Measured U.S. Support Remains Key to Caucasus

Recently, events in the Caucasus have filled the newspapers: the assassination of top officials in Armenia; Moscow’s military campaign against the Chechens; signals from both Armenia and Azerbaijan of readiness for serious negotiations on the Karabakh conflict; and the signing, under U.S. auspices, of a key agreement to build a Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. These developments demand a serious attempt at resolution of the varied conflicts that plague the Caucasus, particularly the Karabakh dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the bloody struggle between Chechnya and Moscow and the Abkhaz contention in Georgia.

While Washington should staunchly support the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the new states in the Caucasus, it should be careful not to make any commitments it is not willing to fully back. Repeatedly, groups around the globe have relied on U.S proclamations of support for their independence or autonomy, and stood up against U.S. rivals in their region, only to end in a worsened security situation. One of the most tragic examples was when Hungary confronted the Soviet Union in 1956--and the expected U.S. aid never materialized. The United States has too often encouraged groups to take a stand and then failed to deliver, setting them up to be crushed by regional powers, as when the Kurds in Iraq stood up to Saddam Hussein.

The leaders of many of the states of the Caucasus place great faith in Washington’s declarations about its commitment to their sovereignty and to the region’s overall independence. They also view such programs as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Partnership for Peace as a serious Western commitment to the region. In fact, after returning from the celebration of NATO’s 50th anniversary, even such seasoned statesmen as Georgia’s Eduard A. Shevardnadze and Azerbaijan’s Heydar A. Aliyev were inspired to stand up to Moscow, because of what they consider a U.S. commitment. These countries’ confrontations with Russia, however, have often backfired. Moscow has aggressively acted against the leaders in the Caucasus, often using local forces to undermine regimes and threaten them. When U.S. policy is advanced in such a half-hearted manner, not only does it fail to attain its goals, it can actually contribute to destabilization of the region.

In fact, the best way for the West to strengthen the independence of the states in the south Caucasus is to assist in the resolution of the conflicts that afflict the region. This would limit new states’ vulnerability to dictates from neighboring powers and thus enhance U.S. ability to advance its goals in the region. Washington should keep in mind that external forces have long played a major role in the south Caucasus. While local factors have provided the basis for the conflicts, external actors--especially Russia--have played a major role in the escalation of these conflicts into all-out wars.

Russia relates to the south Caucasus with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine for it sees this area as affecting its vital strategic interests. While by no means endorsing Moscow’s behavior or validating Moscow’s view of the region, the U.S. must recognize how Moscow views its own interests and understand that Russia will take significant steps in the Caucasus.

For any peace arrangement to succeed in the new states of the south Caucasus, Russia must perceive that the deal minimally satisfies its interests and that it has a stake in preserving the agreement. If not, Moscow can and will work to undermine the plan. Thus, no Pax-Americana peace should be pursued in the south Caucasus, but rather one supported by Moscow and, preferably, by Turkey as well.

Given these principles, what can be done to help resolve the conflicts in the region? One is the establishment of a Caucasian regional-security zone, encompassing the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and the regions of Karabakh, Abkhazia and possibly Chechnya. Within this coalition, all the units would have equal status. In addition, the latter three would agree, as a condition for receiving this status, that they would not seek political recognition of independence beyond this Caucasian grouping.

The Caucasian zone would be free of all foreign forces, and the members would not join any foreign security alliances: no Russian bases in Armenia and Georgia, no NATO. Assurance that this area will not become a location for Western military forces may create a Russian interest in preserving this agreement. Moreover, including Chechnya could give Moscow a face-saving way out of its costly war with the Chechens without setting a precedent for other potentially defiant regions in Russia.

The time is ripe for a comprehensive settlement of the conflicts in the Caucasus: President Aliyev in Baku is 77 and wants a settlement of the Karabakh issue; Russia needs a clean way to disengage from Chechnya while allowing it to protect its interests in the Caucasus; Washington has upped the profile of its commitment to the building of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline; many in Armenia realize that stability and prosperity are not possible without resolving the Karabakh conflict, and, if transport links with Turkey are not opened soon, Armenia may be bypassed by connections built through Georgia. This window of opportunity will not stay open forever, and actors in the Caucasus should take advantage of the presence of a U.S. administration that is interested and involved in the region. *