Nothing Will Stop Putin’s War

Can the Russians lose the war in Chechnya? Can Vladimir V. Putin lose the March 27 presidential election?

Of course, the broader context of the war is important. Oil at $25 a barrel, the continuing emergence of a real private economy and better central finance are all improving life. All pension arrears have been liquidated, and current pensions are being paid on time, as are government salaries. Many state-owned companies are still losing money and paying little and late, but they amount to a diminishing proportion of the Russian economy. All this favors Putin.

The political context is just as favorable for Putin. He already is acting as a “president of all the Russians,” by conciliating the opposition. His Unity Party voted for the reconfirmation of the present (Communist) speaker of the Duma, in exchange for Communist promises to support Putin’s government. The young economic reformers of the Union of Right Forces and the more liberal Yabloko party were antagonized by the deal with the Communists, but of course both parties must vote for any reformist measures in the Duma. With Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky’s party bought off with a few concessions, only the Fatherland-All Russia party of Yevgeny M. Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri M. Luzhkov remains in foursquare opposition. By joining forces with the Communists, Putin has deprived Primakov of their support, leaving Primakov only with Luzhkov’s Moscow business network and Luzhkov’s allies in some regions. Crucially, no party except for Yabloko opposes the war.

Russians are conquering urban space in Grozny and key positions that control access to the mountains. But the Chechen fighters are not territorial, except in Grozny. Only there does the advance of the Russian forces have a cumulative effect--eventually. But elsewhere, the Chechens operate as part-time guerrillas, melting into the civilian population when the Russians arrive, only to come out to attack before going back into hiding.

A high percentage of Chechen males are potential guerrillas--it is a warrior culture. Historically, empires have dealt with irreconcilable warrior nations by extermination or deportation. But the Russian Federation is already too democratic for that. Therefore, the Kremlin is following the only possible strategy: not to eliminate the threat but to reduce it to “bandits” who can be physically contained in pockets of mountain terrain, and part-time guerrillas who can be controlled. Chronic insecurity will persist but the logic of Putin’s strategy is that an insecure Chechnya is much better than a dangerous Chechnya. Before the war, the whole republic was a base for criminals and at least one violent Islamist group. They could import weapons, train and organize openly. After this war, there still will be bandits and guerrillas, but the threat will be confined inside Chechnya.

It seems that the Russian military command is trying to end large-scale fighting by March 1, well before the presidential elections, while continuing to minimize casualties. Russia’s tactics are accordingly cautious.

That is why the morale of the Russian troops is in much better shape than journalistic reportage would indicate. They know that their lives are not being wasted by foolish tactics as in 1994-96. It is not that journalists are misreporting but rather that there are three distinct categories of troops. Ordinary conscripts guard headquarters, artillery firebases and the roads. They are the ones that journalists can see and interview. They are young, poorly trained, often frightened. Journalists rarely see the servicemen from the elite airborne troops who are actually fighting inside Grozny. They are somewhat older, far better trained and periodically rotated. There are also the OMON armed police, with officers from all over the federation, and it is they who are supposed to secure conquered areas. Inevitably, they suffer the most from guerrilla attacks, but the men are professionals, often right wing. There is no sign that Putin’s war will be stopped by mutiny.

Russian tactics are not gentle, and entirely disregard the safety of the civilians. But no Western army would use any other tactics, because all are at least as averse to casualties as the Russians. No Western government would be pleased if the war was stopped, leaving Chechnya a base for criminals and Islamist fighters.

As for the Russian public, few believe that Chechnya can just be left alone as an independent state. That is Putin’s very strong argument against opponents of the war: How will you protect the surrounding regions if Chechnya is abandoned again? Thus nothing will stop Putin’s war, nor the strictly limited victory that is its aim.