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Don’t Rule Out a Deal Between Sharon, Arafat

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Nicholas Rasmussen is an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1996 to 2000, he was a member of the State Department's Middle East peace process team

As Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon launches his national unity government, prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace seem poor. Most analysts predict more of the same for the period ahead: violence, bitterness and mutual recrimination. And given the track records of the two protagonists, it is not a bad bet.

But such an outcome is not inevitable. Indeed it is possible to envision some form of cooperation developing between Sharon and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as both conclude that none of their choices are good ones and the status quo is too painful to endure.

For Sharon, the logic of aiming for something less than the “big” deal on permanent status is compelling on its face, and he has already talked of developing new interim arrangements with the Palestinians. On most issues--sovereignty over Jerusalem, status of settlements, security in the Jordan Valley, Palestinian refugees--his bottom line positions cannot possibly meet Palestinian expectations or aspirations. He also carries a tremendous amount of negative baggage internationally and most leaders expect him to fail in his dealings with the rest of the Arab world.

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A limited agreement has the virtue of setting aside problems that cannot be solved right now and demonstrating that he can do business with Arabs.

For Palestinians, for whom the Oslo process has been a saga of delayed gratification and unmet expectations, accepting the logic of more interim arrangements will not come easily. In their eyes, such arrangements are an excuse for Israel to avoid dealing with Palestinian claims. Still, there may be something of value for Palestinians in another interim accommodation, particularly if the choice is between something and nothing.

Palestinian politics might also push Arafat in this direction. Arafat, ever the clever tactician but rarely the master strategist, has not developed a plan for translating the political success of the intifada into gains at the negotiating table.

Since last September, Arafat and his Palestinian Authority have ridden the wave of street violence and public anger. While this new intifada has highlighted the Palestinian struggle, it has also undermined Arafat’s standing as its undisputed leader. The Palestinian Authority has itself been on the receiving end of some of that public anger because of its corrupt and heavy-handed practices. Achieving modest but tangible results through negotiations, particularly return of more interim land and easing of Israeli security measures, could swing the pendulum back toward Arafat and away from the street.

Any minimally acceptable arrangement for Sharon must include an end to violence and real Palestinian Authority action to rein in paramilitary groups and combat terrorists. For the Palestinians, any deal with Sharon must include the return of more West Bank land (to increase contiguity and reduce friction), recognition of Palestinian statehood and a freeze on Israeli settlement activity.

Sharon has talked openly about the reality of a Palestinian state and pledged to return more land to make the Palestinian entity more viable.

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But a real freeze on settlement activity would break new ideological ground for Likud and could be more than Sharon can swallow. At the same time, continued settlement activity, even so-called natural growth, is likely a deal-breaker for Arafat. Further delays could only be sold to the Palestinians if there is a real Israeli commitment to stop building on the land that is supposedly the subject of negotiations.

Conventional wisdom, echoed by Secretary of State Colin Powell after his get-acquainted visit to Sharon and Arafat, holds that Middle East peace is hidden behind a locked door at the end of a long, dark hallway. And there is much to be pessimistic about: violence that has left more than 400 dead since September, hardening positions on all of the key issues and mutual suspicion about each other’s intentions. That said, there may be room for limited arrangements that meet the minimal short-term needs of both sides: increased security for Israelis and modest but tangible improvement in the daily lives of Palestinians. It may not seem like much, but in the Middle East, even gains that are measured in inches rather than miles are important ones.

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