Latin America Need Not Replay This Charade

Few things--not even movie sequels--are as predictable as the certification process that takes place in Washington every February. Since 1986, the U.S. president has been bound by law to certify that a series of countries are or are not cooperating fully with Washington on drug-enforcement matters.

Most Latin American governments denounce the process and subsequently kneel before it. The U.S. Congress receives the president’s notification and then threatens to override it; back-room negotiations between the White House, the Senate and the Latin Americans are held, and by the end of March or early April everyone packs their bags and forgets the issue until next year.

There are always minor casualties. On occasion, some poor and hapless president of a Latin nation plays the scapegoat--Ernesto Samper of Colombia for the last three years; the president of Paraguay in 1998--but there are no consequences or hard feelings; a waiver on the suspension of aid is always invoked, unless assistance had been suspended years or decades ago anyway.

Some nations in the hemisphere pay lip service to a hypothetical repeal process, but their hearts are not really in it. Others count their blessings, once they are “recertified” after having been “decertified.”

Colombian President Andres Pastrana’s unfortunate statement to the nation in February, after recertification, to the effect that “Colombia’s dignity is no longer at risk. . . . We can now face the future without being uncalled unworthy,” illustrates how far this can go, and the damage it can do to a nation’s dignity.

Still others pledge their support of multilateral evaluations--having the OAS or the U.N. do the United States’ dirty work for it. All decry the process--quite rightly--as unilateral, hypocritical and arbitrary, subject to prevailing American moods and narrowly defined national interests.

But none have truly designed or implemented a long-term strategy to solve the problem on its own terms: to erase the 1986 Omnibus Act from the books by having Congress repeal it.

The reason is simple: Each Latin American government is more focused on getting its certification than on fighting for repeal, especially since the fight could take a year or two, and in the interim, a vengeful Congress could decertify them.

In fact, a carefully crafted, bold and yet reasonable plan to achieve repeal is viable and represents the only sensible way out of the yearly ritual Latin American governments go through. Such a plan rests upon four pillars:

* Working together. If each Latin nation continues to believe that it can do better alone, there is no hope. Conversely, a joint attempt by countries ranging from Mexico to Bolivia, including Colombia, Costa Rica and others--nations both affected by the process and bestowed with a degree of prestige or voice in the U.S.--could have a serious impact. Despite claims to the contrary, Washington feels quite comfortable with the certification ordeal it inflicts on its southern neighbors; it allows the U.S. president to play good cop/bad cop with the Latin Americans and to extract painful concessions from them without paying a price in diplomatic relations. But if the Latins do not push, no U.S. administration is going to truly fight for repeal on its own.

* Target all sectors of American society--the media, businesses with interests in Latin America, academe, politicians--in the effort to repeal this measure. There has been strong public opinion against the certification process, coming from various segments. A repeal measure failed to pass Congress by very few votes a couple of years ago and myriad Latin American governments, personalities, companies and institutions over the years have acquired expertise in lobbying the U.S. Congress.

* Establish consequences for Washington if it fails to repeal. A final component would have to impose a price on Washington for failure to repeal or for not really trying; without it, the White House’s heart would hardly be in the struggle. Given the balance of forces, the Latin American coalition could not seek to actually punish the United States for indifference or failure to repeal. Nonetheless, there are moderate and relevant reprisals that Latin countries could take if repeal is not accomplished within a specific time frame. These could include reductions in the number of DEA agents in their territory, severe restrictions on their freedom of movement, a freeze on extradition of nationals to the U.S., “work to rule” attitudes in other fields of drug enforcement cooperation, etc. All of these forms of retaliation have a price, both domestically and in relations with the U.S. But without some cost, President Clinton will doubtfully pick a fight with Congress just to make Ernesto Zedillo, Andres Pastrana or Hugo Chavez happy.

Certification is a thorn in hemispheric relations. The remedy is not to replace it with something else but to abrogate the typically arrogant law that created it and then to hope that societies in Latin America persuade themselves that drug enforcement is a crucial priority. This is one way to attain that goal and there is no good reason for the Latins not to try.