palestinians is less the one tenth of that of Israelis. It’s better for the Palestinians to save their energy and redirect resources.

Third, the question of the sovereign status of Jerusalem will be a difficult one to resolve, and may even have to be postponed beyond the first stages of implementing a Palestinian state. But the principle of “unity” of Jerusalem is one that is important to Israelis, and agreement on this issue could help frame practical negotiations. The negotiations could then proceed to discuss functional questions, such as access and residency, which affect the daily lives of Israelis and Palestinians, without being saddled by the issue of sovereignty.

If such a deal is struck quickly, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators could begin the difficult task of addressing the contentious details, which will require considerable time. This would enable the Israeli government to focus much effort on its relations with Syria and Lebanon.

It would also move the ball to the court of other Arab states. Israeli gestures would have to be reciprocated by concrete Arab steps to warmer relations, which would help Barak domestically.

The promising prospects of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East today must not blind Israeli and Palestinian leaders to the many opponents of reconciliation who will attempt to derail the process before any benefits can be felt by their publics. The sooner the parties can ignite hope, the better the prospects of the elusive Arab-Israeli peace.