The Missile Dilemma

The collapse of the Soviet Union lessened political rivalry on international strategic arms issues but not the urgency of reducing the bloated nuclear arsenals amassed over decades of superpower confrontation. The major advance on this process that came with the signing of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1993 is now finally nearing fruition. Though the U.S. Senate ratified START II in 1996, Communists in Russia’s parliament succeeded for years in blocking action on the treaty. Now Russia has a new leader and a new parliament, and one of President-elect Vladimir V. Putin’s first legislative victories has been to win ratification of the long-stalled pact. That was quickly followed by parliamentary ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting all nuclear explosions, a step the U.S. Senate has shortsightedly refused to take.

START II would cut U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads to no more than 3,500 each by 2007, from the 6,000 permitted under an earlier agreement. Talks have already begun on further reductions--START III--with the Clinton administration suggesting a goal of between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads each. Putin has proposed a 1,500-warhead ceiling, not least because aging arsenals are expensive to maintain. The United States should be able to accept the lower proposed goal for START III without compromising its security; in addition, there would be a considerable cost savings for Washington.

Russia’s Duma didn’t pass START II unconditionally. It authorized Putin to abandon the treaty if the United States went ahead with deployment of a proposed National Missile Defense system, a decision that President Clinton could make this summer.

To build the NMD system would require either abrogating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or winning Moscow’s agreement to amend it. That treaty allowed each side to build one antimissile launch site to offer protection to a localized area. The limited nature of the agreement meant that each side would maintain its deterrent capability and that the strategic balance wouldn’t be affected. NMD would similarly deploy only a limited number of launchers, since it’s intended to defend against a small-scale missile attack from a country like North Korea or Iran, though it would seek to defend the whole of the United States. Russia officially and adamantly opposes any changes in the ABM treaty. But there have been recent hints at high levels that a compromise is possible.

The first need before tinkering with the ABM treaty is to make sure that NMD would be effective, and here significant doubts remain. First, the tests of the system have not been overly impressive. Now a technical evaluation by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Union of Concerned Scientists warns that the proposed $30-billion system could be defeated by simple countermeasures, for example decoy warheads. It also suggests that the release of chemical or biological bomblets would have a similar result.

Political agitation for NMD should not blind decision makers to the potential flaws in the system. National security may well argue for a defense against missile attacks from rogue states, but a defense that fails to protect is a waste and a sham. START II and START III are very much in the national interest. But the technical case for NMD has yet to be proven.