Palestinian Rioting: A Fury Born of Control

Israeli military commanders insist that the war they are fighting against Palestinians in the streets is an outburst carefully orchestrated from on high by Yasser Arafat--the “instigated moves in the chess game of negotiations,” as one senior officer put it.

Palestinians insist otherwise--that the clashes raging since Thursday started as the spontaneous eruption of a furious and frustrated people who have given up on talking about peace. Not only did the Palestinian Authority president not order it, they say, he cannot completely control it.

The truth includes elements of both views.

The violence of the past six days combines the spontaneous rioting of thousands of Palestinian youths, some too young to remember the uprising of a decade ago, and a more organized armed response from members of Arafat’s security forces and the militia-style factions of his Fatah political movement.

By far, Arafat has more control over his people than any other Palestinian figure. But he must also take into consideration local strongmen, political leaders and, most important, the anger of the average Palestinian.

The current unrest differs notably from the intifada, the 1987-93 rebellion against Israeli military occupation that began as a popular uprising and only belatedly came under the control of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

A combustible succession of events sparked fury that was both genuine and manipulated, and that may have surprised Palestinian and Israeli leaders by its intensity.

First: The intrusion, as Palestinians saw it, of right-wing Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon onto the hallowed grounds of the Al Aqsa mosque here Thursday, and the attack the next day by Israeli troops on Muslim worshipers after Friday prayers. (The Israeli forces were responding to stones thrown at Jews praying at the nearby Western Wall on the eve of the Rosh Hashana holiday.)

Then: What Palestinians saw as a desecration only got worse with what they saw as heavy-handed Israeli military tactics in the days that followed, namely the use of helicopter gunships, antitank missiles and tanks to quell escalating violence.

The killing of a 12-year-old Palestinian boy, captured on television in horrifying images that have become the quintessential symbol of Palestinian martyrdom, added more fuel to the fire.

Palestinian television and radio, dominated by Arafat, broadcast these developments nonstop, with live, often excited coverage. Some of the reports were interspersed with file footage accompanied by a voice chanting, “Where are the masses? Where is the anger? Where is the pride?”

Many Palestinians argue that Arafat shouldn’t try to--and, in any event, couldn’t--stop the unrest.

“If he had acted immediately [to stop the violence], he would have been seen as a collaborator with the occupier,” said Mahdi Abdul Hadi, director of a Palestinian think tank in Jerusalem and occasional advisor to the Palestinian Authority leadership.

Abdul Hadi thinks that Arafat will act to constrain his forces once he is convinced that Israel and the West have gotten the message that there are limits on the concessions he can make to negotiate a final peace treaty--that Muslim sovereignty over the Al Aqsa compound is sacrosanct. And Arafat will respond to pressure from Arab countries such as Jordan and Egypt, where leaders are nervously eyeing a wave of sympathy demonstrations in their countries and believe it may be time to pacify the streets, Abdul Hadi said.

Israeli military officers, and some government officials, reiterated Tuesday that they expect Arafat to rein in the fighting. In some spots, such as the especially violent Gaza Strip, Palestinian police were seen Tuesday, apparently for the first time in the current unrest, attempting to block demonstrators. But clashes between Palestinians and Israelis resumed later in the day.

Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel’s acting foreign minister and public security minister, said Tuesday that Arafat may indeed be giving the order to halt gunfire but that the Fatah militias, under the direction of veteran Fatah youth leader Marwan Barghouti, may not be obeying. “The next few days will tell whether [Arafat] is in control or not,” Ben-Ami said.

Palestinian and some Israeli analysts say that viewing the violence as the result of one man’s machinations is simplistic and allows Israelis to dismiss or ignore the real anger and hatred that lie below the surface. That view doesn’t take into consideration the complex ways Arafat plays Palestinian organizations against each other, rewarding some, punishing others, always to emerge with the most power.

If Arafat’s control is not absolute, it raises a question about the way Israel and the United States deal with him as the singular Palestinian leader who alone decides all matters of importance.

Nahum Barnea, a leading Israeli newspaper commentator, summed up the dismay and confusion among his fellow countrymen: If Arafat did order the riots, then Israel is dealing with him too leniently; if he did not, then the nation’s security chiefs are mistaken and giving bad advice to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.

“It is the Israelis’ right to know whether Arafat is with us or against us, whether he is the architect of the riots--or their victim,” Barnea wrote.

Gershon Baskin, who heads a joint Palestinian-Israeli research center based in the West Bank city of Bethlehem and often mediates between the two sides, believes that much of the most serious violence was directed by senior Palestinian political and military officers.

He notes that most of the shooting from the Palestinian side came from the so-called Tanzim, an armed faction of Fatah, or from uniformed police officers, neither of whom would be likely to act so broadly without orders.

And most of the crowds who throng to the demonstrations are young males, not the women and children who were a mainstay of the intifada.

One reason for that is a widespread alienation that Palestinians were already experiencing and that has led to disaffection with Arafat.

“The political people need some dead and wounded--this is their plan,” said 25-year-old Jihad Tahq as she emerged from a funeral in the West Bank town of Ramallah for a Palestinian youth killed the day before. “It’s the politicians on both sides that play games with our blood.”

Palestinians join the demonstrations, she said, not because of Arafat’s needs but because of what they have seen Israeli soldiers do.

Once Arafat decides to restore order in the West Bank and Gaza, he faces two obstacles: He is reluctant to use lethal force against his own people, and mounting Palestinian casualties have hardened the resolve of gunmen from Fatah and the security services.

“I think Arafat was more surprised than [the Israelis] at the extent and way the street exploded,” said Khalil Shikaki, a respected public opinion researcher.

“Arafat relies on his own instinct and judgment, rather than on careful analytical examination and hard evidence,” Shikaki said. “He is not out of touch. He quickly learns when confronted by a situation. He knew it could be very serious, but the extent of the intensity of the feeling is the surprising part.”