Fujimori May Regret Seeking a Third Term

‘Something sinister is happening here.” Such words are not usually spoken by diplomats charged with observing foreign elections. But Eduardo Stein, an official observer from the Organization of American States, plainly made up his mind to dispense with diplomatic niceties following Peru’s presidential election on April 9.

The emphatic voice of the former Guatemalan foreign minister joined many others in calling attention to such widespread irregularities as delays in the delivery of ballot boxes. In the end, amid remarkable national protests and mounting international pressures, Alberto Fujimori came up just short of achieving a first-round victory in his bid for an unprecedented, and constitutionally dubious, third term.

By early June, the incumbent president--known as “the Fujimori phenomenon” a decade ago--will face Alejandro Toledo, now widely known as “the Toledo phenomenon.” According to the official, though highly suspect, results of the national election commission, Toledo garnered more than 40% of the vote, compared with Fujimori’s 49.8% (50% plus one was needed to avoid a runoff).

Toledo’s stunning surge of support over the past month echoed Fujmori’s own extraordinary emergence on the national political scene in April 1990, when he came from nowhere to force a runoff against novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. In both cases, significant numbers of Peruvians surprised pundits and clamored for change. Ten years ago, the target was a discredited political class that had brought the country to ruin; last week, it was a regime that had gone beyond the bounds of acceptable democratic behavior and whose ability to resolve the country’s underlying social and economic problems is increasingly moot.

Ethnicity and biography have played strong roles in both men’s political careers. Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants, described himself as “el Chino” (the Chinaman) and skillfully exploited his outsider image in defying Peru’s traditional elites. Toledo, who calls himself “el Cholo” (Indian descent), is broadly popular among the country’s profoundly poor Indian population. Peruvians are also drawn to Toledo’s personal story: his rise from a poor family of 16 children to get a doctorate in economics at Stanford and become a World Bank official and business-school professor in Peru. Toledo unsuccessfully ran for president in 1995.

What distinguishes the current political landscape from that of Fujimori’s two terms in the 1990s is that Fujimori’s opposition is united behind a single candidate. Toledo and his highly disparate and fluid Peru Possible movement have received the backing of all candidates. Though sharp divisions are bound to surface, opposition forces are more cohesive than they have been for years. Furthermore, the dramatic political moment has galvanized Peru’s long-dormant civil society, especially its youth.

To be sure, the opposition’s previous weakness resulted from not only Fujimori’s machinations, but also from his undeniable and formidable accomplishments. In 1990, Fujimori successfully tackled two problems that seemed intractable to many Peruvians: a chaotic economy marked by uncontrolled inflation and a high level of political violence fueled by two active insurgencies. Through a mix of sound policies, cunning and sheer luck, Fujimori brought a measure of order to the economy and bolstered security. The peace he negotiated with neighboring Ecuador in the wake of the 1995 border conflict was another important achievement.

But Fujimori’s accomplishments have been costly. Especially since the mid-1990s, he has increasingly flouted democratic rules. For many observers, the die was cast in April 1992, when Fujimori, in the name of carrying out his battle against inflation and political violence, closed Congress, suspended Peru’s constitution and took over the judiciary. Though the country has a new constitution and new Congress, Fujimori has exercised near-complete control over the country’s major political institutions. Most troubling, he has installed a regime that, to borrow Stein’s term, is “sinister”: Significant power is wielded by sectors of the armed forces and Fujimori’s shadowy intelligence advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos.

Peru has also suffered democratic setbacks in two areas in which notable progress has been made in other Latin American countries: free press and free elections. Both official and independent observers, including the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the Committee to Protect Journalists, have strongly criticized the government’s systematic intimidation and harassment of the country’s major media. Peru’s electoral machinery, including the national election commission, has similarly been subjected to outright government control.

For these reasons, Toledo insists that the runoff be conducted under new conditions--including fair media access and a professional, independent electoral body--to level the playing field and lend the election legitimacy. Whether Fujimori will agree to Toledo’s recommendations and engage in the give-and-take of democratic politics remains to be seen.

Fujimori may try to reinvent himself and use the decision to hold a runoff as a way to cleanse his image. As the incumbent, he can use government resources to his benefit. If any lesson can be derived from his rule thus far, it is that Fujimori should not be underestimated. Ironically, however, the same unified opposition that made it difficult for Fujimori to declare a first-round victory may make it exceedingly difficult for him to win the runoff. He has faced challenges before, but never one as cohesive as that represented by Toledo. Fujimori may eventually regret his decision to run again, whatever the outcome. Even if victorious, he will almost surely have a tough time governing a country that questions his credibility.

From all indications, there was an agonizing battle within the Fujimori government about how to respond to the crisis precipitated by the first-round vote. Hard-liners dug in, reaffirming Peru’s sovereignty and rejecting outside pressures to hold a runoff. But the pressures proved unrelenting.

The OAS and the United States, in a rare display of bipartisanship, played positive roles and sent clear and consistent messages. The regime was unprepared to bear the costs that accompany pariah status on the global stage. The Fujimori government also saw that there were, after all, limits to what many Peruvians would tolerate. The line was crossed. *