Real Issue: Israeli, Palestinian Nationalism

Jordan’s King Abdullah visited Washington this month amid reports that Jordan is willing to permanently settle Palestinian refugees on its soil, adding to widespread fears in the region, especially in Lebanon, that a U.S.-led campaign is under way to settle refugees in host states. On the Palestinian side, many are insisting on the return of refugees to their original homes in Israel. Neither option has a serious chance of success, for the issue at hand is not merely the humanitarian task of settling refugees. It is also a question of Jewish and Palestinian nationalism.

Israelis and Palestinians have nationalist red lines that no leader can cross: No Israeli government can accept the massive return of Palestinians into Israel in a way that threatens the Jewish majority, and no Palestinian leader can sign an agreement that does not grant a future Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza the right to accept as citizens any willing Palestinian refugees. The sooner the negotiations address the space between these lines, the better.

The core of the Oslo accords was not their messy and problematic terms, but the mutual recognition expressed in short letters exchanged by Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in which Rabin responded to Arafat’s pledge that “the PLO recognizes the right of Israel to exist in peace and security” with a message that “the government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.” For majorities on both sides, this recognition was the basis of hope.

For many Israelis, the hope emanated from the prospect of a solution that protected Israel’s Jewish character. For many Palestinians, the Israeli recognition of the “Palestinian people” contrasted with reference to their problem as one of refugees, or as a problem of “Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza,” as previous Israeli leaders had framed it. It raised hopes of establishing a state in the West Bank and Gaza to embody Palestinian nationalism and accommodate homeless refugees. It is this hope that made it possible for many Palestinians to forgo the drive to return to their original homes in Israel. These core Israeli and Palestinian aspirations define the boundaries of what is possible.

In addition to the question of monetary compensation for lost property, the negotiations should thus focus primarily on two areas within these boundaries: creation of resettlement “options” for refugees not wishing to move to a Palestinian state (not all Zionists want to move to Israel) and assurance that the population movement to the Palestinian state will be orderly.

The first task must be based on the principle that there be no forced settlement of Palestinians. Arab states, European states and the U.S. could establish quotas for granting citizenship options to Palestinians not wishing to move to a future Palestine. Poor states like Jordan, which has been unique in offering citizenship to Palestinians since 1948, will need international financial backing for resettling refugee-camp residents. Citizenship quotas will have to be coordinated so as not to affect Lebanon, where the addition of new citizens could alter the delicate demographic distribution. The second task requires international coordination and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation to determine the annual absorption capacity in the first several years of statehood.

A pragmatic resolution of the refugee issue will not please every Palestinian and Israeli. Not all who will reject the necessarily limited accord will be “fanatical.” Yet most Israelis and Palestinians probably will go along. Given the September deadline that the parties have set for reaching an agreement, the sooner they focus on what is doable, the greater the chance that they will reach a practical accord.