Take the Missile Defense Debate to a Higher Level
This weekend, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld meets European defense ministers outside of Munich for a two-day conference on U.S. plans for a national missile defense system, effectively opening debate on an issue that threatens to undermine, if not split, the NATO alliance. The meeting is important not only because it will set the tone for future talks between the Europeans and the Bush administration, which has already promised to weigh allied opinions heavily in final consideration of a missile shield deployment, but also because it will give Rumsfeld the opportunity to transform the debate by refocusing it on the issue of security commitments.
During the meeting, Rumsfeld and his team will be presented with well-honed, decades-old arguments against the missile defense system. For the most part, the chorus will be in harmony, sounding off on familiar positions such as the adequacy of classic nuclear deterrence and concerns about the state of Russian relations. The arms control refrain will be particularly strong, with the allies portending arms races with Russia and China if the U.S. moves forward with its plans. There may even be some disagreement over the pace of nuclear and missile proliferation.
Missing from the European’s argument, however, will be recognition of a central truth--indeed, the driving force behind the American plan: that the U.S., because of its security commitments abroad, could face more dire consequences than the Europeans if North Korea, Iran or Iraq gain the ability to hit the U.S. homeland with weapons of mass destruction. These rogue states (now officially “states of concern”) continue to pursue nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Having undoubtedly drawn lessons from the Gulf War, they understand that the conventionally superior U.S. must be kept out of their future regional conflicts if they are to achieve their aggressor goals. A minimal nuclear deterrent, which could be brandished in a crisis, might make the next Saddam Hussein think, however incorrectly, that he could attack his neighbors, perhaps even U.S. allies, without risking interference by American forces.
Our European allies, on the other hand, do not share this strategic situation and, consequently, have not made national missile defense a priority. They have no commitment on the Korean Peninsula and--except for Britain’s contribution to the “no-fly zones” over Iraq--no significant military commitment in the Middle East. Although their contributions to peacekeeping missions are admirable and noteworthy, such missions, for which the European Union is now planning its independent rapid-reaction force, will probably not put the European continent in danger of missile attacks.
Other factors suggest that the Europeans do not anticipate war with these states. Deeper political relationships with North Korea, Iran and Iraq, as well as better-developed economic interests in the Middle East, typify a more relaxed posture toward them. German investment in Iran is particularly strong, for example, and France’s diplomatic support of Iraq at the United Nations, however troubling, is most likely anchored to potentially lucrative petroleum deals there.
More important, a lack of military capabilities on the part of our European allies probably precludes major military action against North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Without the lift and information assets that modern, large-scale operations require, Europe’s armies will most likely stay close to home in the foreseeable future.
In meeting with the Europeans so soon on this matter, Rumsfeld is not only signaling the priority President Bush places on a national missile defense system but also the importance he places on maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance. Now is the time to elevate the national missile defense dialogue to a new level. To be sure, arms control, nuclear deterrence and Russian relations need to be addressed, but Rumsfeld can begin a new chapter in the debate by engaging his counterparts in a frank discussion about security commitments and how they color both sides’ strategic perceptions. Challenging them to have this dialogue could also help to shed light on a second, larger alliance issue the administration is unlikely to escape down the road: NATO’s role in the post-Cold War era.