Don’t Push China on Proliferation

The Senate’s rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty dealt a damaging blow to U.S. nonproliferation policy. Now the Clinton administration and Congress must reconsider how to address one of the biggest challenges to U.S. security: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

A National Intelligence Council report in September publicly stated--for the first time--that China has transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. This unequivocal statement presents the administration with a dilemma. Under U.S. law, transfers of missiles or related technology exceeding Missile Technology Control Regime, or MTCR, parameters--the ability to deliver a 1,100-pound payload over 186 miles--trigger sanctions. The administration can either impose sanctions and provoke a crisis in relations with China or circumvent the law by ignoring convincing evidence of missile transfers that occurred in 1991-’92.

The challenge for the Clinton administration is to resolve this dilemma while advancing the goals of combating proliferation and improving relations with China.

The intent behind the 1990 Missile Control Act mandating sanctions is to punish current missile exporters and to deter future sales. With respect to China, able diplomacy by the Bush and Clinton administrations has largely accomplished this goal. Bilateral negotiations from 1990 to 1994 persuaded China to reduce and then to halt transfers of M-series ballistic missiles to Syria, Iran and Pakistan.

In the case of Syria, U.S. diplomats persuaded China to cancel a contract for M-9 missiles, even though the Syrians had already paid. The U.S. imposed limited economic sanctions on China in 1991 and 1993 over transfers of M-11 components to Pakistan. By 1994, this pressure resulted in China freezing the deal and strengthening its initially limited commitment to adhere to the MTCR. In October 1997, China even agreed to stop selling to Iran C-801 and C-802 cruise missiles, which are not covered by any accord.

China’s recent record on missile proliferation is by no means perfect. It is not a full MTCR member and does not have export laws covering MTCR-controlled items. The U.S. continues to have concerns about transfers of dual-use technology not covered in China’s nonproliferation commitments and about unauthorized exports by Chinese companies. Yet compared with a decade ago, when China openly sold intermediate range missiles to Saudi Arabia, the scope of China’s missile proliferation activities have declined dramatically.

The recent intelligence report does not involve a new transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan. China already has been sanctioned twice for these activities. Additional sanctions now are unlikely to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals.

Internal Chinese debates on issues such as MTCR membership and the test ban treaty ratification are at a crucial stage. China likely would respond to sanctions by limiting future cooperation on these issues and might even backtrack on its existing commitments. Moreover, the Senate rejection of the CTBT is causing even U.S. friends and allies to question U.S. commitment to international arms control and nonproliferation agreements. China is likely to conclude that the U.S. only supports arms control when it is convenient.

Sanctions would deal another blow to strained relations only beginning to improve after the Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade. Our conversations with Chinese foreign ministry officials and army officers indicate that many Chinese view the months leading up to Taiwan’s March presidential elections as a dangerous time. They worry that, as anti-China sentiments in the U.S. grow, Lee Teng-hui will be emboldened to make further moves toward independence, and China will be compelled to respond with force.

This adds up to an overwhelming case for waiving sanctions on the grounds of U.S. national security interests. The Clinton administration should admit that China transferred the missiles to Pakistan in the early 1990s, but it should decline to impose sanctions because they would not advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

We do not mean to suggest that the issue of nonproliferation is unimportant. Rather, the issue is so important that policymakers must concentrate on policies that work.

The administration and Congress should focus on the fundamental question of what measures will persuade China to behave in a manner consistent with international norms on nonproliferation, arms control and international trade. Sanctions are one tool, but in this case, mechanical imposition of sanctions will at best be ineffective and at worst counter-productive.