Bin Laden Types Soften With Legitimacy

After the Sept. 11 attacks, Americans were shocked to learn how deeply our government is hated in some parts of the world. Most also fear the type of Islamic state--based on the puritanical and strict strain of Islam known as Wahhabism--that many in the Middle East apparently dream of creating.

But suppose revolutionaries succeeded in establishing a fundamentalist regime in one or more Middle Eastern states, as almost happened in Algeria. Would this be a disaster for the U.S.?

Not necessarily.

To understand why, we must also understand why so many Muslims find this dream attractive. Look closely at Osama bin Laden’s image, and you see no cleric, no mullah. The camouflage fatigues and automatic rifle at hand recall no one more than Che Guevara.

Bin Laden wants to be the Guevara of the Islamic world.

As all revolutionaries do, he speaks about injustice and oppression. Many Middle Eastern countries have not fared well in the capitalist world system. Their economies are feeble, their political regimes undemocratic, their leaders contemptuous of the wishes and desires of the masses.

In the absence of any realistic alternatives, it is not so difficult to convince these masses that an Islamic regime might better serve their interests.

Iran is the closest example of such a regime. There, a fundamentalist-led revolution unseated the U.S.-backed shah. As a result, the U.S. lost political influence and markets for our goods, especially armaments.

What would be the likely implications of a Wahhabi regime in the Middle East for our two greatest current concerns: international terrorism and oil?

Consider international terrorism. Would such a regime expose us to an increased risk of terrorism? In fact, there is good reason to expect that the terrorist threat would be decreased.

Bin Laden is particularly dangerous because he is a roving bandit. His whereabouts are mysterious and subject to change. Give someone like him a government, and two things would happen. His regime would be forced to become at least somewhat accountable to his supporters. He would have to deliver the goods, or an opposition would brew against him. He also would become stationary. That means we would know how to get to him.

What about the implications for oil, the geopolitical issue that has always loomed largest in the Middle East?

Here, too, the easy answer may be wrong.

Since the supply of oil is essential to the world economy, we fear that a fundamentalist regime (say, in Saudi Arabia) might cut off that supply, thus crippling the global economy. But to what end? All governments are revenue mongers, and the revenue from oil exports are as green as tax receipts and far easier to extract. Iran happens to be a member in good standing of OPEC.

In short, economic realities are just as likely to dictate oil policy in a fundamentalist regime as it would in a secular Islamic one.

U.S. foreign policy has long been inconsistent, especially in the Middle East. Apart from its steadfast support of Israel, our government also extends its embrace to “friendly” Islamic regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf, among others.

Although our leaders continually proclaim that dedication to democracy and self-determination is the linchpin of our national interest, Israel is the only country in the region that meets these criteria.

We should not let our antipathy to Islamic fundamentalism trump our commitment to self-determination. To defeat the Bin Ladens of the world, we should pay greater heed to our own rhetoric.