America Can Still Sway the U.N.

The recent loss of the U.S. seat on the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission is symptomatic of a troubling trend in our multilateral relations. We are the world’s sole superpower but, for all our muscle in multilateral settings, we often find ourselves on the defensive, trapped and on the losing end of important fights.

The Human Rights Commission vote is only the latest example. We also have been backed into a corner over sanctions against Iraq.

And when anti-Israel measures are introduced at the U.N., the U.S. must fend them off virtually alone.

Yet sometimes we beat the odds: In December, the U.S. achieved a historic deal on our back dues to the U.N. with other nations agreeing to pay more so that the U.S.--the richest country in the world--could pay less. In September, we kept favorite candidate Sudan, which the State Department identifies as a sponsor of terrorism, off the Security Council.

With the rising influence of multilateral forums on key issues--including Iraq, human rights, the environment and trade--the U.S. needs a clear strategy to win in these arenas.

The era of the U.S. as multilateral political “boss” is over. To prevail in a system with competing centers of power, the U.S. needs a campaign apparatus aimed at winning countries over through persuasion and leverage.

First, we must understand the limits of our own power. Take the Human Rights Commission vote.

Many in Washington assumed that, as a powerful, founding and vocal commission member, reelection of the U.S. was assured.

That is not how U.N. decisions are made. When U.N. members vote, the best interests of the institution as a whole is but one of many considerations.

The U.N. is made up of voting blocs--including the nonaligned movement and the European Union--whose commitment to one another often trumps all else.

In addition to having no regional alliance, the U.S. abstains from an increasingly widespread U.N. practice of vote-swapping.

As a result, even close allies often decline to support us because they have commitments of reciprocity with others.

Not only does the abstract fact of U.S. power not guarantee victory, it can be a liability. Resenting our status, some nations view international norms as a way to put us in our place.

By presuming that our role on the Human Rights Commission was unassailable, we goaded others into challenging us.

After all, what’s the downside? They know the U.S. won’t unleash its arsenal each time someone votes against us and, absent that danger, the practical consequences of opposing the U.S. may be nil.

For secret votes like the Human Rights Commission election, U.S. diplomats know from experience that promises of support mean little, since no one wants to admit they will oppose us, and betrayals cannot be detected.

This does not render the U.S. a helpless giant. We have unparalleled influence at the U.N. and the ability to prevail on just about any issue if we put our mind to it.

That means using our diplomatic apparatus to mount powerful arguments to win over key allies.

The cornerstone of multilateral advocacy efforts is persuasion tailored to influence individual countries that, in turn, shape the positions of different blocs.

With our network of embassies and bilateral ties, we are better equipped than any other nation to make a convincing case to each and every decision-maker.

Although U.S. diplomats said they campaigned for the Human Rights Commission, we could have won the fight by visiting ambassadors in New York and Washington and foreign ministries in capitals around the world to stress the importance of keeping the U.S. on the panel. Such efforts are time-consuming and labor intensive but--as the U.N. dues issue and Sudan illustrate--they work.

Unfortunately, our diplomatic apparatus is not set up to facilitate aggressive advocacy on multilateral issues. Too often, our “campaigning” on issues like the Human Rights Commission is limited to rote communiques faxed to foreign ministry functionaries.

On priority issues, we need to make our ambassadors accountable for delivering the support of their host countries and to equip them with the tools to make a strong case.

We also need to be prepared to use a carrots-and-sticks strategy to win support.

Most nations count the United States among their most important bilateral relationships, a position that confers substantial leverage.

While open vote-swapping might trigger retaliation, there are ways of letting countries that we have relations with know in advance that their backing is needed and will be rewarded.

This does not mean that the U.S. should demand lock-step support from aid recipients and trading partners, or that Washington would disrupt important policy initiatives when affected countries fail to toe our line.

The breadth of our bilateral relationships makes possible nuanced rewards and disincentives that won’t compromise our principles.

To win in the multilateral arena, the U.S. must rely not on power alone but on persuasion and targeted use of bilateral leverage to break down opposing alliances. Failure to sharpen these tools may mean that in an increasingly interdependent, multilateral world the U.S. will find itself increasingly out in the cold.