Engagement Is Still the Best Policy

Rather than serve as a basis for a reasoned and balanced assessment of the pros and cons of our relationship with China, the facts pertaining to the alleged spy scandal and its effects on U.S. national security are being distorted or ignored in an apparent effort to destroy the engagement policy outright.

Americans are being told that:

* A Chinese-American spy for Beijing stole critical U.S. nuclear secrets from a weapons lab.

* The Chinese have developed technology for the miniaturization of nuclear warheads as a result of such espionage and can now place multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle warheads (MIRVs) atop ICBMs capable of reaching the United States.

* U.S. national security has been seriously compromised as a result of this “leap” in China’s nuclear threat.

* The Clinton administration has permitted this to happen because of its pursuit of an amicable political and commercial relationship with Beijing.

* Engaging the Chinese government is becoming a form of appeasement that serves only Chinese interests.

The key problem with this story is that it is founded upon weak evidence, fed by misperceptions and mingles domestic political motives with genuine concern for national security.

No conclusive evidence has been revealed, at least to date, that Wen Ho Lee served as a spy for Beijing. If there were such evidence, he would have been arrested, not fired. In the superheated atmosphere of Washington, however, some members of Congress and the Department of Energy have rushed to try Lee in the press.

There is no conclusive evidence that the Chinese have copied and deployed a version of the W-88 miniaturized nuclear warhead, whose design Lee allegedly conveyed to them. China’s advances in this area are relatively modest and could have resulted from Russian, American or indigenous Chinese sources alone, or a combination of the above. Moreover, the Chinese have not succeeded in deploying any MIRVed nuclear missiles.

Even if the Chinese do attain a MIRV capability and increase the number of their warheads capable of striking the U.S., this would have only a small, manageable effect on U.S. security. China has been able to target the United States with a few long-range nuclear-tipped missiles since 1981, while the U.S. has long possessed thousands of warheads capable of striking China. Even if Beijing were to acquire hundreds of such missiles, this would not alter our overwhelming superiority in the nuclear balance.

Of greater concern to some is the potential negative impact such increased Chinese capabilities would have on a future U.S.-deployed national missile defense system. It is possible that a hundred Chinese warheads atop long-range ICBMs (MIRVed or not) would be able to overwhelm such a system. However, our undoubted capability to retaliate massively and thereby incinerate most of China would deter the Chinese from unleashing their meager arsenal against us.

Moreover, the only missile in China’s inventory capable of being MIRVed is the CSS-4. This silo-based system is the most vulnerable in China’s arsenal, raising the question of whether China would expend the resources to modify it, test fly the reentry vehicle and deploy MIRVed warheads--all in full view of U.S. intelligence resources--when much the same result could be achieved with decoys. China has no strategic warning capability, no reconnaissance satellites and does not keep its missiles in a ready state, meaning that the U.S. would have ample warning both of an attempt to place MIRVs on missiles and any intention by China to strike the U.S.

Finally, while the Clinton administration can be faulted at times for pursuing an inconsistent and unstrategic policy toward China, there is no conclusive evidence that it intentionally delayed, much less obstructed, the investigation of this possible espionage case to maintain good relations with Beijing or to garner campaign contributions. Such a charge smacks of politics and seems designed to derail the engagement policy. Even if such evidence were to emerge, it would cast doubt primarily on the competence and political integrity of our leadership, not the merit of the policy of engagement per se.

Nearly two decades of engagement with China have produced enormous benefits for the United States: by encouraging and sustaining a more open and outward-oriented Chinese polity and society, by increasing Chinese incentives to cooperate with the U.S. on a range of critical security issues, by strengthening lines of communication with the Chinese leadership so as to avoid dangerous miscalculations and by stimulating Chinese and American economic opportunities. No viable alternative to engagement exists that would better serve such vital U.S. interests. Of course, if improperly conceived or implemented, our engagement policy can (and sometimes has) become counterproductive. But engagement should be assessed on the basis of its demonstrated effect on Chinese behavior, not through innuendo and partisan perspectives.