Anti-U.S. Axis? Not Too Likely

Some people who make a career out of worrying about international relations are starting to worry that China, Russia and India might be heading toward a strategic partnership that could be inimical to U.S. interests. Such a relationship would ally three nuclear powers with a combined population of more than 2 billion, spread out over a large part of the Eurasian landmass. Cementing this bloc would be the shared belief that the United States has become too powerful and in fact too dominant internationally and that the three countries would benefit if they cooperated to counterbalance American power and influence.

This scenario is a variation on the balance-of-power concept, made most familiar by the alliances formed in 19th and 20th century Europe, though in origin dating at least to ancient Greece. The aim of a balance of power is to maintain a rough equilibrium between states or coalitions in an effort to restrain the ambitions of a possible rival, or what China, when it’s feeling accusatory toward the United States, brands as hegemony.

The clearest sign of an emerging trilateral relationship may be in Russia’s apparently accelerating arms sales to China and India. Included are some weapons--antiship missiles, for example--that could help China offset U.S. naval superiority in the Western Pacific. Among the attitudes shared by the three: resentment of U.S.-led NATO’s military operations in Kosovo, which all saw as impermissible interference in another country’s internal affairs; worries about growing Islamic militancy in Central Asia, and opposition to possible U.S. development and deployment of a theater missile defense system that could reduce the value of China’s and Russia’s strategic weapons.

International politics can produce expedient alliances. The Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 is a notable example. Is there a solid basis for a strategic partnership among China, Russia and India? Certainly cash-starved Russia is eager to sell China and India advanced weaponry. Certainly a common feeling of impotence in the face of the global projection of U.S. power encourages consideration of closer political and military cooperation. Does this portend a genuine alliance that challenges American interests?

It’s far too early to say, though it seems a good guess that the three countries are not so motivated by envy or fear of the United States that they are ready to forget about their own sometimes competing national interests. It’s one thing to strike short-term deals for, say, weapons transfers. It’s another to cast aside decades or even centuries of suspicions, rivalries and occasional open hostility.

No less important, all three have compelling interests in maintaining productive working relations with the United States, the world’s biggest market and greatest source of advanced technology. By the same token it behooves Washington to pursue its interests, especially where China and Russia are concerned, in ways that are as mutually beneficial as possible. A pan-Eurasian, anti-American coalition may lurk somewhere over the horizon. Wise U.S. policies can help keep it from appearing.