Sub’s ‘Black Box’ Called a ‘Gold Mine’

Federal investigators probing the deadly collision between a U.S. submarine and a Japanese fishing trawler said Wednesday that they now have the information from the sub’s “black box,” which should help determine how the crew failed to realize that the trawler was virtually overhead.

The data recorder should show what sonar information was available to the crew about other ships in the area when the Greeneville’s commanding officer gave the order for a rapid ascent, called an “emergency blow.”

“This is a gold mine,” said John Hammerschmidt, investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board. “It’s like hitting the mother lode of information.”

After the Feb. 9 accident, Navy officials told NTSB investigators that they were unsure whether any recorded video, sonar or audio information was available, but they pledged to investigate. “As it turns out, there was data there,” and the information was turned over by the Navy, Hammerschmidt said.

Still, he warned against expecting any quick determination about what went wrong and who, if anyone, should be blamed.

“We have seven columns of information--including time--and almost 500 sheets in hard copy, every second of the voyage,” Hammerschmidt said. “We’ve got a lot of work ahead in analyzing this.”

The 6,600-ton nuclear-powered submarine collided with the Ehime Maru, which served as a training school for the Japanese fishing industry, just nine miles off the Honolulu coast. The trawler sank within 10 minutes; 26 people were rescued, but nine others--including four teenage students--are missing and presumed dead.

On Monday, the Navy will convene a court of inquiry into the incident and decide whether to recommend criminal charges against any Navy personnel. Its probe is separate from the NTSB investigation.

Sixteen civilians were in the sub’s control room when the collision occurred. One senior enlisted man has told NTSB investigators that the visitors crowded around his workstation and that he was unable to complete his job of plotting sonar data in a written log intended for the officers’ use during the voyage.

“What he was telling us was that, because of all the activity on board, he stopped maintaining the plot,” Hammerschmidt said.

There is no indication that failure to plot all sonar data on the written log contributed to the collision. The same sonar data were available on display screens in the control room, although one of those screens was inoperative.

But the comment by the fire-control technician, who has 15 years’ experience, does provide an insight into the conditions in the control room just before the collision. The Navy and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld have said that the presence of civilians played no role in the incident.

Also Wednesday, the Coast Guard continued searching for survivors, and the Navy’s remote-controlled undersea vehicles surveyed the trawler’s wreckage in 2,000 feet of water. Despite a request from the Japanese government, the Navy has yet to decide whether to attempt to recover the Ehime Maru.

The court of inquiry, with three admirals hearing testimony, will focus on the actions of the sub’s three top officers: Cmdr. Scott Waddle, the commanding officer; Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, the executive officer; and Lt. j.g. Michael J. Coen, the officer of the deck.

The three have declined to speak to the NTSB until the Navy investigation is complete.

NTSB investigators have said that the Ehime Maru was among several ships that the Greeneville had been tracking on its sonar. Yet to be answered is how the sub, one of the Navy’s most advanced, failed to realize how dangerously close the trawler was.

Retired Adm. Archie Clemins, a former submariner and commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said the scenario that seems most plausible to him is that the fishing trawler and the sub were headed directly toward each other.

If that were the case, Clemins said, the sub’s sonar would have had difficulty distinguishing the trawler from other vessels in the area and might have mistaken it for a smaller and slower vessel--thus overestimating its distance from the sub.

If the trawler were heading directly toward the sub, its noisy propellers would have been muffled by its 190-foot-long hull. Also, some trawlers have extensive soundproofing to keep engine noise from scaring away schools of fish.

On a choppy day, with swells up to 10 feet, the sub’s commanding officer could have misidentified the trawler on his periscope inspection, or missed it altogether, Clemins said.

Thus the commanding officer could have determined it was safe for the sub to execute the rapid surfacing maneuver, in which air is forced into the main ballast tanks and the sub rockets to the surface.

Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, Clemins’ successor, has said that the commanding officer ordered such a maneuver as a “demonstration” for the 16 civilians aboard.

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Times special correspondent Essoyan reported from Honolulu and Times staff writer Perry from San Diego.