Charting a New Course

The ascension of Bashar Assad to the presidency of Syria raises hopes that a peace treaty between Syria and Israel will be concluded and that a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict may soon be within reach. Peace, and the changes it would bring to Syria and its relations with the West, would lead to a dramatic improvement in the lives of the Syrian people. But the harsh realities of Syrian politics, coupled with the struggle for regional domination among Syria, Iraq and Iran, complicate the prospects for the new ruler’s survival, as well as for movement toward peace.

Bashar’s first priority is to consolidate his power at home and fend off any challenges from abroad. Syria’s political institutions, military and security services, growing middle class, Alawite community and Bashar’s own family must give him enough room to maneuver if the course of history is to change.

Bashar must decide whether to continue the harsh, repressive policies of his father Hafez, known as “Hama rules,” or relax the regime’s grip on the lives of its people and provide them with a measure of independence. Bashar’s success will depend on his choice.

The institutions of the state--the Baath Party and parliament--rubber-stamped the former president’s instructions to modify the constitution so Bashar could come to power. But gaining the popular support of Syria’s nascent middle class, the key to the country’s political and economic development, will be more of a challenge.

Bashar has been striving to cultivate middle-class support by characterizing himself as a reformer unafraid to crack down on corrupt government officials. The most notable casualty of his anticorruption campaign was the former prime minister, Mahmoud Zubi, who committed suicide last month rather than face trial. Although it’s difficult to evaluate the impact of Bashar’s campaign on Syrian public opinion, it certainly signals his willingness to take tough action against members of his own community who might stand in the way of economic reform.

The military and security services pose a more difficult test. Aware of the contempt felt by Syria’s traditional military leadership toward his son, Hafez Assad removed the commanders of the army, air force, military security and the general security directorate and replaced them with younger officers who swore fealty to Bashar. These steps, while prudent as long as his father ruled, bode ill for the son. The military and intelligence establishment paid a heavy price to preserve Assad’s regime. Dissent was ruthlessly suppressed, and promotion was based more on loyalty than professionalism. Bashar must assume that some of these displaced officers, bitter over their preemptory dismissals after years of loyal service, will conspire with serving officers and foreign and domestic opponents to overthrow the new regime.

Until Hafez Assad seized power in 1970, military coups were the standard instrument of political change in Syria. Ironically, the men who the former president fired are largely responsible for stopping this practice. It would not be surprising now to see a resurgence of coup plotting, by either the old or the new guard.

But Bashar’s most difficult challenge will be gaining the confidence and support of his immediate family and the Alawite community. His uncle, Rifaat, has already expressed an eagerness to contest Bashar, as has another uncle, Jamil. Rifaat lives in exile in London, having tried unsuccessfully to overthrow his brother in 1983, but maintains a bastion of support inside Syria. Although many of the disgruntled old guard despise Rifaat for his corrupt, excessive behavior, they may rally behind him, at least temporarily, to settle scores and regain their former positions.

Despite the appointment of Sunni Muslims to prominent government and business posts, Syria suffers from serious ethnic divisions. Syrian society is rife with mistrust, injustice and inequality of opportunity. It is by no means clear that Bashar can preserve his base within the Alawite community and create genuine opportunities for the Sunni majority to fully participate in the political and economic life of Syria.

Many Sunnis are likely to exploit Bashar’s flexibility and exact revenge on the Alawites for the decades of suppression they have endured. In the end, Alawite elders may turn on Bashar if he proves unwilling to stand up to Sunni assertiveness, or if his political and economic reforms threaten their status.

All these domestic challenges reduce the likelihood that Bashar will make peace with Israel any time soon. Syria’s internal balance of power did not change just because the old man died.

The regional situation further militates against peace. Both Iran and Iraq seek influence in Damascus. Although the most likely battleground between these rivals is Lebanon, an attempt by Baghdad to foment subversion inside Syria to install a pro-Iraqi regime cannot be ruled out.

The long-standing struggle between Iraq and Syria for regional dominance is both bitter and bloody. It has mostly been played out in Lebanon in the form of terrorist attacks against the respective countries’ diplomats, agents and allies. But Iraqi President Saddam Hussein no doubt wants to avenge Syria’s participation in the Gulf War coalition in 1990-91 and Damascus’ alliance with Iran throughout the decade-long Iraq-Iran war. Bashar should be wary of Iraqi peace overtures while demonstrating his commitment to Arab solidarity.

The Iranian regime may try to capitalize on Bashar’s domestic preoccupations by attempting to strengthen its influence in Lebanon. In the wake of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah victory in south Lebanon and the death of Hafez, who kept Hezbollah on a tight leash, Tehran will be tempted to encourage Hezbollah to seek greater influence in Beirut, thereby testing the limits of Bashar’s ability to preserve Syria’s dominance in Lebanon.

Greater Iranian influence in Lebanon, especially if it comes at the expense of Syria, does not bode well for security of Israel or U.S. interests in the Middle East. In light of Iran’s strong opposition to the Middle East peace process, any attempt by Bashar to renew talks with Israel could be accompanied by Iranian activism in Lebanon.

Foreign dignitaries attending his father’s funeral urged Bashar to take advantage of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the desire of the government of Israel to withdraw from most, if not all of the Golan Heights, to resume the peace talks as soon as possible. Bashar asserted that he intends to follow his “father’s path,” which suggests that he is willing to resume peace talks with Israel. Whether this path includes greater flexibility toward how much of the Golan Heights must be returned to Syria before peace can be made remains to be seen.

Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and the Gulf states also are likely to encourage Bashar to show greater flexibility in peace talks with Israel. Although the economic assistance they can provide is important, pan-Arab politics may offer Bashar a measure of political cover to compromise with Israel. Even Yasser Arafat, a longtime rival of his father, has nudged the Syrians to make peace.

But reaching a compromise with Israel is the last thing on Bashar’s mind.