Use Ethnic Albanians to Stop Slobodan Milosevic

Once the ethnic Albanians said they would sign the Rambouillet agreement on the temporary status for Kosovo, leaders of the Western alliance declared almost in unison: Now the pressure is on Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.

No, it is not. Now the pressure is on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to force Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement.

This is not only a question of semantics. It is a question of calling a credible threat a credible threat and a dictator a dictator. And this dictator may have reasons not to believe that this threat is credible.

Milosevic has made it clear that he has no intention of agreeing to the military part of the Rambouillet deal, i.e., the NATO-led international forces assuring the implementation on the ground of the temporary autonomy.

Therefore, if the international negotiators do not give in and do not make concessions to Milosevic, it would seem that no NATO troops can deploy in a permissive environment unless Milosevic either is forced from office or into changing his mind. It is worth repeating that Milosevic only understands the argument of force.

But to use force against Milosevic, NATO countries would have to put their soldiers in harm’s way, because air bombing alone does not remove a dictator, as we see almost daily in Iraq. This is something that the U.S. is not ready to stick out its neck for, and neither are the West Europeans, certainly not without American necks by their side. The three new East European NATO members may agree to do it, but this would make every other NATO nation look like a sissy.

Meanwhile, almost the entire 2 million ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo is ready to fight the forces of Milosevic and to die if need be in order to gain independence for their homeland, a rather understandable if distant goal.

Doesn’t it therefore make sense for the alliance to use this eagerness of the ethnic Albanians to risk their lives for their independent homeland and thus present Milosevic with a credible threat of force, a threat of ethnic Albanian force? So let the leaks go forth: NATO supports the ethnic Albanian fighters and will spare no effort in bolstering their firepower as well as their human rights record.

This may sound like a bloodthirsty, realpolitik approach, but conventional finger-wagging and uttering the customary “we will not allow” speech fails to stop the carnage on the ground. And if such a scenario is scary, then is it perhaps scary enough to force Milosevic to sign? Without further carnage?

In the past few decades, the U.S. has been applying this “our goal, their blood” approach with the moujahedeens in Afghanistan and the Contras in Nicaragua. And recall a more recent Balkan precedent: The oft-cited NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb positions in 1995, which forced Milosevic to the Dayton negotiating table, was preceded by a crucial Croatian forces’ ground offensive against Bosnian Serbs. Power on the ground speaks to Milosevic.

Now, for the NATO alliance to “use” the ethnic Albanians’ Kosovo Liberation Army, the two partners would have to first put in sync their means and ends, because one man’s independence is another man’s irredentism, and one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist.

If the KLA wants to be treated as a regular civilized army, it would have to start behaving like one: Stop the kidnappings and the attacks on civilians (Kosovo Serbs or Albanians who may disagree with the KLA); start respecting the basic laws of war and applying the Geneva Convention. And if the NATO alliance wants to be perceived as a real ally of those brave ethnic Albanians who are ready to give their lives in this fight, it would have to recognize, at least theoretically, that the Kosovo Albanians’ goal of independence is a legitimate one, although it may be not reachable at this stage.

The alliance’s ally in the Contact Group, Russia, would obviously be very unhappy with any such quid pro quo, but Russians failed in their attempt to talk Milosevic into signing, and there is no more time to lose.

Last Friday, by welcoming three new members, NATO found itself having a common border with a Yugoslavia that is ruled by Milosevic. Perhaps the physical proximity of that dreaded man to its borders will concentrate the alliance’s collective mind on how to stand up to Milosevic.