Salvaging the Strategic Sino-American Link

Two weeks after the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the anti-U.S. protests this sparked in China, I received a call from a young woman who worked for an independent economic research institute associated with Peking University. She was surveying American employees of American companies about the impact of the protests.

Had I been surprised by the protests? (Yes.)

Why? (Because protests aren’t usually allowed in China.)

But you have student protests in America, don’t you? (Yes, we do. But the last time there were student protests in China, people got shot.)

Was the American consulate in Shanghai damaged? (Not seriously. Government officials stood between the consulate and the protesters. One high-level official spotted an American surrounded by shouting students and ran to his rescue, only to discover that the American, an anti-NATO protester himself, was urging the students to attack the consulate. The official told the American to stop causing trouble. The students turned on the official and began taunting, “What kind of Chinese are you?”)

But the last question gave me pause: Did I think this was the lowest point in U.S.-China relations in 20 years?

The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979 was an obvious high point. In 1989, the glorious spring of hope that ended with tanks and blood was an obvious low point. I never dreamed the relationship could get any worse.

But what about now? I open Chinese papers and I read shrill pronouncements that “China cannot be bullied” and labored analysis of “American hegemonic ambitions.” I turn on Chinese television and see old Korean war movies from the 1950s and video montages of the bombed embassy, the three dead reporters and a burning U.S. flag. For the first time since I’ve lived in China, I am afraid that announcing my citizenship will bring wrath rather than smiles.

And then, I open American papers and read articles that detail the Cox report’s “explosive findings” on China’s “relentless” nuclear weapons espionage, but don’t see until paragraph 46 that the CIA doesn’t think spying was “a critical element of China’s effort to improve its nuclear capabilities.” I turn on American satellite television and see old footage of Chinese military parades. I see video clips of a harried Taiwan-American scientist who may turn out to be a spy but against whom nothing has been proved.

My Chinese friends who live in America--many are now Americans--tell me they feel anxious and angry about the inflammatory rhetoric about alleged Chinese spies. They moved to the U.S. to find freedom but now face an atmosphere that one friend likened to the early stages of the McCarthy era.

The researcher repeated her last question. I blurted out an answer:

For the American people, 1989 was worse. We watched the entire spring of protests unfold on CNN, replete with rock music and the Goddess of Democracy. And then we saw it all end in a hail of bullets and a barrage of tanks.

For the Chinese people, 1999 is worse. Most believe that the NATO campaign against Serbia is morally wrong, a belief born of conviction, not of propaganda. And they saw the bombing of their embassy and the deaths of three Chinese journalists.

The vehemence of the emotions expressed in response--to the slaughter at Tiananmen and the bloodshed in the Chinese Embassy--was in both cases a product of naive and misplaced hope. In 1989, many Americans fooled themselves into believing that democracy would triumph in China. In 1999, many Chinese fooled themselves into believing that all the talk about a “constructive strategic partnership” meant the U.S. wouldn’t do things like go to war over Kosovo.

Both nations need leaders who--like the Shanghai official--will face the wrath of a mob and salvage a relationship that may never be a partnership but will always be strategic and can even be constructive.

Instead, we find our national dialogues dominated by U.S. politicians who hope that hyped reports on alleged Chinese spying will be their ticket to higher office, and by Chinese politicians who hope that hyped reports on America’s alleged deliberate bombing of their embassy will increase their clout. And we find far too many journalists--Americans seeking Pulitzers and Chinese striving to canonize three of their own--who gladly exploit this dangerous situation.

Recent events have underlined fundamental differences between the U.S. and China. But, they have also brought to light some very sad similarities.